The peninsula of Korea had long been dominated by neighboring nations. Initially a part of the Chinese empire, by the sixteenth century, it was a battleground for Japanese and Chinese control. Early in the twentieth century, Russia also joined the battle. By 1911, Korea had become a colony of Japan, a status it retained until after World War II. In 1945, it was split into two states: the north with assistance from the Soviet Union and the south with advisors from the United States.1 When the United Nations proposed free elections in the two states, North Korea refused to participate, resulting in the creation of the Republic of Korea in the South (non-communist) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the North (communist). Shortly after American and Soviet forces were withdrawn, the Communist North Korean People’s Army staged the invasion of South Korea that began the three-year conflict often referred to as “the Forgotten War,” a lethal combination of communist aggression, ancient rivalry, and United States “containment” policy.
On 25 June 1950, the North Korean army crossed south of the 38th Parallel, the latitudinal border between North and South Korea. Within a few hours of their invasion, the North Koreans had taken several towns and, by the end of the first day, their troops were encamped just 17 miles north of Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea.2 When North Korean planes began to attack Seoul two days later, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the United States Far East Command, called American naval and air forces into action. The first ground troops would not arrive until 5 July.3 Initially required to provide air support for the evacuation of American nationals, the Far East Air Force (FEAF), commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, soon found itself assuming a much larger role in the conflict. Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee stated that the “future course of hostilities may depend largely on whether [the] United States will or will not give adequate air assistance.”4 Indeed, early in the war, FEAF established air superiority over the battlefield, allowing the United Nations army to repel the communist forces and eventually bring them to the bargaining table for an armistice.
By the time the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, the conflict had drawn in a United Nations armed force encompassing troops from the United States, Australia, South Africa, Greece, Canada, Great Britain and 16 other nations around the world. United States air units, including those from the Air Force, Navy, and Marines, provided the majority of the aircraft and aviation personnel used during the war. The United States Air Force alone provided 85 percent of the land-based combat-committed aircraft under the operational control of FEAF. The Republic of Korea Air Force, flying United States-built F-51 fighter-bombers, made up another 5.3 percent, and allied countries, especially Australia and South Africa, made up approximately 3.5 percent of the air power used in Korea.5
At the time of FEAF’s initial involvement, it was composed of three numbered air forces: the Fifth in Japan, the Thirteenth in the Philippines, and the Twentieth in Guam. Altogether, these forces had 1,172 aircraft, including 504 F-80s, 47 F-51s, 42 F-82s, 73 B-26s, 27 B-29s, 179 transports, 48 reconnaissance aircraft, and 252 miscellaneous types (T-6, SB-17, T-33, and L-5).6 Of this inventory, however, only 657 were combat-ready or available for service in Korea. The United States Air Force immediately initiated Project HOLDOFF to recondition mothballed aircraft and ready them for combat in Korea. As the war continued, the Air Force also deployed newly developed aircraft to the Far East, including the F-86, F-94, C-119, and C-124.
Throughout the war, the United States Air Force flew over 720,000 sorties for a variety of missions.7 One of the Air Force’s primary activities involved air campaigns over North Korea in order to gain control of the air space and prevent damaging attacks by communist aircraft. Within a month, United Nations troops flying F-80s and F-82s had forced North Korean aircraft out of the skies, and kept them out for the next three months.8 The propeller-driven F-51 was also critical to this aspect of air operations, and some F-80 jet squadrons were reequipped with the older planes because of their extended range and their ability to carry both bombs and napalm at the same time.
