September 2007 - Posts

Sandi is on holidays!

My family and I are on holidays for a few weeks, so things will be quiet around here.  I am not planning to do any blogging until mid-October.

That being said, keep an eye on my blog; there is an announcement already written and scheduled to go live in my absence Wink

Posted by sandi with 1 comment(s)

In IE7 you cannot use an application to programmatically enumerate IE7 instances in a desktop other than the default desktop

This issue occurs because of a change in behavior in Internet Explorer 7.

In Internet Explorer 6, the ShellWindows object is associated with the following CLSID:
{9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39}

This object is a COM local server that exists for each desktop. When you use the CoCreate function to create a ShellWindows instance, the instance is bound to the server on the desktop where you create the instance. Therefore, the application can enumerate the Internet Explorer 6 windows in all desktops.

In Internet Explorer 7, the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\ subkey is added together with the RunAs registry entry. And the value of the RunAs registry entry is set to Interactive User. This change in behavior for Internet Explorer 7 causes the ShellWindows instance to be bound to the server on the default desktop even if you create the instance in other desktops.

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx/kb/940998

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HOTFIX: Problems may occur when you try to use POST method or the GET method to pass Form data in a Web page in IE7 or in IE6

Symptom 1

The POST method or the GET method may encode certain characters as Unicode numeric character references. For example, these methods may encode あ as %26% 2312354%3B.

This problem may occur in Web pages that contain Japanese characters. Additionally, the Web pages are marked with a charset of windows-31j in the HTTP headers.

Symptom 2

The POST method or the GET method cannot transmit Form data to the Web server. Additionally, you may receive a script error message that resembles the following:

Line: Line Number
Char: Number
Error: Unspecified error.
Code: 0
URL: URL

This problem may occur if the Form data contains Unicode-only characters at the start of a lone field. For example, the Form data may contain one of the following kinds of Unicode-only characters at the start of a lone field:

• A mixture of ASCII and Japanese characters.
• The character U+301C (tilde 〜) together with Chinese, Japanese, or Korean characters.
• The character U+3030 (tilde 〰) together with Chinese, Japanese, or Korean characters.

This problem occurs because Internet Explorer does not correctly use the code page for the required language when the Form data contains certain character combinations.

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx/kb/939941

Fight back: MS targets Storm malware

Microsoft quietly added detection of the "Storm" family of malware to the September build of its Malicious Software Removal Tool.  The MSRT is released as part of the monthly security update cycle (although I do wish it was updated more often - it can be an extremely effective tool in the fight against malware, as you will see from this article).

Jimmy Kuo of the Anti-Malware Engineering Team has posted some very interesting statistics and snippets of background information about the effect that adding detection of "Storm" had on Windows PCs (and the Storm botnet) around the world which illustrates just how powerful the MSRT can be in the fight against malware.

Jimmy reports that:

"The Renos family of malware has been removed from 668,362 distinct machines.  The Zlob family has been removed from 664,258 machines.  And the Nuwar family has been removed from 274,372 machines.  In total, malware has been removed by this month’s MSRT from 2,574,586 machines.

So, despite some public concern in the press and among researchers about the “Storm” worm, it ranks third among the families of malware whose signatures have been added to the MSRT."

Sadly, as has always been the case in this type of battle, the criminals behind Storm fought back quickly.  Jimmy went on to say that: 

"Another antimalware researcher who has been tracking these recent attacks has presented us with data that shows we knocked out approximately one-fifth of “Storm’s” Denial of Service (DoS) capability on September 11th.  Unfortunately, that data does not show a continued decrease since the first day.  We know that immediately following the release of MSRT, the criminals behind the deployment of the “Storm” botnet immediately released a newer version to update their software.  To compare, one day from the release of MSRT, we cleaned approximately 91,000 machines that had been infected with any of the number of Nuwar components.  Thus, the 180,000+ additional machines that have been cleaned by MSRT since the first day are likely to be home user machines that were not notably incorporated into the daily operation of the “Storm” botnet.  Machines that will be cleaned by MSRT in the subsequent days will be of similar nature."

