

Remarks by

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Non-Lethal Weapons - Let's Make it Happen

For the last few years, we have been debating the concept of Non-lethal weapons and capabilities.

The theory is that technology will bring new concepts to the battlefield that will make the soldier's job safer and potentially reduce the loss of life and property.

This promise of broadening the commander's options, and thus allowing for a graduated response capability has long been the aim of our research and technology centers.

Unfortunately, as is often the case, expectations far outstrip reality and we have to wait for a catastrophic event to really stimulate the process.

Non-lethal weapons are in danger of falling into that category of tomorrow's weapon. They may very well always be a weapon of the future if we do not do something about this concept.

Over the past two days, many people from diverse backgrounds and organizations have talked about moving Non-lethal weapons from the laboratory into the operational arena, but are hamstrung by institutional inertia and bureaucratic red tape.

We must change the perception that "Non-lethal is the stuff that never happens."

This is a riot baton. It has a place in history. Once you use it, you are engaged for good or bad.

"Why do our troops and law enforcement people just have two choices?"

"Why do we continue to put our young men and women in situations where they must decide between using deadly force or risk possible injury and death?"

Most of the post-Cold War missions our forces face today fall in the "other-than-war" category on the conflict spectrum.

Whether it's U.S. forces in Somalia, IFOR troops in Bosnia, QRF in Panama or either Haiti or Guantanamo Bay Cuba, we have all faced operational situations where Non-lethal weapons and capabilities were needed but unavailable.

The requirement for non-lethal weapons and capability is well-known. Congress gave us \$38 million to invest in non-lethal development, and now Dr. Kaminski is conducting a program review to ensure DoD gets its money's worth.

I know that the Services have been bringing non-lethal concepts through their respective RDA activities for several years. You have heard and seen some of the indications of that work over the past two days.

Yet our existing weapons' development, procurement, training and equipping policies have not kept pace with the emerging needs for non- and less-lethal weapons. We must move on to the next step of either creating or empowering the sponsors of this technology.

This nation should no longer tolerate dedicated, professional troops equipped with the wrong tools for new, more complex missions.

In the CNN era, an individual's decision to use or not use deadly force is no longer merely a tactical decision. The implications of the decision will be immediately broadcast to every capital in the world. It therefore has a strategic dimension.

Today, the NATO and non-NATO troops in Bosnia that make up the Implementation Force or IFOR are in a very difficult situation. They obviously have sufficient power to counter any armed adversary. But what about the unarmed demonstrator?

What are the implications for the IFOR mission if they are forced to use deadly force to break through a threatening demonstration or roadblock?

The same holds true for a non-combatant evacuation. The ability of our forces to control a situation without prematurely resorting to deadly force could mean the difference between a permissive and a non-permissive situation. Non-lethal weapons provide that capability.

Readiness

All Geographic CINCs want the capability/flexibility that NLW weapons provide--- but they are still limited by the TO & E of the units provided to them.

In Haiti, we used a tiger-team approach with the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) activities of a particular Service to address requirements for non-lethal

capabilities. We were able to accomplish safety and legal screening, acquire the non-lethal devices, and train the troops before deploying them with these capabilities. When these units were about to complete their tour in Haiti, we wanted to leave their non-lethal capability in place and transfer it to the units replacing them.

The mission had not changed, but the service carrying out the mission had. Working through the road blocks to transfer those devices across service boundaries was time consuming and should not have been necessary.

As a supported CINC, and a force provider of most of the combat forces in CONUS, I want to know that the units I'm getting or sending forward have similar capabilities. It makes no sense to break OPTEMPO or PERSTEMPO goals of specific units, for example a MP company, when either a Marine company or Air Force Security Flight could provide the same capability with the proper equipment and training.

That also goes for active and reserve forces. In today's active-reserve integrated force structure, a supported CINC shouldn't have to settle for a reduced capability when they get a reserve force.

When one considers that National Guard forces are often the first DoD forces called on to respond to civil disturbance in this country, it makes no sense for them not to have the latest non-lethal technology as part of their standard equipment.

The Challenge

My challenge to all in this room, and the organizations you represent, is to respond to these new requirements.

It is time for these various service programs to be pulled out of the lab and put into the operational arena to be tested against actual requirements and priorities; to be tested against realistic scenarios.

The S&T laboratories need to explore the best that science and technology has to offer. Bring us your best ideas. Transfer your mature ideas to industry.

Let's move beyond the close-quarters technology and explore innovative ways in which our troops can control situations and disable suspect vehicles, go-fast boats and aircraft on the ground without placing themselves in danger or allowing the smugglers or perpetrators to go free.

Industry has a great opportunity to invest in non-lethal weapons. The requirements, and therefore the market, are already there.

The Services have the mission and resources to develop concepts, doctrine, training and logistics to get non-lethal weapons out of the laboratories and into the hands of the troops who need them. You have been bringing these ideas along through the RDA systems. But

The ultimate "users" of non-lethal weapons and capabilities---the Combatant CINCs---need to better articulate their "joint" requirements for these weapons.

I noticed that no other Geographic CINC has clearly stated the requirement for less or non-lethal weapons in their Integrated Priority Lists. We need to revisit this requirement and focus more on capabilities rather than on specific platforms.

USACOM is currently in discussion with OSD and JCS to develop and sponsor non-lethal weapons as a separate ACTD for FY97 if not sooner. Such an ACTD will give us the proper level of focus on the whole area of non-lethal weapons and concepts.

The ACTD process is an appropriate vehicle to bring together the joint warfighter requirements and the technologies that hold the most promise.

It is time to accept the challenge to meet the changing realities before us. Non-lethal weapons must be part of today's tool kit.