THE THAI CRISIS

History repeats itself

By W. Scott Thompson

Published: December 1, 2008

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Thailand is facing its third and greatest crisis since World War II and by far the greatest test of its monarch's power. It is difficult for outsiders to comprehend how so revered but distant a leader can wield such extraordinary powers, despite his merely "constitutional" role and numerous other constraints on his action.

The secret is not in the innate role of the throne, but in the style of this particular king. Twice before, in 1974 and 1992, when mobs threatened state order in their demands for a more democratic polity, Rama IX, or Bhumibol Adulyadej, waited day upon day to test the resilience of those he sought to favor, and to see if those he opposed could be forced to fade.

In 1974, students demanded an end to a particularly third-rate triumvirate, who had nonetheless empowered enormous economic growth. After bloodshed reached an intolerable level, by Thai standards, the king sent all three packing - to Boston and Taipei. He'd known them well and worked through them but realized their time had passed. And the king's power grew immeasurably in that decisive move.

Similarly in 1992, students seized the high ground against a coup-installed military regime, and again only after several hundred deaths did the king summon the two contenders to the palace - and cause them literally to crawl on the carpet to the elevated place of the monarch, all but foretelling their agreement to his dispensation.

He waits anew. This time he has a bigger task: the damage to the economy and political system by two years of demonstrations is far greater, and his own goal is much bigger. He wishes to bury forever the prospects of the only political leader in his 50-year reign to stand up to him and attempt to supplant him - Thaksin Shinawatra, a self-made billionaire and former police general who developed a huge base in the Thai countryside through demagogic policies and increasingly strident opposition to the "forces of the status quo" - a direct jab at the throne itself.

In fact the current crisis is a bit more complicated, for there are three players, each a descendant of forces set in motion when the absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932.

First, the monarchy. From 1932 until about 1963, 17 years after the present king's accession, the throne was a faint glimmer of past glory. A junta that had seized power in 1957 began to use Bhumibol, but he proved cannier in using them, and that has been the pattern. He is now old and frail but intends to stick around until he's won this final round.

Secondly, the direct descendant of a group of Mussolini-like semi-fascists who staged a coup in 1932 is not the army, but Thaksin himself.

From 1948 a third group of Thais emerged around a progressive promoter, Pridi Panomyong, who founded a great university and inspired young democrats, but who wasn't able to maintain power against the better-armed rightist group who restored themselves to power. Students abroad encouraged democratic roots in the kingdom, demanding reforms and elections in country-wide demonstrations late in 1973, forcing the king's hand to prevent chaos. They have matured - if we call it that - into the People's Alliance for Democracy, the PAD, which now occupies airports, government buildings and has brought business virtually to a standstill.

There was always, though, a permanent government of foreign-educated princes who, even today, keep a tight hold on power.

Thaksin overwhelmingly won the elections he contested. Why then are the "democrats" in such opposition to him? It would be tempting to say, with Lenin, that he is the "principal enemy." They suspect that if left to his own devices he would rule eternally. Tolerance has never been Thaksin's virtue.

His ability to elicit the animosity of the throne came naturally, given the enormous electoral mandate he acquired in the countryside. In a variety of ways he made known that the national adoration of the king was old-fashioned.

Bhumibol is a gentle man but he has never countenanced opposition gently. It was he who signaled the army to move in September 2006 to depose Thaksin. But the government all but placed in power by him failed to move in the way he desired.

Secondly, the "democrats" were never quite so pure. Of course there is a spectrum of views in the PAD, including some very virtuous professed democrats. But there are also unscrupulous party hacks that make the organization work. And most of the professedly "democratic" opposition haven't flinched at such trivial details as military coups, martial law, and whatever else needed to rid the country of Thaksin or his allies forever. Thaksin was seen as an illegitimate upstart.