The Malicious Software Removal Tool is offered as a critical update via Microsoft Update, Windows Update, and Auto Update to any computer that is running Windows Vista, Windows XP, Windows 2000, and Windows Server 2003.  Comprehensive information about the MSRT, and download links, can be found here:
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=890830

An important note about the MSRT:

"**W32/HackDef typically hides other potentially unwanted software on the computer. If the cleaner tool reports that W32/HackDef was detected on the computer, we strongly recommend that you run a scan with up-to-date antivirus and antispyware programs (see http://www.microsoft.com/athome/security/spyware/default.mspx). If you want to view the software that W32/HackDef was hiding, first open the log file for the cleaner tool (%WINDIR%\debug\mrt.log). Next, in the Scanning Results section, find the line or lines that note the folder in which Win32/Hackdef was found. In that same folder, you should find the Win32/Hackdef configuration file that has the .ini file name extension. View this file to determine the software that Win32/HackDef was hiding on the computer."

SECURITY FIX: Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2007-28

As noted here, a vulnerability involving Firefox and QuickTime was reported, and code advising how to take advantage of that vulnerability has been published.

As noted by Mozilla, "Disabling JavaScript in the browser does not protect against this attack; in vulnerable versions scripts passed through the -chrome option would be executed regardless of the JavaScript setting for web content, much as interpreters for languages such as perl and Python execute scripts passed on the command line. The NoScript add-on, however, has provided protection against this class of attack since the cross-browser vulnerabilities described by MFSA 2007-23 were discovered."

It is strongly recommended that you download Firefox 2.0.0.7 as soon as possible, because it fixes this QuickTime vulnerability by removing the ability to run arbitrary scripts from the command line.

Developing Safer ActiveX Controls Using the Sitelock TemplateDeveloping Safer ActiveX Controls Using the Sitelock Template

The IE team have blogged about the release of a new version of the SiteLock Template for ActiveX Controls.  I can't stress strongly enough how important it is that developers place security first when developing controls. 

Over the years there have been numerous instances where ActiveX controls have exposed a vulnerability that has been exploited by the bad guys, including controls that were never meant to be used on the internet per se.  IE7 addressed this problem by disabling many pre-installed activex controls, making them inaccessible to Web pages without user permission and interaction.  Microsoft, in conjunction with control developers, have at various times, released killbits to stop controls that were never meant to be used by IE from being used nefariously.  But, such steps do not relieve developers of their basic responsibility to code with security uppermost in their mind.

The great thing about the SiteLock Template is that it helps developers manage how their controls can be used (zone and domain name) and even allows a developer to impose a time frame for use, after which the control will no longer work.

"The Internet" has never been more dangerous than it is now for the casual web surfer and it is going to take a concerted effort by everyone to make a difference - *all* web browsers will have to continue to improve on safety (hopefully without 'breaking the web'); those who manage sites and servers will have to be conscious of security at all times with appropriate hardware and software defences, always patching and keeping their software up to date; developers will have to take advantage of services such as the SiteLock Template to guard against misuse of their products, and users have to take responsibility for their own safety by patching and updating software, practising safe-hex and not taking silly risks.

Far too often a web site is compromised because the back-end software is an older, vulnerable version, or because patches are missing.  The bad guys find these vulnerable servers and have no hesitation in getting in there and taking advantage of the situation, sometimes gaining access to hundreds, if not thousands, of sites in one fell swoop.  The people who own such servers bear first responsibility for allowing such a situation to develop in the first place, but their clients must also shoulder some responsibility for not educating themselves about the services and software they are using, or failing to make the sometimes financially detrimental decision to go elsewhere if their host will not clean up their act.

Far too often a user is infected because they haven't patched, or they haven't installed the latest version of their web browser or other software exposed to "the internet", or because they're turned off inbuilt protections or lowered their browser's security settings.

