orth Korea's October 9 nuclear weapon test was an outcome of Pyongyang's judgment that the test will enhance its regime survival and increase its foreign policy leverage. It does not expect that any state will launch a military operation against it in response to the action and, by acquiring a proven nuclear capability, it makes such a strike less likely in the future.

The success of North Korea's initiative hinges upon China's reaction to the test and whether Beijing will continue to support Pyongyang. If the test moves Beijing closer to the United States -- which is unlikely -- pressure will mount on Pyongyang to backtrack from its decision in a face-saving way. Yet if Beijing mounts public criticism of North Korea but remains passive in action, then North Korea will have succeeded in adding to its political and military capabilities without inviting a major conflict.

In August 2003, PINR analyzed the effects of a North Korean nuclear weapon test. Three years later, the implications found in this analysis are just as relevant today. PINR found that "if Pyongyang were able to develop a large nuclear arsenal with second strike capability, it would reduce the risk of attack by the United States and other adversaries. The potential for destruction against states attacking the North would be too high and too costly. Becoming a nuclear-armed state with second strike capability could be a lot more valuable than a non-aggression pact to the survival of Kim Jong-il's regime." These motives explain why Pyongyang has been pursuing nuclear weapons for the last three years. [See: "Why Nuclear Weapons May Be In North Korea's National Interests"]

That same analysis, however, also found that acquiring nuclear weapons would not be a risk-free initiative for North Korea. "If Pyongyang were unable to create a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons, with the capability of second strike status," the analysis found, "the United States would still be able to preemptively strike North Korea's nuclear sites and destroy Pyongyang's nuclear capability. This course of action would be very risky for the United States, however, as it would certainly alienate important powers such as China that, while opposed to Pyongyang developing nuclear weapons, would object fiercely over the possible precedent created by such a military strike by the United States against another sovereign state in East Asia. Furthermore, Washington would have to be certain that it was able to completely eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear capability; otherwise the consequences of North Korean retaliation could be devastating to U.S. interests in the region." More than 24 hours after the test, Washington has not threatened military action and has instead continued to look for a diplomatic solution by pushing the issue to the United Nations.

The other important outcome of North Korea's nuclear weapons test may be some form of an arms race in East Asia. As stated in PINR's August 2003 analysis, "Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear weapons could also spark a regional arms race in East Asia. It would lend credence to the claims by hawks in Japan that Tokyo needs to abandon its non-nuclear status and become a nuclear-armed state. While able to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a nuclear-armed North Korea could compel Japan to develop its own nuclear capability as insurance against the peninsula state. This, in turn, could cause China -- no doubt already stressed by a freshly nuclear-armed North Korea -- to expand its own nuclear arsenal in order to keep it superior to Japan's." Already, Tokyo has announced that it will increase its "missile defense" cooperation with Washington.

The ramifications of North Korea becoming the ninth state (including Israel) to have a nuclear weapons capability will be seen in the coming weeks. Pyongyang has assessed that it is unlikely the United States or any other state will take effective action against it as a result of the test. North Korea's ability to launch massive strikes into South Korea makes any preemptive U.S.-led attack fraught with risks. If effective action is not taken against North Korea, it will likely build up its nuclear weapons stockpile or offer to dismantle its nuclear weapons in exchange for extensive economic and political incentives, although the latter scenario is less likely.

As PINR stated in May 2005, "it is feasible that Pyongyang would go one step further to declare itself a nuclear power by testing a nuclear device. It may rationalize that its pursuit of nuclear weapons would follow the path pursued by Pakistan and India. In these examples, the international community initially reacted negatively, only to accept grudgingly the nuclear declarations over time. If North Korea were able to develop nuclear weapons without it leading to an attack by the United States, it would dramatically increase its power in East Asia, an outcome that would drastically alter the balance of power in the region." [See: "Intelligence Brief: North Korea"]

Again, it will be important to monitor how Beijing reacts to North Korea's nuclear test. Additionally, it will be significant to watch Tokyo's response to this test and whether its security establishment comes to the conclusion that it will need to develop its own nuclear arsenal in order to better deter Pyongyang. A nuclear weapon capable Japan will certainly push China to continue its military modernization program since Beijing sees Tokyo as a potential threat to its long-term interests in the Asia Pacific region.

Report Drafted By:

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.