China entered the war on the side of the North Koreans in the winter of 1950. In November, with the appearance of the jet-powered MiG-15 flown by Chinese pilots, achieving and maintaining air superiority became more challenging for the United Nations. These Soviet-built swept-wing aircraft were 100 miles per hour faster than the American F-80C and could out-climb the jet-powered American F-86A, introduced to service in December 1950. The MiG’s performance advantage was especially notable at higher altitudes, but the F-86 had better flying qualities and was a more stable gun platform. Additionally, American pilots proved to be more capable than their communist counterparts, which helped to even the odds. Soon, however, Soviet pilots fortified the ranks of the less skilled North Korean and Chinese pilots, and the communist fleet grew to more than 900 MiG-15s. FEAF, on the other hand, could only field about 150 F-86s, half of which were often grounded awaiting spare parts. Despite their greater number of air superiority aircraft, the North Korean Air Force was never able to gain the advantage. In Report on the Korean War, written one year after the armistice, FEAF analysts attributed this to the enemy’s misuse of his available power “by failing to exploit both his numerical advantage and the superior high altitude performance of his equipment.”9
Maintaining air supremacy proved to be difficult due to the geography and the United Nations rules of engagement. The majority of fighter engagements took place in the area called “MiG Alley,” a triangle of land in the northwest corner of North Korea. Its northern border was the Yalu River and China, whose airspace United Nations pilots were forbidden to enter for fear that it would ignite a much larger general war, specifically with the Soviet Union. Because of the distant location of suitable friendly airfields, American jet fighters had to fly almost the entire length of the Korean peninsula to engage the MiGs in battle. Unfortunately, the limited range of the American fighters allowed them less than 25 minutes of combat time, whereas the MiGs, with the support of a ground control intercept system and easy access to their nearby airfields, could operate with much less concern for fuel restrictions.10 Even faced with the MiG’s advantages, however, the F-86 proved to be an able adversary. Some of the fiercest fighting of the war took place on 30 June 1953, when American pilots flying F-86s shot down 16 MiGs, the single-day record for the Korean War. Overall, superior American technology and training proved decisive: United States Air Force F-86 pilots established a ratio of 10 MiGs shot down for every one F-86 lost. In addition to the F-86, the F-94A/Bs, introduced in late 1951, contributed to air superiority with their night-fighting interceptor missions and as escorts for B-29s making night attacks.11
Aviation historian Walter J. Boyne mentions that the public’s attraction to aerial battles in the Korean War was “not so much because of the importance of the outcome but because of the glamour [sic] attached to dogfights between swept-wing fighters.”12 Air-to-air combat was not the only aerial activity that took place over Korea, however. Other categories of air operations also involved dangerous missions designed to protect ground troops and attack strategic and tactical enemy targets. In addition to air superiority, FEAF air operations fell into seven distinct missions: close air support, air interdiction, strategic bombing, cargo transport, reconnaissance, aeromedical evacuation, and search and rescue.
Close air support, which took place primarily over the front in South Korea, was conducted by the F-51s, F-80s, and F-84s. These aircraft not only protected ground troops from attacks by enemy aircraft, they also conducted air strikes on enemy ground positions. The T-6 aircraft, called “Mosquitos,” proved quite useful as airborne controllers by directing allied aircraft to the location of enemy targets. The Mosquitos, which were able to relay requests between ground commanders and the Tactical Air Control Center, also helped prevent tragedies due to friendly fire.13
Another category of air operations involved the deep interdiction bombing campaigns primarily carried out by the Fifth Air Force over North Korea. President Harry S. Truman first authorized the bombing of North Korean targets on 29 June 1950. B-26s and B-29s flew numerous missions to destroy trains, supply columns, bridges, depots, and industrial facilities.14 F-80s and F-84s also took part in these missions. Fully 25 percent of FEAF’s sorties during the war were for interdiction. Statistics show that over 1,300 tanks, 82,000 vehicles, 900 locomotives, 10,000 railway cars, 1,100 bridges, 118,000 buildings, 65 tunnels, 16 oil storage tanks, and 590 barges and boats were destroyed during United Nations interdiction missions. Additionally, 28,000 cuts were made on enemy rail lines.15 Consequently, the communist armies, often cut off from their supplies, were forced to move at night and rely on the use of truck transport rather than railroads.
