By the time F W de Klerk became president of SA in September 1989, the writing was on the wall.
Drastic action had to be taken to stop the spiral of violence that had escalated in speed and volume during the latter half of the 1980s.
The alternative was ominous: the country would slip into civil war, with the threat of international intervention.
Because the steps taken by the National Party (NP) government to curb the violence had all but failed, it was clear that the problem would be resolved only by addressing the key issue - real political representation .
The majority of white South Africans, including the NP, had started to realise this and it was against this background that preparations for major changes to the political landscape started once De Klerk assumed office.
It soon became clear that De Klerk (contrary to the expectations of many) was destined to break out of the mould painstakingly cast by many of his predecessors in the NP. His fundamental belief in justice was what enabled him to turn away from the previous securocratic system to a democratic approach.
De Klerk immediately set up a ministerial committee for negotiations, chaired by Gerrit Viljoen. Its first function was to address the obstacles impeding negotiations and the findings were quick and clear: the ANC had to be unbanned and Nelson Mandela had to be released from prison.
This was a minimum requirement and unless these steps were taken, any negotiations on the constitutional future of the country would be impossible. The decision was finally made at a cabinet bosberaad in early December 1989.
As far as the De Klerk government was concerned, SA would seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The first step would be to announce this at the opening of parliament on February 2 1990. As far as government was concerned there was no alternative.
Considering the worsening state of affairs during that period, it was obvious that the consequences would have been dire had De Klerk not made that speech at that stage. Firstly, he would have missed the opportunity to initiate the process and he would have been held in the same low regard as his predecessors.
Without a doubt, the surprise element of the speech had an effect on the events that unfolded thereafter. SA instantly became an international focal point of interest and hope.
It is clear now that had we not chosen this path, the frustrations and anger of the black majority would have culminated in a situation that few could have controlled.
Not only would all the security measures have been meaningless, but the black leadership would have found it impossible to persuade the masses of a negotiated settlement and reconciliation.
And finally, the international community, on both bilateral and multilateral levels, would have started to intervene directly.
The punitive measures that already existed would have been extended, with a harsh impact on the SA economy. The added possibility of direct action against the white regime could not be excluded.
Fortunately, the process that unfurled became one of the benchmarks in recent world history.
Unexpectedly, South Africans of all persuasions became driven by the desire to find a peaceful solution. Implementing the negotiations and establishing the required structures happened naturally - almost as if we had been trained to do so. The attitude that evolved was one of "there is no problem that we cannot resolve".
The personal chemistry of some of the key role players, together with mutual trust and a sense of ownership of the process and its outcome, were all ingredients of the success story that is now a part of our history.
Maybe the sense that we had but one chance to peacefully resolve the conflict became the driving force on both sides to produce a settlement.
Even during the most difficult times of the negotiations - such as the breakdown of talks after the Boipatong massacre in June 1992 - it was this sense that kept us talking. And it ensured that we never returned to the starting point.
As time passed, all of us involved gained deeper and more focused insights into how to find answers to various conflicting positions.
A shift took place in the minds of the NP government around the time of Boipatong. Until then we were still clinging to the old concept of maximum protection of white minority interests, secured through various constitutional mechanisms. It was an integral part of the overall problem.
But reality dawned and with it a new realisation: equal rights for all, safeguarded through a set of fundamental rights entrenched in the constitution. This new focus resulted in a sense of liberation for each of us.
Therefore, when the negotiations on the interim constitution were concluded and the document signed by Mandela and De Klerk on November 17 1993, I could celebrate with Cyril Ramaphosa and everybody else.
In a way, I felt I was granted the opportunity to be liberated in my own mind and to contribute to the liberation of all South Africans. And that is exactly how I still feel today, 10 years on.
- Meyer was in President F W de Klerk's cabinet and went on to play a key role in the negotiation process and in writing SA's new constitution.
