Today's Washington Post reports on a new article in the Armed Forces Journal by Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, the deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which sharply criticizes the American military's leadership for its performance during the Iraq war. Yingling writes that courage is the most important characteristic for a general. It is a given that military planning will not see everything, and that military operations will require change. The essence of generalship is the ability to see the battlefield, recognize the need for change, and then implement it. Yingling sees all this lacking in the current crop of U.S. generals:

America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First, throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America's generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally, America's generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq.

Despite paying lip service to "transformation" throughout the 1990s, America's armed forces failed to change in significant ways after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In "The Sling and the Stone," T.X. Hammes argues that the Defense Department's transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-technology conventional wars. The doctrine, organizations, equipment and training of the U.S. military confirm this observation. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did little to bolster their capabilities for civic reconstruction and security force development. Procurement priorities during the 1990s followed the Cold War model, with significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft and artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in both schools and training centers replicated high-intensity interstate conflict. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.

Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America's generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq's population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America's generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central Command exercise "Desert Crossing" demonstrated that many postwar stabilization tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the U.S. government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the scale required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted the assumption that the State Department would administer postwar Iraq. The military never explained to the president the magnitude of the challenges inherent in stabilizing postwar Iraq.

After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America's generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation institutions to provide security and other essential services to the population. America's generals treated efforts to create transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial reconstruction teams to improve essential services as afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of personnel necessary for success.

After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that "there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq." The ISG noted that "on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals." Population security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. For more than three years, America's generals continued to insist that the U.S. was making progress in Iraq. However, for Iraqi civilians, each year from 2003 onward was more deadly than the one preceding it. For reasons that are not yet clear, America's general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq's government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq. Moreover, America's generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks of committing so large a portion of the nation's deployable land power to a single theater of operations.

The intellectual and moral failures common to America's general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq. Different military and civilian leaders in the two conflicts produced similar results. In both conflicts, the general officer corps designed to advise policymakers, prepare forces and conduct operations failed to perform its intended functions. To understand how the U.S. could face defeat at the hands of a weaker insurgent enemy for the second time in a generation, we must look at the structural influences that produce our general officer corps.

This is an incisive and brilliant article — it is precisely the kind of ruthless self-examination which is so necessary for an army at war. Unfortunately, Lt. Col. Yingling is one of the few officers with the moral courage to make this point so far. Although I've heard this argument made (in somewhat less sophisticated fashion) by a number of military friends and colleagues, I have not seen it made publicly and on-the-record by many. That speaks to a moral decline within the American military, and perhaps to the triumph of careerism over integrity. Perhaps I'm exaggerating here, but given the scope of these failures, I'm disappointed to see so few officers speaking out like this.

The U.S. Army trains tactical leaders very well. You will not find better tactical leadership schools than what the Army runs in places like Fort Benning and Fort Leonard Wood. Its apprenticeship and mentorship system (aka the company-grade ranks) is second-to-none. However, something has broken at the upper echelons of the military. Instead of producing generals today, the Army is producing bureaucrats and managers. America's private sector is producing visionary leaders like Larry Page, Sergey Brin, Carly Fiorina Meg Whitman and Larry Ellison. The military system gave us Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez. Huh?

Yingling's article begins with a quote from Frederick the Great, drawing a historical analogy between the U.S. Army after Iraq and the Prussian Army after Jena. It is an apt choice. The U.S. Army will eventually leave Iraq, on terms yet to be decided. At that point, the Army can construct a narrative for its performance which accentuates the positive and assigns blame for the negative to the media, Congress, the American people the Iraqis, etc. Or, it can turn its focus inward, engaging in ruthless and brutal self-examination to distill the critical lessons from Iraq and learn from them.

It is not yet clear which path the Army will take.

Army Gen. Creighton Abrams, in 1968, as reported by Lewis Sorley:

"Effective now, the overall public affairs policy of this command will be to let results speak for themselves. We will not deal in propaganda exercises in any way, but will play all of our activities at a low key . . . achievements, not hopes, will be stressed."

Today, I stumbled across a new website maintained by the Walter Reed Army Medical Center which contains a series of newsletters from the hospital's new commanding general, Maj. Gen. Eric Schoomaker. Except that these aren't newsletters or press releases — they read like SITREPs drafted by an S3 with a heavy dose of facts and a light dose of spin. Check out this excerpt:

WRAMC Main Section Facility Condition Assessment—The assessment team is making progress and has completed assessments on the Old Hospital (1), Abrams Hall (14), Delano Hall (11), Mologne House (20), Guest House (17), Steam Plant (15), Chiller Plant (48), and the Auxiliary Chiller Plant (49). The assessment continues on schedule. All on-site field assessments are scheduled to be completed by 25 April with draft reports submitted for review by 25 May. Daily reports are provided to the Garrison and Corps staffs.

WRAMC Real Estate Actions Update—The Corps has executed 34 leases for WRAMC, housing 62 Soldiers. Approximately $800,000 of the initial $962,000 provided has been expended. The Corps will not be able to secure additional leases until the 1 April submission (and 14-day waiting period) of the Title 10 (T-10) to the House and Senate Armed Forces subcommittees. As soon as the T-10 is approved, the Corps will secure 35 two bedroom units, to be available for use by 20 April, to accommodate a scheduled influx of student Soldiers. This leaves a 5 day schedule to execute leases and furnish apartments that will require close coordination with all stakeholders, to include the apartment complex selected and the furnishings providers.

