Schulze method
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The Schulze method is a voting system developed in 1997 by Markus Schulze that selects a single winner using votes that express preferences. The method can also be used to create a sorted list of winners. The Schulze method is also known as Schwartz Sequential Dropping (SSD), Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping (CSSD), Beatpath Method, Beatpath Winner, Path Voting, and Path Winner.
If there is a candidate who is preferred pairwise over the other candidates, when compared in turn with each of the others, the Schulze method guarantees that candidate will win. Because of this property, the Schulze method is (by definition) a Condorcet method.
Currently, the Schulze method is the most wide-spread Condorcet method. The Schulze method is used by several organizations including Wikimedia, Debian, Gentoo, and Software in the Public Interest.
Many different heuristics for computing the Schulze method have been proposed. The most important heuristics are the path heuristic and the Schwartz set heuristic that are described below. All heuristics find the same winner and only differ in the details of the computational procedure to determine this winner.
Contents |
[edit] The path heuristic
Under the Schulze method (as well as under other preferential single-winner election methods), each ballot contains a complete list of all candidates and the individual voter ranks this list in order of preference. Under a common ballot layout (as shown in the image to the right), ascending numbers are used, whereby the voter places a '1' beside the most preferred candidate, a '2' beside the second-most preferred, and so forth. Voters may give the same preference to more than one candidate and may keep candidates unranked. When a given voter does not rank all candidates, then it is presumed that this voter strictly prefers all ranked candidates to all not ranked candidates and that this voter is indifferent between all not ranked candidates.
[edit] Procedure
Suppose d[V,W] is the number of voters who strictly prefer candidate V to candidate W.
A path from candidate X to candidate Y of strength p is a sequence of candidates C(1),...,C(n) with the following properties:
-
- C(1) = X and C(n) = Y.
- For all i = 1,...,(n-1): d[C(i),C(i+1)] > d[C(i+1),C(i)].
- For all i = 1,...,(n-1): d[C(i),C(i+1)] ≥ p.
p[A,B], the strength of the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B, is the maximum value such that there is a path from candidate A to candidate B of that strength. If there is no path from candidate A to candidate B at all, then p[A,B] : = 0.
Candidate D is better than candidate E if and only if p[D,E] > p[E,D].
Candidate D is a potential winner if and only if p[D,E] ≥ p[E,D] for every other candidate E.
[edit] Implementation
Suppose C is the number of candidates. Then the strengths of the strongest paths can be calculated with the Floyd–Warshall algorithm. The following Pascal-like pseudocode illustrates the determination of such a path.
- Input: d[i,j] is the number of voters who strictly prefer candidate i to candidate j.
- Output: Candidate i is a potential winner if and only if "winner[i] = true".
1 for i : = 1 to C 2 begin 3 for j : = 1 to C 4 begin 5 if ( i ≠ j ) then 6 begin 7 if ( d[i,j] > d[j,i] ) then 8 begin 9 p[i,j] : = d[i,j] 10 end 11 else 12 begin 13 p[i,j] : = 0 14 end 15 end 16 end 17 end 18 19 for i : = 1 to C 20 begin 21 for j : = 1 to C 22 begin 23 if ( i ≠ j ) then 24 begin 25 for k : = 1 to C 26 begin 27 if ( i ≠ k ) then 28 begin 29 if ( j ≠ k ) then 30 begin 31 p[j,k] : = max { p[j,k]; min { p[j,i]; p[i,k] } } 32 end 33 end 34 end 35 end 36 end 37 end 38 39 for i : = 1 to C 40 begin 41 winner[i] : = true 42 end 43 44 for i : = 1 to C 45 begin 46 for j : = 1 to C 47 begin 48 if ( i ≠ j ) then 49 begin 50 if ( p[j,i] > p[i,j] ) then 51 begin 52 winner[i] : = false 53 end 54 end 55 end 56 end
[edit] Examples
[edit] Example 1
Example (45 voters; 5 candidates):
- 5 ACBED (that is, 5 voters have order of preference: A > C > B > E > D)
- 5 ADECB
- 8 BEDAC
- 3 CABED
- 7 CAEBD
- 2 CBADE
- 7 DCEBA
- 8 EBADC
d[*,A] | d[*,B] | d[*,C] | d[*,D] | d[*,E] | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
d[A,*] | 20 | 26 | 30 | 22 | |
d[B,*] | 25 | 16 | 33 | 18 | |
d[C,*] | 19 | 29 | 17 | 24 | |
d[D,*] | 15 | 12 | 28 | 14 | |
d[E,*] | 23 | 27 | 21 | 31 |
The critical defeats of the strongest paths are underlined.