I miss the old days when internet dangers were pretty much restricted to attachments on email and risky behaviour such as surfing to porn sites or downloading warez, and removing adware or malware was simply a matter of deleting a few files and registry keys.  Nowadays, any web site at any time could potentially present a risk to a visitor - whether it be because of hacking, or malicious advertising.  And some malware is so difficult to remove, and the risk it presents to user security so grave, that reformatting is the only way to guarantee that nothing nasty has been left lying around.

Be careful out there gang.  Don't just use Windows Update - switch over to using Microsoft Update which will cover not only the operating system but other Microsoft software such as the Office suite - if you use a third party web browser update it.  If you use QuickTime, or Flash, or Java, or whatever else, update it.  Any piece of software that touches the internet is a potential risk that must be managed.

 

HOTFIX: You may be unable to use an FTP application to upload a file to a remote server on a computer that has Internet Explorer 7 installed

On a computer that has Windows Internet Explorer 7 installed, you may be unable to use an FTP application to upload a file to a remote server.

This problem occurs if the application is based on WinINet FTP functions.

This problem occurs because of an access violation that is caused by the InternetWriteFile WinINet API function.

When you use an application that is based on WinINet FTP functions to upload a file to a remote server, the remote file is created by using the APPE FTP command. However, when the operating system tries to use the InternetWriteFile function to write the file, this access violation occurs.

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx/kb/934376

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One little apostrophe made all the difference

This link, when clicked on in Outlook, generated an error message in IE7 (The original URL is now changed, so don't try it):

http://www.castlecops.com/a6827-eChecks_and_Credit_Charges_–_I_Didn't_Authorize_That.html

The error was:

Internet Explorer cannot read this webpage format  HTTP 406 
   What you can try:
     Go back to the previous page.
 
     More information

This error (HTTP 406 Not Acceptable) means that Internet Explorer was able to receive information from the website you visited, but the information was not in a format that Internet Explorer can display.

**But**, if we went to the site in question, then clicked on the very same link on the web page, the page opened successfully.

The site author needed to edit the URL so that it would work for IE7 users to this:

http://www.castlecops.com/a6827-eChecks_and_Credit_Charges_–_I_Did_Not_Authorize_That.html

The cause of the problem was the apostrophe in the original URL.  To quote the site owner when notified of the problem:

"for some folks its taken as a literal, for others its escaped.  The literal ' we 406 on"

Have you been to Egypt?

We're taking a real family holiday in a few weeks - the first one that we have taken as an entire family in a very long time - and it is very special - Singapore then Cairo, then Frankfurt, then Zurich, then Paris, then Versailles, then Mont St Michel, then Neuschwanstein Castle.

Anyway, I'm hoping to prepare the kids for the experience that is Egypt - one is 16, one will be *just* 18.  Cairo is going to be a place that is nothing like anything they have ever experienced before.

I have found some fantastic guides, the best of which seems to be the "Spiral Guide" to Egypt.  The author obviously had an exquisite sense of honesty ... some quotes - and I swear, it really says this:

  1. Taxis are much cheaper than in Europe, but rarely use their meters.  Even if they do, the amount shown will probably bear little resemblance to the fare charged by the driver.
  2. Beejous have been nicknamed "flying coffins" as they tend to be driven fast, and recklessly. Accidents are common, especially at night.
  3. If you hit someone in the countryside, report it immediately at the nearest police station, and be aware that you may be attacked by angry villagers.
  4. Egyptian car mechanics are often masters of invention and can usually fix a breakdown - if you run into trouble, people will often gladly help you push your car to the next garage or the side of the road.
  5. Budget hotels are rarely air-conditioned, but some will have cooling fans.  A few are real gems, old art-deco buildings with high ceilings, old-fashioned furniture and unreliable plumbing.  The less said about others, the better.

So anyway, does anybody have advice for the trip to Egypt?  What would *you* advise somebody who had never been to the country before?  My most important concern is that the family as a whole respects the traditions and cultures of the country being visited, and that my (teenage) kids have a handle on what to expect when we get there, that they understand the 'what', the 'why' and the 'wherefore', and that they learn the traditional greetings and responses... and understand the importance of traditions such as baksheesh in a country where such 'tipping' is often the only source of income, but where it can also cause offence if offered inappropriately.

