IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei discusses the threat of nuclear proliferation—and how it could affect global security
Joe Klamar / AFP-Getty Images
Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, believes Iraq is proof that arms inspections work
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Gregory Beals
Newsweek
Updated: 6:18 p.m. ET May 20, 2004
May 20 - Mohamed ElBaradei believes that the regime of safeguards meant to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in danger, and as the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, he is in a position to know. Everything from Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear program to the nuclear black-market activities of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan have occupied his attention and frequently made his job more difficult. The Egypt-born ElBaradei, 62, has taken a novel approach to nonproliferation. He believes that the best path to keeping countries from seeking atomic weapons is to address their underlying security concerns. Ultimately, he would like to see all nuclear materials used in the world’s commercial nuclear programs come under multinational controls. Last week, he spoke with NEWSWEEK's Gregory Beals at his offices at the United Nations about his concerns over nuclear arms proliferation, the war in Iraq and the impact it may have on security in both the Middle East and the rest of the world. Excerpts:
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NEWSWEEK: You’ve called for international authorities to oversee production of fissile materials—highly enriched uranium and plutonium. But given their potential to be used in nuclear weapons, why should the IAEA continue to countenance them in the first place? Mohamed ElBaradei: We are working on a plan to clean up the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian programs. In fact, I talked to President Bush about that and he suggested that we have a comprehensive plan to clean up all highly enriched uranium in the world. On the other hand, the use of plutonium is more problematic because there is a lot of plutonium around the world. But eventually not having any plutonium or highly-enriched uranium is really the way to go.
When I talk to experts in the United States about the terrorist use of a radiological weapon, they tell me that for the most part they are surprised that it hasn’t happened yet. It’s very difficult to assess the threat. What we know is that there are a lot of radioactive sources that could be used for a dirty bomb—hundreds of thousands around the world. Is the threat real? Of course it is real. But we cannot accept that as a fait accompli or be pessimistic. We need to do our best to prevent it if possible. It is a race against time, we know that.
It strikes me that there is a difficult balance at play here. Should we let the bad guys know what the potential uses of these materials are by talking about the dangers in public? I don’t think we gain anything by not talking about any issue. I think it is important to continue to alert people to the danger that they face. These are the dangers that we live with. We need to talk about it. We need to understand that there is always a certain degree of risk in our life.
Do you think that the U.S.-led war in Iraq has helped to create the stable kind of environment that would lead towards a nonproliferation regime there? Iraq proved that inspections can work and will work. It shows that you can possibly resolve these issues without use of force because we have discovered that Iraq was free from weapons of mass destruction. On the larger issue it shows that you need to look into better options for assuring compliance. It is true Iraq was not the model of compliance over many years, but you need to think of other models of compliance before you resort to war.
What do you think the Iraq war says about how the U.S. views the importance of inspections? Iraq is still under the spotlight as to what was the major reason for going to war. We know now that it was not just about inspections. But I come back to the central theme that you cannot delink proliferation from security, and security means you cannot have two worlds of the [countries that] have nuclear weapons and those that are the have-nots. That does not work. That is not sustainable. You have to deal with the insecurity of countries by trying to provide them a security system that, in case of a crisis, can intervene and provide their security. Right now the collective-security system of the United Nations is not looked at as credible. It works sometimes and it doesn't work other times. The system is an on-again-off-again system.
Is the Bush administration getting more faith in collective security? I would hope so.
Has anyone in the Bush administration acknowledged to you that you were correct in stating that Iraq had no viable nuclear-weapons program? I am not waiting for that. The important thing is to look to the future....
Are you surprised by the breadth of the black market utilized by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Kahn? In particular, did it surprise you that non-nuclear states were participating in that market? What is surprising is the black market itself. That companies and individuals were involved without the knowledge, in most cases, of their own governments, that is really the worrying indication. It indicates the importance of having a good national-control system over countries and individuals, particularly countries that are into the high-tech type of engineering because they can produce the facilities that can produce fissile materials which can make a weapon.
How do you cope with such a threat? Governments must know what is going on within their borders and to make sure that none is involved themselves in the nuclear black market. We are doing a lot of investigation now about the A. Q. Khan network which, as we know, has been all over the place—Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East. Components have been manufactured and designed in every part of the world. But the important thing now is to have a good national system of accounting and control over certain sensitive items that could be used in nuclear trade.
What would it take for you to judge that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons? Is suspension of their program enough or should it be dismantled altogether? Having a nuclear-enrichment program does not automatically mean that you have a weapons program. It is mostly a question of intention. Our task is to make sure that everything, including the enrichment program in Iran, is not being used for military purposes. My view is that it is too close for comfort in terms of security, because if a state has plutonium or highly-enriched uranium they are very close to a weapons capability. Then it is a question of security intention. Of course, we need to be sure that the Iran program is not weaponized. But the question of the enrichment program has to be dealt with in terms of the overall regime we would like to manage for everyone.
Are you concerned that we might see an arms race in that region of the world if Iran goes nuclear? It is not just a question of Iran. There is a good deal of frustration in this area. There is a good deal of a sense of impotence, imbalance and frustration because of the fact that Israel continues to be outside the regime. I have said that this is not sustainable and again it comes back to a question of security. The Middle East is the most prone for proliferation because of this sense of a security imbalance. You need to work on a security structure in the Middle East as you work on a peace process. Unfortunately this has not happened, the focus has always been on land for peace or what have you. But this is not really a serious discussion of security requirements that should undergird the peace process. I do not see any peace in the Middle East in the long term without having the region free of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
There are so many different views on Iran. It seems as though you are right in the middle of all of this. What do you see your role in all of this? The nuclear issue is part of a larger issue of security in the Middle East which includes Afghanistan, Iraq, this network of extremist groups that work in the region. There is a good degree of linkage between many security issues and nuclear is just one of them ... I of course have to operate aware of all of this and provide my personal advice. My ultimate objective is to resolve this issue through verification and through diplomacy, if we can. That is the best option and we have been making progress … We have been securing much better cooperation from Iran and frankly, if it carries over in terms of diplomacy and verification, that would be a great success and a good precedent.
How do you know what Washington wants? We listen to the different voices that come from Washington. I give them my views on how I see things and how we can move forward. We have to talk to as many people as possible both in Iran and Washington and other places. Our role is to make sure that they have all the facts. I couple that with my personal views on how I think they might go, but at the end of the day it is their call.
The United States, Europe and Tehran seem to be pursing different goals vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear program. How much stress has this put on the agency? It is an issue that is taking up a lot of our attention, but we got used to that after Iraq. Our role is to do the right thing: to be impartial, be objective, and not have a hidden agenda. This whole issue is part of global security. You cannot deal with proliferation in isolation of the whole concept of collective global security. As long as countries feel insecure for whatever the reason, they will continue to try to proliferate and develop weapons of mass destruction, whether they be nuclear, chemical or biological. We should not lose sight of the big picture, which is a system of global security in which countries should not try to develop weapons of mass destruction.
We've seen discussions go on between Washington and Pyongyang a long time now. To what extent will any future inspections in North Korea be hampered by the continuing stalemate? North Korea is one of the worst precedents that has been established in terms of nonproliferation. They have been in noncompliance for 12 years. We know that it has weapons or capability to make a weapon on short notice and it has withdrawn from the nonproliferation treaty without any reaction from the international community. It gives the impression that if you have a nuclear deterrent you are treated gently. It is going to be difficult to verify the nuclear program in North Korea, but it is not impossible. Again it requires absolutely full transparency, full cooperation, and it is going to take some time. But the more time passes the more difficult it becomes.