... to A | ... to B | ... to C | ... to D | ... to E | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
from A ... | A-(30)-D-(28)-C-(29)-B | A-(30)-D-(28)-C | A-(30)-D | A-(30)-D-(28)-C-(24)-E | |
from B ... | B-(25)-A | B-(33)-D-(28)-C | B-(33)-D | B-(33)-D-(28)-C-(24)-E | |
from C ... | C-(29)-B-(25)-A | C-(29)-B | C-(29)-B-(33)-D | C-(24)-E | |
from D ... | D-(28)-C-(29)-B-(25)-A | D-(28)-C-(29)-B | D-(28)-C | D-(28)-C-(24)-E | |
from E ... | E-(31)-D-(28)-C-(29)-B-(25)-A | E-(31)-D-(28)-C-(29)-B | E-(31)-D-(28)-C | E-(31)-D |
p[*,A] | p[*,B] | p[*,C] | p[*,D] | p[*,E] | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
p[A,*] | 28 | 28 | 30 | 24 | |
p[B,*] | 25 | 28 | 33 | 24 | |
p[C,*] | 25 | 29 | 29 | 24 | |
p[D,*] | 25 | 28 | 28 | 24 | |
p[E,*] | 25 | 28 | 28 | 31 |
Candidate E is a potential winner, because p[E,X] ≥ p[X,E] for every other candidate X.
[edit] Example 2
Example (30 voters; 4 candidates):
- 5 ACBD
- 2 ACDB
- 3 ADCB
- 4 BACD
- 3 CBDA
- 3 CDBA
- 1 DACB
- 5 DBAC
- 4 DCBA
d[*,A] | d[*,B] | d[*,C] | d[*,D] | |
---|---|---|---|---|
d[A,*] | 11 | 20 | 14 | |
d[B,*] | 19 | 9 | 12 | |
d[C,*] | 10 | 21 | 17 | |
d[D,*] | 16 | 18 | 13 |
The critical defeats of the strongest paths are underlined.
... to A | ... to B | ... to C | ... to D | |
---|---|---|---|---|
from A ... | A-(20)-C-(21)-B | A-(20)-C | A-(20)-C-(17)-D | |
from B ... | B-(19)-A | B-(19)-A-(20)-C | B-(19)-A-(20)-C-(17)-D | |
from C ... | C-(21)-B-(19)-A | C-(21)-B | C-(17)-D | |
from D ... | D-(18)-B-(19)-A | D-(18)-B | D-(18)-B-(19)-A-(20)-C |
p[*,A] | p[*,B] | p[*,C] | p[*,D] | |
---|---|---|---|---|
p[A,*] | 20 | 20 | 17 | |
p[B,*] | 19 | 19 | 17 | |
p[C,*] | 19 | 21 | 17 | |
p[D,*] | 18 | 18 | 18 |
Candidate D is a potential winner, because p[D,X] ≥ p[X,D] for every other candidate X.
[edit] Example 3
Example (30 voters; 5 candidates):
- 3 ABDEC
- 5 ADEBC
- 1 ADECB
- 2 BADEC
- 2 BDECA
- 4 CABDE
- 6 CBADE
- 2 DBECA
- 5 DECAB
d[*,A] | d[*,B] | d[*,C] | d[*,D] | d[*,E] | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
d[A,*] | 18 | 11 | 21 | 21 | |
d[B,*] | 12 | 14 | 17 | 19 | |
d[C,*] | 19 | 16 | 10 | 10 | |
d[D,*] | 9 | 13 | 20 | 30 | |
d[E,*] | 9 | 11 | 20 | 0 |
The critical defeats of the strongest paths are underlined.
