The July (1914) Crisis: Views of the German General Staff

This summary of the political situation was submitted to the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, as the European powers hovered on the brink of war in the wake of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Bosnian Serbs. Note that Germany was bound to Austria by the Dual Alliance which promised joint action should either Germany or Austria be attacked by Russia. In these circumstances, it is to be assumed that the German military leaders would cast suspicions on Russian troop movements during the crisis, though there had been no formal orders for mobilization and no evidence to suggest that Russia desired war, despite the resolve of that government not to let Serbia in the lurch. The crisis deepened, however, on July 28 with the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.

(Wednesday) July 29, 1914

It goes without saying that no nation of Europe would regard the conflict between Austria and Serbia with any interest except that of humanity, if there did not lie within it the danger of general political complications that today already threaten to unchain a world war. . . . With a patience approaching weakness, Austria has up to the present borne the continuous provocations and the political machinations [of Serbia] aimed at the disruption of her own national stability by [the Serbian people] . . .

Austria has declared to the European cabinets that she intends neither to make any territorial acquisitions at Serbia's expense nor to infringe upon her status as a nation; that she only wants to force her unruly neighbor to accept the conditions she considers necessary if they are to continue to exist side by side, and which Serbia, as experience has proved, would never live up to, despite solemn assurances unless compelled by force. The Austro-Serbian affair is a purely private quarrel in which, as has been said, nobody in Europe would have a profound interest and which would in no way threaten the peace of Europe but, on the contrary, would establish it more firmly, if Russia had not injected herself into it. This was what first gave the matter its menacing aspect.

Austria has only mobilized a portion of her armed forces . . --just enough with which to be able to put through her punitive expedition. As against this . . . (Russia) announces that she intends to mobilize when Austria advances into Serbia, as she cannot permit the destruction of Serbia by Austria, though Austria has explained that she intends nothing of the sort.

What must and will the further consequences be? If Austria advances into Serbia she will have to face not only the Serbian army but also the vastly superior strength of Russia; thus she can not enter upon a war with Serbia without securing herself against an attack by Russia. That means that she [Austria] will be forced to mobilize the other half of her Army, for she can not possibly surrender at discretion to a Russia all prepared for war. At the moment, however, in which Austria mobilizes her whole Army, the collision between herself and Russia will become inevitable. But that, for Germany, is the casus foederis [reason to go to war]. If Germany is not to be false to her word and permit her ally to suffer annihilation at the hands of Russian superiority, she, too, must mobilize. And that would bring about the mobilization of the rest of Russia's military districts as a result. But then Russia will be able to say: I am being attacked by Germany. She will then assure herself of the support of France, which, according to the compact of [the Franco-Russian]alliance, is obliged to take part in the war, should her ally, Russia, be attacked. Thus the Franco-Russian alliance, so often held up to praise as a purely defensive compact, created in order to meet the aggressive plans of Germany, will become active, and the mutual butchery of the civilized nations of Europe will begin.

It cannot be denied that the affair has been cunningly contrived by Russia. While giving continuous assurances that she was not yet "mobilizing", but only making preparations " for an eventuality," that "up to the present" she had called no reserves to the colors, she has been getting herself so ready for war that when she actually issues her mobilization orders, she will be prepared to move her armies forward in a very few days. Thus she puts Austria in a desperate position and shifts the responsibility to her, inasmuch as she is forcing Austria to secure herself against a surprise by Russia. She will say: You, Austria, are mobilizing against us, so you want war with us. Russia assures Germany that she wishes to undertake nothing against her; but she knows perfectly well that Germany could not remain inactive in the event of a belligerent collision between her ally [i.e., Austria] and Russia. So Germany, too, will be forced to mobilize, and again Russia will be enabled to say to the world: I did not want war, but Germany brought it about. After this fashion things must and will develop, unless, one might say, a miracle happens to prevent at the last moment a war which will annihilate for decades the civilization of almost all Europe.

Germany does not want to bring about this frightful war. But the German Government knows that it would be violating in ominous fashion the deep-rooted feelings of fidelity which are among the most beautiful traits of German character and would be setting itself against all the sentiments of the nation, if it did not come to the assistance of its ally at a moment which was to be decisive of the latter's existence.

According to the information at hand, France, also, appears to be taking measures preparatory to an eventual mobilization. It is apparent that Russia and France are moving hand in hand as far as regards their preparations.

Thus, when the collision between Austria and Russia becomes inevitable, Germany, also, will mobilize, and will be prepared to take up the fight on two fronts.

With relation to the military preparations we have in view, should the case arise, it is of the greatest importance to ascertain as soon as possible whether Russia and France intend to let it come to a war with Germany. The further the preparations of our neighbors are carried, the quicker they will be able to complete their mobilization. Thus the military situation is becoming from day to day more unfavorable for us, and can, if our prospective opponents prepare themselves further, unmolested, lead to fateful consequences for us.

[Ref.: M. Montgelas at al., Outbreak of the World War (New York, 1924), pp. 306-8]

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