Bombing of strategic and tactical targets was a critical mission throughout the Korean War. Within a few weeks of entering the war, B-29s had flown enough missions over North Korea to wipe out the country’s industrial capability. When the propeller-driven bombers became vulnerable to MiG attacks, they began flying night missions with jet fighter escorts. Throughout the war, the B-29s flew over 20,000 sorties, over half at night, and dropped over 168,000 bombs.16 Late in the war, the bombing mission included FEAF’s “air pressure” campaign designed to force North Korean and Chinese officials to accept an armistice. Important in bringing the conflict to an end, the campaign included attacks on North Korea’s hydroelectric generating complexes resulting in the loss of power for two weeks. Attacks on irrigation dams flooded thousands of acres of rice paddies, in addition to transportation networks.17
Although not a part of the aerial battles, rapidly moving critical supplies was essential for the preservation of United Nations air supremacy. Established in August 1950 and redesignated the 315th Air Division in January 1951, Combat Cargo Command had the important mission of supplying and transporting troops and war casualties. Using C-46s, C-47s, C-54s, C-119s, and C-124s, the command flew nearly 200,000 sorties, transporting 2.6 million passengers (including 307,804 medical air evacuation patients) and nearly 400,000 tons of cargo (both air-dropped and air-landed).18 In one mission early in the winter of 1950,the command helped sustain some 12,000 Marines and Army troops near Chosin Reservoir in NorthKorea by dropping over 250 tons of supplies each day, often in sub-zero temperatures. Command aircraft also air-dropped eight two-ton bridge spans that allowed the troops to cross a gorge and continue their southward withdrawal. The 315th Air Division also participated in joint Army-Air Force airborne assault operations.19
Other categories of air operations included aeromedical evacuation and search and rescue missions. Previously confined to emergency situations, aeromedical evacuation became a routine procedure during the Korean War. The 3rd Air Rescue Squadron used H-5 and H-19 helicopters to move front-line casualties to nearby mobile army surgical hospitals or MASH units (made famous by the novel, movie, and television series of the same name), thereby increasing casualty survival rates. Various transport aircraft, including C-46s, C-47s, C-54s, and C-124s, were used for these missions, which resulted in the transport of 311,673 sick or wounded patients to Japan and the United States.21 The Air Rescue Squadron was also responsible for search and rescue operations, including retrieval of downed airmen. Using L-5 liaison aircraft, converted B-17s, SA-16 flying boats, and H-5 and H-19 helicopters, the squadron rescued some 254 persons behind enemy lines during the Korean War.22 Water pickups were normally made with the SA-16, and on-land rescues with the helicopters.
At 2201 on 27 July 1953, an armistice was signed, beginning the longest cease-fire in history.23 The aerial war that helped bring about this event involved an amazing number of sorties. According to historians William T. Y’Blood and Walter J. Boyne, FEAF alone flew a total of 720,980 sorties, including over 92,000 close air support, 192,581 interdiction, over 20,000 bombing, 210,000 cargo, and thousands of reconnaissance and air superiority sorties. FEAF delivered 476,000 tons of ordnance (68 percent of the total amount of ordnance delivered during the war by the United Nations) and destroyed over 900 enemy aircraft. The fight for air supremacy also exacted incredible losses. FEAF lost some 1,466 aircraft (about half or 757 to enemy action). The Navy, Marines, and other United Nations forces lost another 520 aircraft. FEAF also lost 1,180 personnel, with an additional 600 non-fatal casualties reported.24
During the Korean War, the United States Air Force achieved a number of first time accomplishments.25 The Korean War was the first conflict in which jet aircraft were used extensively in aerial combat, and it included the first jet-to-jet aerial fighting, which resulted in a number of jet air aces. The air war in Korea pioneered SHORAN night radar-controlled bombing, which was later used extensively in the Vietnam conflict, and the first combat employment of in-flight refueling. It was also during this war that the F-84, F-86, F-94, C-124, and RB-45 (the first jet reconnaissance aircraft in the Air Force inventory) entered service and combat operations. It was also during this period that the Air Force (established in 1947) matured into a service equal to the Army and Navy. Boyne states: “The newly established Air Force proved to one and all that it was ready to fight and to win, regardless of politics, rules of engagement, gaps in procurement budgets, or the prowess of the enemy.” He also states that an important lesson of the war was the necessity for a combat-ready air force, not one that had to rely on a time-consuming buildup to be able to defend and deter enemy forces.26 The same was true for the other military services. In the new age of high technology, having a skilled, readily available force could make the difference between victory and defeat.
Facts Relating to this Chapter
Last Update: 2 Jan 03