... to A | ... to B | ... to C | ... to D | ... to E | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
from A ... | A-(18)-B | A-(21)-D-(20)-C | A-(21)-D | A-(21)-E | |
from B ... | B-(19)-E-(20)-C-(19)-A | B-(19)-E-(20)-C | B-(19)-E-(20)-C-(19)-A-(21)-D | B-(19)-E | |
from C ... | C-(19)-A | C-(19)-A-(18)-B | C-(19)-A-(21)-D | C-(19)-A-(21)-E | |
from D ... | D-(20)-C-(19)-A | D-(20)-C-(19)-A-(18)-B | D-(20)-C | D-(30)-E | |
from E ... | E-(20)-C-(19)-A | E-(20)-C-(19)-A-(18)-B | E-(20)-C | E-(20)-C-(19)-A-(21)-D |
p[*,A] | p[*,B] | p[*,C] | p[*,D] | p[*,E] | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
p[A,*] | 18 | 20 | 21 | 21 | |
p[B,*] | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | |
p[C,*] | 19 | 18 | 19 | 19 | |
p[D,*] | 19 | 18 | 20 | 30 | |
p[E,*] | 19 | 18 | 20 | 19 |
Candidate B is a potential winner, because p[B,X] ≥ p[X,B] for every other candidate X.
[edit] Example 4
Example (9 voters; 4 candidates):
- 3 ABCD
- 2 DABC
- 2 DBCA
- 2 CBDA
d[*,A] | d[*,B] | d[*,C] | d[*,D] | |
---|---|---|---|---|
d[A,*] | 5 | 5 | 3 | |
d[B,*] | 4 | 7 | 5 | |
d[C,*] | 4 | 2 | 5 | |
d[D,*] | 6 | 4 | 4 |
The critical defeats of the strongest paths are underlined.
... to A | ... to B | ... to C | ... to D | |
---|---|---|---|---|
from A ... | A-(5)-B | A-(5)-C | A-(5)-C-(5)-D | |
from B ... | B-(5)-D-(6)-A | B-(7)-C | B-(5)-D | |
from C ... | C-(5)-D-(6)-A | C-(5)-D-(6)-A-(5)-B | C-(5)-D | |
from D ... | D-(6)-A | D-(6)-A-(5)-B | D-(6)-A-(5)-C |
p[*,A] | p[*,B] | p[*,C] | p[*,D] | |
---|---|---|---|---|
p[A,*] | 5 | 5 | 5 | |
p[B,*] | 5 | 7 | 5 | |
p[C,*] | 5 | 5 | 5 | |
p[D,*] | 6 | 5 | 5 |
Candidate B and candidate D are potential winners, because p[B,X] ≥ p[X,B] for every other candidate X and p[D,Y] ≥ p[Y,D] for every other candidate Y.
[edit] The Schwartz set heuristic
[edit] The Schwartz set
The definition of a Schwartz set, as used in the Schulze method, is as follows:
- An unbeaten set is a set of candidates of whom none is beaten by anyone outside that set.
- An innermost unbeaten set is an unbeaten set that doesn't contain a smaller unbeaten set.
- The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets.
[edit] Procedure
The voters cast their ballots by ranking the candidates according to their preferences, just like for any other Condorcet election.
The Schulze method uses Condorcet pairwise matchups between the candidates and a winner is chosen in each of the matchups.
From there, the Schulze method operates as follows to select a winner (or create a ranked list):
- Calculate the Schwartz set based only on undropped defeats.
- If there are no defeats among the members of that set then they (plural in the case of a tie) win and the count ends.
- Otherwise, drop the weakest defeat(s) (plural in the case of ex æquo[clarify] defeats) among the candidates of that set. Go to 1.
[edit] An example
[edit] The situation
Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities, and that everyone wants to live as near the capital as possible.
