he long-awaited Annapolis summit on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process managed to bring together more than 40 countries in support for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It remains unclear, however, whether it has made any significant contribution toward a resolution of the conflict.

The main outcome of the meeting was a joint understanding between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (P.A.), in which both sides made two major mutual commitments. First, Israel and the P.A. agreed "to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception" and to "make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008." Second, both sides agreed to implement their obligations under the 2003 Roadmap issued by the Quartet of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and Russia.

While the commitment to seek an agreement on final status issues by the end of 2008 and the negotiation process dedicated to achieving this have attracted and will likely continue to attract the majority of attention, the renewed commitment of both sides to implement their obligations under the Roadmap and the actual process of implementing these obligations are likely to be of greater significance in making substantive progress toward a resolution of the conflict.

While it is hoped that final status negotiations will serve to create the conditions for implementation of the Roadmap obligations as well as a final status agreement, these negotiations themselves are highly dependent on both sides' implementation of their obligations under the Roadmap. Since both Israeli and Palestinian support for an agreement is likely to be conditional upon the ability of both sides to implement it, the agreement to pursue final status negotiations without prior implementation of phase one obligations under the Roadmap is unlikely to lead to significant progress toward a final status agreement.

Final Status Negotiations and Internal Politics

Despite the commitment made in the joint understanding, it remains extremely doubtful that Israel and the Palestinian Authority will be able to conclude an agreement on final status issues before the end of 2008. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has already downplayed that goal, stating that the two sides "cannot negotiate according to a time limit."

Agreement on the core issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security will require concessions from Israel and the P.A. that the leaders of both sides will find difficult to make, particularly given that President George W. Bush gave little indication that he intends to undertake significant efforts to apply pressure or bridge the gap between both sides. The difficulties faced by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas in agreeing on final status issues are made even greater by both leaders' weakness within their domestic political spheres.

Of the two leaders, Olmert is in the stronger position. After initial skepticism, his political rival and coalition partner, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, appears to have moved closer to Olmert's way of thinking in regard to negotiations with the Palestinians as a result of the Annapolis meeting and seems likely to keep the Labor Party within Olmert's governing coalition, despite earlier commitments to reconsider his party's position in the government when the report of the Winograd Commission on the 2006 Lebanon war is released.

At the same time of strengthening his support from the left, Olmert has also managed to avoid alienating the coalition partners to his right. Before the summit, the leaders of the Israel Beiteinu and Shas parties drew up a list of red lines they did not want crossed at Annapolis, including any discussion of Jerusalem. Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of Israel Beiteinu, and Eli Yishai, chairman of Shas, were both satisfied with Olmert's speech and the joint statement at Annapolis and have decided to remain in the government for the present.

Nevertheless, Olmert will find it difficult to keep their support once negotiations start to focus on core issues such as Jerusalem. Supporters of Israel Beiteinu and Shas are already unhappy with the decision to remain in the government, while the fear of losing supporters to the Likud Party will only increase the pressure on the two party heads to leave the government.

Olmert will hope that he is able to maintain the support of Israel Beiteinu and Shas until a final status agreement with the P.A. is concluded, allowing him to use it as a platform for a second term. In regard to Shas and Israel Beiteinu, this seems a plausible strategy. Polls indicate that both parties would be likely to suffer losses in early elections, giving them an incentive to prevent the collapse of the governing coalition that would result from both parties' withdrawal.

Regarding the use of a final status agreement as a platform for the next elections, Olmert's strategy, while still viable, is on less firm ground. According to a poll conducted a day after Annapolis, 53 percent of Israelis support a two-state final status agreement with a solution to all of the core issues. This support, however, is likely to be conditional upon the ability of the P.A. to implement the agreement and bring about real benefits for Israel. Specifically, Israelis want an agreement that will allow them to withdraw from the West Bank, thus securing the democratic and Jewish identity of Israel, while maintaining the security of Israel's population.

Olmert will find it difficult to sell to the Israeli public a final status agreement in which Israel makes concessions on borders and Jerusalem unless the P.A. has made significant progress toward implementing its phase one obligations under the Roadmap, in particular the obligations to confront groups planning and carrying out acts of terrorism, dismantle terrorist infrastructure and end incitement against Israel. Olmert will thus have an interest in delaying progress on final status negotiations unless and until there are clear signs that the P.A. is making progress in regard to security issues.

