Lenin's N.E.P.

The Bolshevik revolutionary takeover in October 1917 was followed by over two years of civil war in Russia between the new Communist regime (with its Red Army) and its enemies--the conservative military officers commanding the so-called White armies. The struggle saw much brutality and excesses on both sides with the peasants suffering most from extortionate demands of food supplies and recruits by both sides. The repressive and dictatorial methods of the Bolshevik government had so alienated the mass of peasants and industrial working class elements that the erstwhile most loyal supporters of the regime, the sailors at the Kronstadt naval base, rebelled in March 1921 (see ob19.doc) to the great embarrassment of senior Bolsheviks. Though the rebellion was mercilessly crushed, the regime was forced to moderate its ruthless impulses. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was the result, a small concession to the capitalist and free market instincts of peasant and petty bourgeois alike. Moreover, victory in the civil war was assured by this stage, thus allowing a relaxation of the coercive methods symbolized by the War Communism of the previous two to three years.

. . . .The most urgent thing at the present time is to take measures that will immediately increase the productive forces of peasant farming. Only in this way will it be possible to improve the conditions of the workers and strengthen the alliance between the workers and peasants, to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . .
This cannot be done without a serious modification of our food policy. Such a modification [effected by NEP] was the substitution of the surplus-appropriation system [a euphemism for forcible acquisition of grain production above what is needed for subsistence] by the tax in kind [i.e., handing over of grain in amounts to satisfy tax due], which implies free trade . . .
The tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from that peculiar "War Communism," which we were forced to resort to by extreme want, ruin and war, to the proper socialist exchange of products. The latter, in its turn, is one of the forms of transition from Socialism, with the peculiar features created by the predominance of the small peasantry among the population, to Communism.
The essence of the peculiar "War Communism" was that we actually took from the peasant, all the surplus grain--and sometimes even not only surplus grain, but part of the grain the peasant required for food--to meet the requirements of the army and sustain the workers . . It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat which is exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country is to obtain grain in exchange for the manufactured goods the peasant requires. . . . only such a policy can strengthen the foundations of Socialism and lead to its complete victory . . .
The effect will be the revival of the petty bourgeoisie and of capitalism on the basis of a certain amount of free trade (if only local). This is beyond doubt. It would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to it.
The question arises: Is it necessary? Can it be justified? Is it dangerous? . . .
.. . . What is to be done? Either to try to prohibit entirely . . all development of private, non-state exchange, i.e., trade, i.e., capitalism, which is inevitable amidst millions of small producers. But such a policy would be foolish because such a policy is economically impossible. It would be suicidal because the party that tried to apply such a policy would meet with inevitable disaster. We need not conceal from ourselves the fact that some Communists sinned.... in this respect . . . We shall try to rectify these mistakes . . . otherwise things will come to a very sorry state.
A wise Communist will not be afraid of learning from a capitalist (no matter whether that capitalist is a big capitalist . . . or a little capitalist cooperator). Did we not in the Red Army [which was partly created from officers and men of the old tsarist army]learn to catch treacherous military experts, to single out the honest and conscientious, and on the whole, to utilize . . . tens of thousands of military experts? . . . We shall learn to do the same . . . with the commission agents, with the buyers who are working for the state, with the little-cooperator capitalists, with the entrepreneur concessionaires, etc. . . . (Ref.: Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. 1, pp. 213-16)

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