(Via Abu Muquwama) A couple of days ago, ABC News reported on one particularly disturbing angle of the blossoming scandal involving veterans charities — the fact that retired Gen. Tommmy Franks lent his name to one "charity" in exchange for $100,000. "Charity" is in quotes because the vast majority of the money which was donated to this outfit went towards overhead, salaries, and other things like country club memberships. In other words, not to veterans at all. According to ABC:

Retired U.S. Army Gen. Tommy Franks, who led the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, was paid $100,000 to endorse a veterans charity that watchdog groups say is ripping off donors and wounded veterans by using only a small portion of the money raised for veterans services, according to testimony in Congress today.

Gen. Franks' involvement was revealed as members of Congress questioned Roger Chapin, who operates Help Hospitalized Veterans and the Coalition to Salute America's Heroes Foundation, charities that congressional investigators say spend only 25 percent of the money they raise on projects for wounded veterans.

The charities were graded "F" by the American Institute of Philanthropy because so little of the money is used for actual charity projects or services.

Chapin testified he approached Gen. Franks in 2005, and he agreed to let his signature be used on mass mailings seeking contributions to his charities.

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"Gen. Franks did support the Coalition to Support American Heroes back in 2004 and 2005. The General made several speeches for the organization because he supports the idea of taking care of our disabled veterans. He also premitted the use of his name in direct mailings for about a year," Michael Hayes, chief of staff for Franks & Associates LLC, said. "He ended his support for the CSAH in late 2005 when he learned that the percent of money raised that was going to the troops was less than 85 percent, a figure which was then and remains today his critertia for supporting charitable organizations."

Let's assume for the sake of argument that Franks was acting with good intentions here. He was asked to help a group whose stated purpose was helping veterans; he was offered $100,000 for his involvement. Seems like a win-win situation, right?

Wrong. Turned out to be a lose-lose situation. The only winners here were the people who got rich off this scam to capitalize on American support for veterans. Veterans certainly didn't profit much from this venture. And neither did Franks, who now faces questions of personal ethics and integrity over this fiasco. (Not to mention this fiasco.) In my imagination, I picture Doug Feith joking about Franks to his friends over a drink "Who's the f--king stupidest person on the planet now, buddy?"

Clearly, Franks had an obligation to do more of what we lawyers call "due diligence" here. He was a retired 4-star general with a very high public profile. If he's going to lend his name to causes, organizations, candidates, etc., he owes it to himself to ask some hard questions, to make sure those causes are really worthy.

And it's not just Franks' integrity that's at stake here. It's the integrity of what he represents — the military profession, and more specifically, the general officer corps. There's nothing wrong with retiring from the military and using your experience and expertise to make a living, even a really good living. I wouldn't be where I practice law today if not for my military experience, and there are thousands of former/retired military officers working in the private sector on the basis of their experience. I don't think there's anything wrong with this, and I don't begrudge Franks for the work he does, the money he made on his book, or his various consulting gigs.

But though we have separated from the service, we still represent the military and the profession of arms. It's a matter of honor. We have a professional culture of norms, values and ethics to uphold, even when we no longer wear the uniform. This is true for former captains; it's even more true for retired general officers. Franks' behavior is out of step with this tradition, and with the profession.

So what should Franks do here? I think it's simple. He should disgorge the $100,000 he got from this charity, and donate it to a cause that actually helps veterans. The USO, Red Cross, and Fisher House Foundation come to mind. Ball's in your court, general.

I've written a bit about the current offensive in Diyala and commented on the characteristics of the province which make it so thoroughly intractable. However, I've been optimistic that recent U.S. operations there — a combination of combat operations, local diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and political outreach — have made a difference. That's what we've been hearing from commanders there too, and I wanted to believe that things were improving in my old area of operations.

However, this report from the Associated Press (LAT / NYT / WP) regarding another suicide bombing in Diyala makes me think things are significantly worse today than four months ago. The bombing is the 4th in recent weeks involving a female suicide bomber, a notable evolution in tactics for the insurgency. But, more important, it represents a significant spike in civilian casualties — perhaps our best indicator of general violence and sectarian warfare:

Diyala has defied the trend toward lower violence over the past six months in Baghdad and much of central Iraq, largely because it became the new base for insurgents pushed out of Baghdad and Anbar province.

At least 273 civilians were slain in Diyala last month, compared to at least 213 in June, according to an Associated Press count. Over the same span, monthly civilian deaths in Baghdad dropped from at least 838 to at least 182. [emphasis added]

Query 1: If Operation Arrowhead Ripper (run by 3rd Brigade / 1st Cav in June) and the current offensive have been so successful, why are civilian deaths in Diyala rising sharply? I think the answer is clear. Notwithstanding the concentration of troops on the current offensive, we've reduced the aggregate troop level in Diyala to lower than it was at the height of the surge, spreading troops more thinly across the province to provide security for the Iraqi people. And the Iraqi security forces (army and police) have not picked up the slack. So, in the vacuum formed by the drawdown of U.S. forces, violence has surged.