The candidates for the capital are:
- Memphis, the state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other cities
- Nashville, with 26% of the voters
- Knoxville, with 17% of the voters
- Chattanooga, with 15% of the voters
The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:
42% of voters (close to Memphis) |
26% of voters (close to Nashville) |
15% of voters (close to Chattanooga) |
17% of voters (close to Knoxville) |
---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
|
The results would be tabulated as follows:
A | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Memphis | Nashville | Chattanooga | Knoxville | ||
B | Memphis | [A] 58% [B] 42% |
[A] 58% [B] 42% |
[A] 58% [B] 42% |
|
Nashville | [A] 42% [B] 58% |
[A] 32% [B] 68% |
[A] 32% [B] 68% |
||
Chattanooga | [A] 42% [B] 58% |
[A] 68% [B] 32% |
[A] 17% [B] 83% |
||
Knoxville | [A] 42% [B] 58% |
[A] 68% [B] 32% |
[A] 83% [B] 17% |
||
Pairwise election results (won-lost-tied): | 0-3-0 | 3-0-0 | 2-1-0 | 1-2-0 | |
Votes against in worst pairwise defeat: | 58% | N/A | 68% | 83% |
- [A] indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the column caption to the candidate listed in the row caption
- [B] indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the row caption to the candidate listed in the column caption
[edit] Pairwise winners
First, list every pair, and determine the winner:
Pair | Winner |
---|---|
Memphis (42%) vs. Nashville (58%) | Nashville 58% |
Memphis (42%) vs. Chattanooga (58%) | Chattanooga 58% |
Memphis (42%) vs. Knoxville (58%) | Knoxville 58% |
Nashville (68%) vs. Chattanooga (32%) | Nashville 68% |
Nashville (68%) vs. Knoxville (32%) | Nashville 68% |
Chattanooga (83%) vs. Knoxville (17%) | Chattanooga: 83% |
Note that absolute counts of votes can be used, or percentages of the total number of votes; it makes no difference.
[edit] Dropping
Next we start with our list of cities and their matchup wins/defeats
- Nashville 3-0
- Chattanooga 2-1
- Knoxville 1-2
- Memphis 0-3
Technically, the Schwartz set is simply Nashville as it beat all others 3 to 0.
Therefore, Nashville is the winner.
[edit] Ambiguity resolution example
Let's say there was an ambiguity. For a simple situation involving candidates A, B, C, and D.
- A > B 68%
- C > A 52%
- A > D 62%
- B > C 72%
- B > D 84%
- C > D 91%
In this situation the Schwartz set is A, B, and C as they all beat D.
- A > B 68%
- B > C 72%
- C > A 52%
Schulze then says to drop the weakest margin, so we drop C > A and are left with
- A > B 68%
- B > C 72%
The new Schwartz set is now A, as it is unbeaten by anyone outside its set. With A in a Schwartz set by itself, it is now the winner.
[edit] Summary
In the (first) example election, the winner is Nashville. This would be true for any Condorcet method. Using the first-past-the-post system and some other systems, Memphis would have won the election by having the most people, even though Nashville won every simulated pairwise election outright. Nashville would also have been the winner in a Borda count. Instant-runoff voting in this example would select Knoxville, even though more people preferred Nashville than Knoxville.
[edit] Satisfied and failed criteria
[edit] Satisfied criteria
The Schulze method satisfies the following criteria:
- Universality
- Non-imposition (a.k.a. citizen sovereignty)
- Non-dictatorship
- Pareto criterion [1]
- Monotonicity criterion [2]
- Majority criterion
- Condorcet criterion (a.k.a. Condorcet winner criterion)
- Condorcet loser criterion
- Smith criterion
- Schwartz criterion
- Local independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Mutual majority criterion
- Independence of clones [3]
- Reversal symmetry [4]
- Mono-append
- Mono-add-plump
- Resolvability criterion [5]
- Polynomial runtime [6]
If winning votes is used as the definition of defeat strength, it also satisfies:
If margins as defeat strength is used, it also satisfies:
[edit] Failed criteria
The Schulze method violates the following criteria:
- All criteria that are incompatible with the Condorcet criterion (e.g. independence of irrelevant alternatives, participation [8], consistency, invulnerability to compromising, invulnerability to burying, later-no-harm)
[edit] Independence of irrelevant alternatives
The Schulze method fails independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, the method adheres to a less strict property that is sometimes called Local independence of irrelevant alternatives. It says that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will win the election if Y is not in the Smith set. Local IIA implies the Condorcet criterion.
[edit] Comparison with other preferential single-winner election methods
The following table compares the Schulze method with other preferential single-winner election methods:
Monotonic | Condorcet winner | Condorcet loser | Majority | Mutual majority | Clone independence | Reversal symmetry | Polynomial time | Participation, Consistency | |
Schulze | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ranked Pairs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
Kemeny-Young | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No |
MiniMax | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
Nanson | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No |
Baldwin | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No |
Instant-runoff voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
Coombs | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No |
Contingent voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
Sri Lankan contingent voting | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
Supplementary voting | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
Borda | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Bucklin | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No |
Plurality | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Anti-plurality | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
The difference between the Schulze method and the Ranked Pairs method is discussed in section 9 of this paper.
