(October 13, 1950)

　　(1) Consultations with comrades of the Political Bureau have resulted in the consensus that it is advantageous for our troops to move into Korea. In the first stage our troops can single out the puppet troops as our target of attack. Our troops are certain of victory in dealing with the puppet troops and can open up base areas in the vast mountainous regions of Korea north of the Wonsan-Pyongyang line, thereby heartening the Korean people. In the first stage, with the wiping out of several divisions of the puppet troops, the situation in Korea will take a turn to our advantage.

　　(2) Our adoption of the above-mentioned positive policy is extremely advantageous to China, Korea, the East and indeed the world as a whole. Conversely, if we do not send our troops and let the enemy press forward to the banks of the Yalu River, the arrogance of the domestic and international reactionaries will be inflated, causing disadvantages to all concerned, first of all to northeast China, with the entire northeast border-guard forces pinned down and electrical power of southern Manchuria brought under enemy control.

　　In short, we deem that we should and must join the fighting in Korea. Participation will be most advantageous, while nonparticipation will be detrimental.