Query 2: What is the relationship between increased airstrikes by Multi-National Forces - Iraq and civilian deaths? According to today's Wash. Post: "The U.S.-led coalition dropped 1,447 bombs on Iraq last year, an average of nearly four a day, compared with 229 bombs, or about four each week, in 2006." What's the significance of this for the overall counterinsurgency and stability effort in Iraq? Although human rights observers express concern about the collateral damage from these strikes, they don't think we're actually causing the uptick in civilian deaths in Diyala with these airstrikes. Rather, I think there's a more subtle link, possibly the relationship between our airstrikes and the aggregate level of violence among all parties. But I'm not sure. What do you think is going on here?

Or, rather, he's requested permission from the Army to leave. Tom Ricks reports in today's Washington Post that Army Lt. Col. John Nagl has submitted his retirement papers to the Army. Now, the Post reports that Nagl will leave the Army to take a policy fellowship with the centrist Center for a New American Security in DC.

One of the Army's most prominent younger officers, whose writings have influenced the conduct of the U.S. troop buildup in Iraq, said he has decided to leave the service to study strategic issues full time at a new Washington think tank.

Lt. Col. John Nagl, 41, is a co-author of the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations, which has been used heavily by U.S. forces carrying out the strategy of moving off big bases, living among the population and making the protection of civilians their top priority.

A Rhodes scholar, Nagl first achieved prominence for his Oxford University doctoral dissertation, which was published in 2002 as a book titled "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam." The introduction to a recent edition of the book was written by Gen. Peter Schoomaker, at the time the Army's chief of staff.

Nagl led a tank platoon in the 1991 Persian Gulf war and served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 as the operations officer for an Army battalion in Iraq's Anbar province. "I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency," Nagl told the New York Times Magazine in January 2004, "until I started doing it."

The Army is poorer for his loss. Nagl is one of this country's leading soldier-scholars. He was a likely candidate for general's stars and high command, because he had a rare combination of brilliant intellect and operational excellence as a commander. He was also one of the Army's best public intellectuals — capable of writing a book on counterinsurgency history, leading the effort to write the Army's new COIN manual, and even appearing on the Daily Show to talk about it all.

Some will argue that officers are fungible — that we are just cogs in the big green machine, and that one battalion commander is as good as the next one. In a limited sense, that argument is correct, to the extent that plenty of competent officers can competently command or serve as staff. But in John Nagl's case, it's wrong. He was one of the Army's "best and brightest." Except that unlike the previous generation written about by Halberstam, Nagl actually devoted his life to studying military history and incorporating those lessons into current operations. He pushed, cajoled, browbeat and nudged the Army to become a better institutional learner, and he succeeded in a number of ways, largely because he had influence that far outstripped his rank (through the power of a number of senior mentors, like Gen. David Petraeus, who advanced Nagl's ideas and protected him from bureaucratic retaliation.) The lethargic and ossified American Army needs change agents like John Nagl to push for evolution and revolution from within, and it will miss his absence.

Another risk in Nagl's departure is the "Pied Piper" effect he may have on other bright, shining stars within the Army. There is a cadre of talented young Army and Marine Corps soldier-scholars with graduate degrees, Oxford / Truman / Marshall scholarships, serious combat bona fides, and the desire to make the institution better. I know a number of these folks and they're truly outstanding officers. Many looked to Nagl for leadership. Some may see this and choose to get out too. Their departure will also leave the Army poorer, although I also think that many who leave do continue to serve in other ways (as I have tried to do).

However, I have every confidence that Lt. Col. Nagl will continue to serve in his new role, and continue his push for change from the outside. As he told the Post: "It's not the strain of repeated deployments," he said, but "a belief that I can contribute perhaps on a different level — and my family wants me to leave." I respect him for listening to his family, and look forward to the contribution that Mister Doctor Nagl can make in his next career.

Several review copies of books have shown up lately. And while I haven't had a chance to read or review them yet, I wanted to post a note with recommendations in case you're interested in checking them out:

"God Willing" -- by Capt. Eric Navarro, USMCR. The title of the book comes from the English translation of "insha'allah" -- an all-purpose saying in Iraq for "if God wills it." It can mean either hope or fatalism; optimism or determinism. Depends on the context. As a combat adviser to the Iraqi Army, I'm sure that Capt. Navarro heard it many, many times. This is the story of his time advising the Iraqi Army during the assault on Fallujah, among other engagements, and it's a great tale. Capt. Navarro is now back in Iraq on his second tour, but I look forward to reading his book and hopefully meeting him when he comes home to New York City.