[edit] History of the Schulze method
The Schulze method was developed by Markus Schulze in 1997. The first times that the Schulze method was discussed in a public mailing list were in 1998 [9] and in 2000 [10]. In the following years, the Schulze method has been adopted e.g. by Software in the Public Interest (2003) [11], Debian (2003) [12], UserLinux (2003), Gentoo (2005), TopCoder (2005), and Sender Policy Framework (2005). The first books on the Schulze method were written by Tideman (2006) and by Stahl and Johnson (2007).
[edit] Use of the Schulze method
The Schulze method is not currently used in government elections. However, it is starting to receive support in some public organizations. Organizations which currently use the Schulze method are:
- The Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia (AMS) [13] and the Langara Students' Union (LSU) [14] are using the Schulze method for their voter-funded media system.
- Annodex Association [15]
- Blitzed [16]
- BoardGameGeek [17]
- Codex Alpe Adria [18]
- County Highpointers [19]
- Debian [12] [20]
- EnMasse Forums
- EuroBillTracker [21]
- Fair Trade Northwest (see article XI section 2 of their bylaws)
- Free Software Foundation Latin America (FSFLA) [22]
- Gentoo Foundation [23]
- GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) [24]
- Kingman Hall [25]
- Kumoricon [26]
- Mathematical Knowledge Management Interest Group (MKM-IG) (The MKM-IG uses Condorcet with dual dropping. That means: The Schulze ranking and the ranked pairs ranking are calculated and the winner is the top-ranked candidate of that of these two rankings that has the better Kemeny score.) [27]
- Metalab [28]
- Music Television (MTV) [29]
- North Shore Cyclists (NSC) [30]
- OpenCouchSurfing [31]
- Pittsburgh Ultimate [32]
- RPMrepo [33]
- Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [34]
- Software in the Public Interest (SPI) [11]
- Students for Free Culture [35]
- TopCoder [36]
- Wikimedia Foundation [37]
- Wikipedia in French (The Schulze method is one of three methods recommended for decision-making.) (see here)
- Wikipedia in Hungarian (see here and here)
- Wikipedia in Spanish (see here)
[edit] Wikimedia Foundation
As of July 2008, the largest Schulze poll was the election to Wikimedia's Board of Trustees in June 2008 [37]: One vacant seat had to be filled. There were 15 candidates, about 26,000 eligible voters, and 3,019 valid ballots.
As Chen was a clear Condorcet winner, he won the vacant seat. However, there was a tie for sixth to ninth position between Heiskanen, Postlethwaite, Smith, and Saintonge. Heiskanen beat Postlethwaite; Postlethwaite beat Smith; Smith beat Saintonge; Saintonge beat Heiskanen.
TC | AB | SK | HC | AH | JH | RP | SS | RS | DR | CS | MB | KW | PW | GK | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ting Chen | 1086 | 1044 | 1108 | 1135 | 1151 | 1245 | 1190 | 1182 | 1248 | 1263 | 1306 | 1344 | 1354 | 1421 | |
Alex Bakharev | 844 | 932 | 984 | 950 | 983 | 1052 | 1028 | 990 | 1054 | 1073 | 1109 | 1134 | 1173 | 1236 | |
Samuel Klein | 836 | 910 | 911 | 924 | 983 | 980 | 971 | 941 | 967 | 1019 | 1069 | 1099 | 1126 | 1183 | |
Harel Cain | 731 | 836 | 799 | 896 | 892 | 964 | 904 | 917 | 959 | 1007 | 1047 | 1075 | 1080 | 1160 | |
Ad Huikeshoven | 674 | 781 | 764 | 806 | 832 | 901 | 868 | 848 | 920 | 934 | 987 | 1022 | 1030 | 1115 | |
Jussi-Ville Heiskanen | 621 | 720 | 712 | 755 | 714 | 841 | 798 | 737 | 827 | 850 | 912 | 970 | 943 | 1057 | |
Ryan Postlethwaite | 674 | 702 | 726 | 756 | 772 | 770 | 755 | 797 | 741 | 804 | 837 | 880 | 921 | 1027 | |
Steve Smith | 650 | 694 | 654 | 712 | 729 | 750 | 744 | 778 | 734 | 796 | 840 | 876 | 884 | 1007 | |
Ray Saintonge | 629 | 703 | 641 | 727 | 714 | 745 | 769 | 738 | 789 | 812 | 848 | 879 | 899 | 987 | |