What do my gentle readers have to say, especially about baksheesh?

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Cool. Some nice publicity for IE-VISTA...

IE-VISTA is featured on the Internet Explorer Community Site, and the Windows Vista Community site, and my latest article, Don't Take The Bait!, is currently a featured column.

image

image

 

You can see my article about phishing scams, Don't Take The Bait!, here.  Word is that the article has the highest satisfaction rating ever, at 0.91 out of maximum rating of 1.00.

My previous article, which was also featured on the Windows Vista Community site, and titled Better Browsing, also achieved a high satisfaction rating, at 0.84 out of a possible 1.00.  The median user rating for articles is 0.42, and only 7.5 percent of Help topics have achieved a rating higher than 0.70.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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me.dium updated again

An important change that needs to be noted is that all me.dium profiles are now public, albeit with limited information.   Looked at the from the perspective of my earlier comments about my concerns about people on my friends list having private profiles, the change is a good thing in that I'm not blocked from seeing *something* about those on my friends list, but at the same time, some may not be happy.  If, like me, you have a widget on your web site or blog, your friends list will grow very quickly as people use your widget to join the me.dium community and it is far nicer to be able to learn something about all these strangers - it's a fascinating social experiment.

Those of you who have already installed me.dium should be prompted to download and install the latest version when you start IE.  The same installer can be used on x86 and x64 systems (although I note that the installer still cannot add the me.dium button to the Command Bar on Vista x64 systems :o(  The process fails, and all custom buttons are removed.  IE must be restarted before any custom buttons can be added to the Command Bar using the standard dialogue box.

Me.dium had a part to play in a chat I had online with a friend, just today.  The only reason the conversation took place at all was I saw somebody who had been on my friend list for a while, and who I knew of from the original me.dium beta testing group, pop over to my latest article for the Windows Vista Community.  It turned out he did not know that I had written the article in question.  Then, in the course of the discussion, we chatted about phishing, and malicious web sites, and somehow moved on to holidays, travel, and eventually diving.  I was able to use me.dium to quickly guide my correspondent to a web site with lots of photographs from a boat charter service that I know of that specializes in sea lion tours.  All very cool.

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Keyloggers compulsory in Mumbai Internet Cafes...

"The Mumbai police are in dialogue with M/s Micro Technologies for procuring a software called CARMS (Cyber Access Remote Monitoring System), a powerful monitoring tool that seeks to curb cyber crime.

CARMS monitors web browsing, file transfers, news, chats, messaging and e-mail, including all encoded attachments. In a sensitive environment, CARMS can also be used to restrict user or group access to only approved external and internal sites, explained a company official.

All cyber cafes in the city will now need a police license to keep their business going. All cafes need to register at the police headquarters and provide details on the number of computers installed, type of computers and technical details like the IP address of each machine."

Source: http://www.mid-day.com/news/city/2007/august/163165.htm

There are several internet cafes close to where I work, and I shudder when I walk past and see people accessing their email, or doing their banking.  My personal rule is that I do not use any computer that is not under my sole ownership and control when travelling for anything that requires a username or password, whether it be internet banking, or webmail, or chat clients or anything else.  This is because I have no way of knowing what may be installed on a computer that is not under my care and control, and I am not willing to risk compromising my personal and financial safety. 

When travelling I only use my laptop (with Vista installed) and either a temporary T.Mobile or other ISP account or a wireless hotspot - and even then I set the connection as "public", with things such as network discovery and file sharing, printer sharing, public folder sharing, and media sharing turned off.  If I don't have my laptop, then I simply stay offline.

