On Sunday, UCLA professor
Mark Kleiman posed four questions to us "war bloggers" about the upcoming campaign in Iraq. I'll focus on #3, since that's the one I've been reading about lately. (Just finished a couple of great pieces in
International Security on this subject, including Stephen Middle's masterpiece "
Victory Misunderstood.") Mark asked:
3. There's no question that we could conquer Iraq on the ground. But that would cost us a significant number of casualties. So instead the plan seems to be to start by raining bombs on Baghdad in hopes of so demoralizing the leadership that they just stop fighting. As we all know, the smartest of smart bombs is an idiot studying to be a moron: a large number of civilians are certain to die if we really use the "Shock and Awe" approach. Do we really think that's ok?Legend has it that the air campaign in Gulf War I was spectacularly accurate - more so than any air campaign in history. The latter part is true; the former is not. The Pentagon spun this story well, and fed CNN enough tapes of smart bombs to make everyone think that's all we used. In reality, we used very few precision munitions in the Gulf - somewhere between 10-30% of total air-dropped munitions in that war. The first reason was cost. Our
Tomahawk missiles cost $2 million a pop, and our air-dropped smart bombs (e.g.
AGM-65 Maverick) were pretty pricey too. The second reason was that the Gulf War I generation of smart bombs were primarily laser-guided, and those lasers only worked in good weather under good conditions. The Gulf War I campaign was better than Vietnam, but it was not the precision-guided campaign of popular lore.
Kosovo was much more of a precision-guided campaign, and Afghanistan improved even on this. Major failures in these campaigns generally traced to human error - either on the ground or in the air. Sometimes, as in the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the human error happened all the way back at CIA HQ in Langley, VA. However, for the first time in history, the overwhelming majority of munitions dropped were precision-guided munitions.
Why? Because for the first time, the U.S. military had a cheap precision-guided bomb called the "JDAM" -
Joint Direct Attack Munition. This was nothing more than a GPS-and-guidance kit that was bolted onto a dumb bomb, thus transforming a dumb bomb into a smart bomb the way that UCLA transforms a dumb... never mind. Anyway, this made precision warfare cheap. Also, the JDAM kit worked in day or night, because it ran off satellite GPS signals instead of lasers. Thus, the military now had a cheap, all-weather, extremely accurate bomb. And it used it.
That's a long build up to say this: the "
shock and awe" approach in Iraq will look a lot different from the images we remember from Gulf War I. Don't expect any highways of death or strikes on Baghdad housing areas as a way of demoralizing our enemy. Instead, expect lots of attacks on Iraqi infrastructure - bridges, railways, power stations, phone networks, water plants, etc. Expect lots of attention to collateral damage, for two reasons. First, CNN is watching. Second, we have to govern these people after the war, and we don't want them more pissed off than necessary. Expect every target to be vetted at very high levels, as they were during Kosovo and Afghanistan. (See
Waging Modern War by Wesley Clark, for a description of the painstaking targeting and clearance process that went all the way to the White House.)
Finally, expect a great deal of the bombing campaign to be directed at very discrete targets like the Iraqi military and political structure. They're who we want to leave drooling in a state of "shock and awe" - not the Iraqi people.