"Torture and Democracy" -- by Darius Rejali, professor of political science at Reed College. This massive tome contains a comprehensive modern history of torture -- "from the late nineteenth century to the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, from slavery and the electric chair to electrotorture in American inner cities, and from French and British colonial prison cells and the Spanish-American War to the fields of Vietnam, the wars of the Middle East, and the new democracies of Latin America and Europe." It ties together a number of disparate strands of scholarship which haven't been brought together before, and provides a chilling look at what governments have sought to do in the name of security and the greater good. Rejali is a prominent scholar and public intellectual with a long c.v. of writings on the subject. I'm looking forward to reading this history.

Sunday's New York Times features a lengthy front-page article titled "Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles" — what it bills as Part I of a "series of articles and multimedia about veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who have committed killings, or been charged with them, after coming home."

Right..... Because we all know that all veterans are coming home crazy, shell-shocked, and ready to kill their friends and loved ones. Here's how the NY Times staff produced this sensational story:

The New York Times found 121 cases in which veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan committed a killing in this country, or were charged with one, after their return from war. In many of those cases, combat trauma and the stress of deployment — along with alcohol abuse, family discord and other attendant problems — appear to have set the stage for a tragedy that was part destruction, part self-destruction.

Three-quarters of these veterans were still in the military at the time of the killing. More than half the killings involved guns, and the rest were stabbings, beatings, strangulations and bathtub drownings. Twenty-five offenders faced murder, manslaughter or homicide charges for fatal car crashes resulting from drunken, reckless or suicidal driving.

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The Pentagon does not keep track of such killings, most of which are prosecuted not by the military justice system but by civilian courts in state after state. Neither does the Justice Department.

To compile and analyze its list, The Times conducted a search of local news reports, examined police, court and military records and interviewed the defendants, their lawyers and families, the victims’ families and military and law enforcement officials.

This reporting most likely uncovered only the minimum number of such cases, given that not all killings, especially in big cities and on military bases, are reported publicly or in detail. Also, it was often not possible to determine the deployment history of other service members arrested on homicide charges.

The Times used the same methods to research homicides involving all active-duty military personnel and new veterans for the six years before and after the present wartime period began with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

This showed an 89 percent increase during the present wartime period, to 349 cases from 184, about three-quarters of which involved Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans. The increase occurred even though there have been fewer troops stationed in the United States in the last six years and the American homicide rate has been, on average, lower.

The Pentagon was given The Times’s roster of homicides. It declined to comment because, a spokesman, Lt. Col. Les Melnyk, said, the Department of Defense could not duplicate the newspaper’s research. Further, Colonel Melnyk questioned the validity of comparing prewar and wartime numbers based on news media reports, saying that the current increase might be explained by “an increase in awareness of military service by reporters since 9/11.” He also questioned the value of “lumping together different crimes such as involuntary manslaughter with first-degree homicide.”

So, basically, the reporters went trolling on Lexis-Nexis and other databases to find "murder" within the same paragraph as "veteran" or "soldier," and built a front-page story around that research. They compared the pre-war numbers to the post-war numbers and found that, voila!, there's a difference. And then it looks like they cherry-picked the best anecdotes out of that research (including the ones where they could get interviews and photos) to craft a narrative which fit the data.

The article makes no attempt to produce a statistically valid comparison of homicide rates among vets to rates among the general population. Nor does it rely at all on Pentagon data about post-deployment incidents of violence among veterans. It basically just generalizes from this small sample (121 out of 1.7 million Iraq and Afghanistan vets, not including civilians and contractors) to conclude that today's generation of veterans are coming home full of rage and ready to kill.

I've got a one-word verdict on this article and its research: bullshit.

To be sure, the article contains many truths about the struggles veterans face when they come home. Combat sears the mind and body in ways we can only begin to understand. An increased propensity to violence has been noted among veterans of previous wars, and by commanders supervising troops coming home from this one. However, there's a long road from those observations to the conclusions in this article, and the evidence simply doesn't add up in this story.

More broadly though, I worry about the larger narrative of this story. It seems like we've been down this road before — casting veterans in the role of crazed, violent, disturbed young men who come home from war to become homeless or criminal (or both). America needs to wrap its arms around its sons and daughters who go to war, not alienate them and push them away with this kind of narrative. We sent these men and women to fight; we have a sacred trust to ensure they're taken care of when they come home. Irresponsible journalism like this impedes that effort by giving people the wrong impression about combat veterans. I'm disappointed in the New York Times for running this story, and for giving it such prominence.

Update I: Abu Muquwama — himself an Iraq and Afghanistan veteran — notices the Rambo connection too, and also notices the ironic placement of a Style piece in today's paper about Rambo and tough guys. Hmmm...

Update II: Marc Danziger at Winds of Change also criticizes the article, and notes the lack of any statistical comparison between veterans and the base population. Using some publicly available stats and a little back-of-the-envelope math, he concludes that these homicide rates actually look lower than that among the general population. Marc thinks the Times left this point out because "it's not part of the narrative of how our soldiers are either depraved or damaged." Perhaps. But whether this omission of statistical analysis was intentional, irresponsible or simply amateurish, it's still wrong.