Dan Rosenthal | 595 | 654 | 609 | 660 | 691 | 724 | 707 | 699 | 711 | 721 | 780 | 844 | 858 | 960 | |
Craig Spurrier | 473 | 537 | 498 | 530 | 571 | 583 | 587 | 577 | 578 | 600 | 646 | 721 | 695 | 845 | |
Matthew Bisanz | 472 | 498 | 465 | 509 | 508 | 534 | 473 | 507 | 531 | 513 | 552 | 653 | 677 | 785 | |
Kurt M. Weber | 505 | 535 | 528 | 547 | 588 | 581 | 553 | 573 | 588 | 566 | 595 | 634 | 679 | 787 | |
Paul Williams | 380 | 420 | 410 | 435 | 439 | 464 | 426 | 466 | 470 | 471 | 429 | 521 | 566 | 754 | |
Gregory Kohs | 411 | 412 | 434 | 471 | 461 | 471 | 468 | 461 | 467 | 472 | 491 | 523 | 513 | 541 |
Each figure represents the number of voters who ranked the candidate at the left better than the candidate at the top. A figure in green represents a victory in that pairwise comparison by the candidate at the left. A figure in red represents a defeat in that pairwise comparison by the candidate at the left.
[edit] References
- ^ Schulze1, section 4.2
- ^ Schulze1, section 4.4
- ^ Schulze1, section 4.5
- ^ Schulze1, section 4.3
- ^ Schulze1, section 4.1
- ^ Schulze1, section 2.4
- ^ a b Schulze1, section 6
- ^ Schulze1, section 3.7
- ^ See:
- Mike Ossipoff, Party List P.S., July 1998
- Markus Schulze, Tiebreakers, Subcycle Rules, August 1998
- Markus Schulze, Maybe Schulze is decisive, August 1998
- Norman Petry, Schulze Method - Simpler Definition, September 1998
- Markus Schulze, Schulze Method, November 1998
- ^ See:
- Anthony Towns, Disambiguation of 4.1.5, November 2000
- Norman Petry, Constitutional voting, definition of cumulative preference, December 2000
- ^ a b Process for adding new board members, January 2003
- ^ a b Constitutional Amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD Voting Method, June 2003
- ^ May-June 2008 Voter-Funded Media Contest at University of British Columbia
- ^ Langara Students Union 2008 Voter-Funded Media Contest
- ^ Election of the Annodex Association committee for 2007, February 2007
- ^ Condorcet method for admin voting, January 2005
- ^ Important notice for Golden Geek voters, September 2007
- ^ Codex Alpe Adria Competitions
- ^ Adam Helman, Family Affair Voting Scheme - Schulze Method
- ^ See:
- ^ See:
- Candidate cities for EBTM05, EuroBillTracker Forum, December 2004
- Meeting location preferences, EuroBillTracker Forum, December 2004
- Date for EBTM07 Berlin, EuroBillTracker Forum, January 2007
- Vote the date of the Summer EBTM08 in Ljubljana, EuroBillTracker Forum, January 2008
- ^ FSFLA Voting Instructions (Spanish); FSFLA Voting Instructions (Portuguese)
- ^ See:
- Gentoo Foundation Charter
- Aron Griffis, 2005 Gentoo Trustees Election Results, May 2005
- Lars Weiler, Gentoo Weekly Newsletter 23 May 2005
- Daniel Drake, Gentoo metastructure reform poll is open, June 2005
- Grant Goodyear, Results now more official, September 2006
- 2007 Gentoo Council Election Results
- ^ GnuPG Logo Vote, November 2006
- ^ See:
- Ka-Ping Yee, Condorcet elections, March 2005
- Ka-Ping Yee, Kingman adopts Condorcet voting, April 2005
- ^ See:
- ^ See:
- MKM-IG Charter
- Michael Kohlhase, MKM-IG Trustees Election Details & Ballot, November 2004
- Andrew A. Adams, MKM-IG Trustees Election 2005, December 2005
- Lionel Elie Mamane, Elections 2007: Ballot, August 2007
- ^ Generalversammlung 2007/Wahlmodus (German), March 2007
- ^ Benjamin Mako Hill, Voting Machinery for the Masses, July 2008
- ^ NSC Jersey election, NSC Jersey vote, September 2007
- ^ Thomas Goorden, CS community city ambassador elections on January 19th 2008 in Antwerp and ..., November 2007
- ^ 2006 Community for Pittsburgh Ultimate Board Election, September 2006
- ^ LogoVoting, December 2007
- ^ See:
- SPF Council Election Procedures