At the same time, Olmert will not wish or be able to delay progress toward a final status agreement too much, since he recognizes the weakness of Abbas and the Palestinian Authority. The purpose of negotiating a final status agreement is, and the originally intended purpose of the Annapolis meeting was, to strengthen Abbas by providing for the Palestinian people a "political horizon" with the vision of a Palestinian state. This would increase support for Abbas, giving him the strength to build effective institutions and maintain security in the West Bank, thus enabling significant progress toward a resolution of the conflict.

While the negotiation of a final status agreement would likely increase support for Abbas, the extent to which it would strengthen Abbas should not be overestimated. The Palestinians will be required to make significant concessions on the issues of borders and refugees in a final status agreement. While the support of the Arab states could provide some political cover, these concessions could counteract any gains made by Abbas if a final status agreement is not accompanied by clear signs of progress toward its implementation. Palestinians, like Israelis, are willing to make the concessions necessary for a final status agreement for the real benefits that such an agreement would bring.

To strengthen Abbas, a final status agreement would therefore have to be accompanied by clear indications of Israeli willingness to withdraw from the West Bank and significant Israeli progress toward implementing its Roadmap obligations, including a freeze on all settlement activity and dismantlement of settler outposts.

Implementing the Roadmap

Implementation of Roadmap obligations remains the key to making progress toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Annapolis meeting did make some progress in this regard. Israel and the P.A. made a renewed commitment to implementing their obligations under the Roadmap. Both sides agreed that the U.S. would monitor and judge compliance with their Roadmap obligations. In addition, the United States has appointed James Jones, a retired general, as Middle East security envoy, with responsibility for assisting the P.A. in developing its capacity to maintain security and for overseeing Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.

There are significant doubts about how these measures will work in practice, however. It remains unclear how strictly Washington will monitor compliance with the Roadmap or what the consequences will be for non-compliance. The likely actions and attitude of James Jones toward his role are also uncertain. Some reports suggest that his appointment will serve to put pressure on the Israeli defense establishment to make concessions in regard to security measures. Other reports suggest that he will be unwilling to take any steps that might prove controversial.

In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the new measures to ensure compliance with the Roadmap, many of the major obstacles that have hindered its implementation since 2003 will continue to make compliance difficult. The central problem remains that while Israel is unwilling to make concessions in regard to security measures until the P.A. can effectively maintain security in the West Bank, at least some Israeli concessions on such issues (on roadblocks and checkpoints, for example) will likely be needed to strengthen the P.A. sufficiently to allow it to maintain security. The ability to overcome this dilemma in the latest round of peacemaking will depend on a number of factors, one of the most important of which will be the support of the international community for the Palestinian economy and Palestinian institution-building.

The extent to which Israel will make concessions in regard to security measures will depend on the ability of the P.A. to maintain security, which will in turn depend on the extent and effectiveness of international support to the Palestinians. International support for the Palestinian economy in the West Bank will enable a degree of economic growth and thus strengthen the P.A., increasing its ability to maintain security.

At the same time, international support for Palestinian institution-building and reform of the security services should allow the P.A. to maintain security more effectively. This will enable both sides to take steps toward fulfilling their Roadmap obligations.

There is no guarantee that international support for the Palestinian economy and institution-building will be sufficient to achieve these aims. It will likely remain impossible, however, for Israel and the Palestinians to overcome the central security dilemma preventing progress toward a resolution of the conflict in the absence of such support.

Conclusion: What About Gaza?

The Roadmap and the lack of progress made toward implementing it since 2003 were to a great extent an accurate reflection of the power and interests of the parties involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While many of the interests have remained the same, since 2003 new interests have emerged while the power of various parties' has shifted.

Most notably, the rise of Hamas has created common interests between Israel and Fatah, while the rise of Iran has done the same for Israel and the Arab states. The Annapolis summit reflected these changes to a certain extent. The attendance of the Arab states reflected to a large extent their fears over Iran. The rise of Hamas was reflected in the need to strengthen Abbas by pursuing final status negotiations and, indeed, even holding the meeting at all.

One change that the meeting and the agreement were unable to address, however, was Hamas' takeover of Gaza. Hamas' control of Gaza in fact gives it the ability to disrupt the whole Annapolis process. An intensification of rocket fire into Israel from Gaza could lead to Israeli disillusion with a process that involves no plans for dealing with such a threat. It could also compel a large-scale Israeli incursion into or reoccupation of Gaza.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the Arab states to maintain support for the process or for Abbas to remain engaged in negotiations with Olmert. Thus, even if Abbas and Olmert are able to navigate their respective domestic political spheres effectively while complying with their obligations under the Roadmap and negotiating a final status agreement, the Annapolis process rests on very unstable foundations.

Report Drafted By:
Nick Keehan

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.