The Corps team has selected an apartment complex meeting the proximity requirements at a single location with two bed, two bath fully furnished units, all utilities paid, washer/dryer included, cable/phone hookups, at competitive market rates. Funding Requirement has been identified and funds provided for the current 35 unit request. Apartment Complex (The Enclave) is reviewing terms and conditions of Government lease. Contracting is preparing two Blanket Purchase Agreement's to meet the furnishing requirements for these and additional apartment leases as they come on-line.

Clothing Issue Point—For the past week, the Walter Reed CIP sized 42 more Soldiers and issued their clothing. Additionally, the major population of Soldiers was sized during the Personnel Asset Inventory on Friday, April 13th at Wagoner Gym. CIP personnel worked over the weekend to prepare for all the deliveries today.

There's still a lot of work to do at Walter Reed, but this is an encouraging sign. Deeds matter more than words, and the Walter Reed leadership appears to get that. Gen. Abrams would be glad to see them following his sage advice from 40 years ago.

In Iraq today, the U.S. military has adopted an increasingly risky strategy of pushing its forces out from large forward operating bases ("FOBs") into small combat outposts where they live, work and immerse themselves in the cities of Iraq. It is a risky strategy, as shown in Baqubah two days ago, because it exposes soldiers to greater risk by placing them right in the middle of the fight. But, as I explained on the NewsHour last night, it may be the best course of action:

[This attack occurred] because of the new way that the U.S. is postured. No longer is the U.S. simply occupying these massive super bases outside the city, but they're now pushing out into smaller outposts throughout the cities, the kind of things that might resemble a community policing substation in a housing area. We're talking small bases, with small-sized units, and they're much more vulnerable than the large bases outside of town.

. . . counterinsurgency is a contact sport. It's the kind of thing that requires engagement. And you get so much intelligence and so much cultural and situational awareness by being in a city. My team lived in downtown Baquba, and I don't think we could replace that experience if we lived outside of the city.

This is the tactical risk calculus — we will acquire better situational awareness, and establish better security, at the risk of more casualties. However, there is a strategic risk for these combat outposts as well, one which the enemy is keenly aware of:

The thing is to look at these bases and imagine them from the enemy's perspective. You now have this essentially occupying army that's pushing deeper into your city. You recognize that the clock is running out and that, if you can increase the casualty toll, you may be able to reduce that game clock that General Petraeus is playing with in Baghdad. You may be able to affect the political calculus of domestic politics in Washington.

And so I think the insurgents and the militias are very savvy about this, and they see these bases as an opportunity. If they can attack U.S. forces where they're more vulnerable and they can have an outsized impact on our politics, then, in their minds, they win.

Put simply: the enemy gets a vote. And in Balad Ruz, a city several miles east of Baqubah in the arid part of the Diyala province, the enemy cast his ballot this morning for more chaos and violence.

Battle command is part science, but mostly art. What Clausewitz called the "friction" of war — its human element — makes even the most simple tasks difficult under fire. The art of command is practiced fairly by many, but well by only a few. Try as the U.S. military might, it cannot be reduced to field manuals, formulae, or staff products. It is an art, to be learned through experience, and applied expertly by the masters.

One of the most significant decisions a commander faces is the calibration of risk. Some choose to make this decision along the lines of a cost-benefit analysis, comparing risk to reward. Others makes a more instinctive decision, evaluating the risk in light of the circumstances. Bold commanders will be rewarded for taking the right risks when they result in success; a commander who risks his force foolishly will (should) be relieved. In all this, luck and chance play a role too.

Over the last three years, concerns about efficiency and force protection have played an absurd role in determining U.S. strategy in Iraq. These concerns have animated the decisions to close bases, consolidate units, and pull back from cities. This strategic tectonic plate movement enabled insurgents and militias to have free reign in many parts of Iraq. We are now starting to reverse this trend, but we are doing so at great risk. There will almost certainly be more attacks like those in Baqubah and Tarmiyah, targeting our new combat outposts. But this part of the "surge" has neither been mentioned to the American people, nor explained, by America's political and military leaders. It might be time to do that.

Update: Abu Muqawama (pseudonym for a colleague which translates as "Father of the Resistance) opines on the outlook for this strategy:

Abu Muqawama's take on all this is the same as his take on the greater Baghdad Security Plan, which is that this sounds like a great idea ... for 2004. Does anyone out there think we have enough sand left in the hourglass to make this work in 2007? Abu Muqawama, for one, does not think the U.S. public -- nor GOP senators up for re-election in 2008 for that matter -- is going to put up with these casualties for much longer.

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam died today just south of San Francisco, the victim of a car crash near the Dumbarton Bridge in Menlo Park. Halberstam was one of America's legendary storytellers. He will forever be known for his reporting on Vietnam, for which he earned the Pulitzer. His reporting on that war, first for The New York Times and later for "The Best and the Brightest", captured the essence of the conflict in its early days. His reporting also formed the mold for so many other brilliant journalists who would follow, including Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett, and Michael Herr, among many others.

After the war ended, he continued his brilliant journalism career, covering everything from baseball to politics. Two of his later books had a profound impact on my political education — "The Powers That Be" (about America's media empires) and "War in a Time of Peace" (about U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s). I never had the chance to meet Mr. Halberstam, but I sure learned a lot from him.