- 2006 SPF Council Election, January 2006
- 2007 SPF Council Election, January 2007
- ^ See:
- Bylaws of the Students for Free Culture, article V, section 1.1.1
- Free Culture Student Board Elected Using Selectricity, February 2008
- ^ See:
- 2006 TopCoder Open Logo Design Contest, November 2005
- 2006 TopCoder Collegiate Challenge Logo Design Contest, June 2006
- 2007 TopCoder High School Tournament Logo, September 2006
- 2007 TopCoder Arena Skin Contest, November 2006
- 2007 TopCoder Open Logo Contest, January 2007
- 2007 TopCoder Open Web Design Contest, January 2007
- 2007 TopCoder Collegiate Challenge T-Shirt Design Contest, September 2007
- 2008 TopCoder Open Logo Design Contest, September 2007
- 2008 TopCoder Open Web Site Design Contest, October 2007
- 2008 TopCoder Open T-Shirt Design Contest, March 2008
- ^ a b See:
- Jesse Plamondon-Willard, Board election to use preference voting, May 2008
- Mark Ryan, 2008 Wikimedia Board Election results, June 2008
- 2008 Board Elections, June 2008
Schulze1: Markus Schulze, A New Monotonic, Clone-Independent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-Consistent Single-Winner Election Method
[edit] External links
Note that these sources may refer to the Schulze method as CSSD, SSD, beatpath, path winner, etc.
[edit] General
- Proposed Statutory Rules for the Schulze Single-Winner Election Method by Markus Schulze
- A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method by Markus Schulze (mirrors: [1] [2])
- A New Monotonic, Clone-Independent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-Consistent Single-Winner Election Method by Markus Schulze
- Free Riding and Vote Management under Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote by Markus Schulze
- Implementing the Schulze STV Method by Markus Schulze
- A New MMP Method by Markus Schulze
- A New MMP Method (Part 2) by Markus Schulze
[edit] Tutorials
- Schulze-Methode (German) by the University of Stuttgart
[edit] Advocacy
- Election Methods Resource by Blake Cretney
- Voting Methods Survey by James Green-Armytage
- Descriptions of ranked-ballot voting methods by Rob LeGrand
- Accurate Democracy by Rob Loring
- Schulze beatpaths method by Warren D. Smith
- Election Methods and Criteria by Kevin Venzke
- The Debian Voting System by Jochen Voss
- election-methods: a mailing list containing technical discussions about election methods
[edit] Research papers
- A Continuous Rating Method for Preferential Voting by Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, and Laia Saumell
- Voting Systems by Paul E. Johnson
- Distance from Consensus: a Theme and Variations by Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi
- Analyzing Political Disagreement by Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi
- Descriptions of voting systems by Warren D. Smith
- Election Systems by Peter A. Taylor
- Personalisierung der Verhältniswahl durch Varianten der Single Transferable Vote (German) by Martin Wilke
- Approaches to Constructing a Stratified Merged Knowledge Base by Anbu Yue, Weiru Liu, and Anthony Hunter
[edit] Books
- Understanding Modern Mathematics by Saul Stahl and Paul E. Johnson (ISBN 0-7637-3401-2)
- Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice [3] by Nicolaus Tideman (ISBN 0-7546-4717-X)
[edit] Software
- Voting Software Project by Blake Cretney
- Condorcet with Dual Dropping Perl Scripts by Mathew Goldstein
- Condorcet Voting Calculator by Eric Gorr
- Selectricity and RubyVote by Benjamin Mako Hill
- Java implementation of the Schulze method by Thomas Hirsch
- Electowidget by Rob Lanphier
- Haskell Condorcet Module by Evan Martin
- Condorcet Internet Voting Service (CIVS) by Andrew Myers
- BetterPolls.com by Brian Olson
- OpenSTV by Jeffrey O'Neill