You can find more information about the different types of wireless network categories in Vista here:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/cableguy/cg0906.mspx


 

Quicktime and Firefox vulnerability

"In practice I can do anything with the browser, like installing browser backdoors, and the operating system if the victim is running with administrative privileges. However, just for the sake of this demonstration, I simply open calc.exe. Keep in mind that the exploit is cross-platformed."

and

"Before we move on, I have to say a few things. Last year I disclosed two highly critical QuickTime vulnerabilities here and here. The first vulnerability was fixed but the second one was completely ignored. I tried to bring the spot light on the second vulnerability one more time over here, yet nobody listened. So, I decided to post a demonstration of how a Low risk issue can be turned into a very easy to perform HIGH risk attack."

Note that the exploit apparently also works in IE, but its impact is not as critical due to "due to the tightened security policies IE implements for local zone scripts".

Source: http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/0day-quicktime-pwns-firefox

Mozilla's response:

"If Firefox is the default browser when a user plays a malicious media file handled by Quicktime, an attacker can use a vulnerability in Quicktime to compromise Firefox or the local machine. This can happen while browsing or by opening a malicious media file directly in Quicktime. So far this is only reproducible on Windows.

Petkov provided proof of concept code that may be easily converted into an exploit, so users should consider this a very serious issue."

Source: http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2007/09/12/quicktime-to-firefox-issue/

The latest version of QuickTime is Version 7.2 - it is strongly recommended that you download and install this version from here.  Sorry, but I can't cast my eye over the End User Licence Agreement because the link on the QuickTime download page is broken - good one Apple.

You cannot log on to an FTP site or you are redirected to the root folder of the FTP site in IE7

"There are two main methods to use FTP in Windows. One method uses Windows Explorer to browse FTP sites by using a folder-based interface. By default, Internet Explorer uses this method. The other method uses an implementation in Internet Explorer that is based on the WinINet API. When you use this method, you browse FTP sites in Internet Explorer in the same manner that you browse Web sites.

Versions of Internet Explorer that are earlier than Internet Explorer 7 are not separate from the rest of Windows. Internet Explorer and the rest of Windows just have different entry points in the user interface. When you browse an FTP site in Internet Explorer, the FTP site opens in Windows Explorer. Windows supports home directories and the relative path of the FTP URL. Therefore, after you enter the user name and the password, you are redirected to an assigned folder according to the user name. This assigned folder appears as the root of the FTP server.

Internet Explorer 7 is separate from the rest of Windows. Therefore, when you use Internet Explorer 7 to access an FTP site, the behavior differs from the behavior of earlier versions of Internet Explorer. Internet Explorer does not support home directories and the relative path of the FTP URL. Therefore, you are redirected to the root folder of the FTP server. If you do not have permission to access the root folder, you cannot access the FTP site.

For more information, click the following article number to view the article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base:
Separation of Internet Explorer 7 from the Windows shell"

To work around this issue, follow these steps:

1. Start Internet Explorer.
2. Click Tools, and then click Internet Options.
3. Click the Advanced tab. 
4. Under Browsing, Click to select the Enable FTP folder view (outside of Internet Explorer) check box, and then click OK.
5. In Windows Explorer, enter the URL of the FTP site, and then press ENTER.


http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx/kb/941896

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A potential end to free speech on the internet?

2Clix has sued the owner of the Australia based Whirlpool chat forums for $150,000.00 and requested the permanent removal of two threads criticizing the 2Clix software.

2Clix, a less than reputable software company, has filed suit against the founder of the Whirlpool forums, because of negative comments made about 2Clix software by Whirlpool forum participants.

The Statement of Claim in the action can be seen here.  The basic premise of the 2Clix's suit is that the comments cited are "false and malicious".  The comments are not made by Whirlpool's owners, or controllers, but rather by members of the forum.

The lawsuit says that Whirlpool "as a matter of law was and is responsible for the publication of the statements to users of the internet who access the website ("the publication"), but, inconveniently, does not expand on the specifics of this "matter of law".  I've been trawling through Austlii trying to find what they may be referring to, but it's a needle in a haystack.  It may be that by labelling the forums a "publication" they are trying to draw a comparison between the forums and professional tomes such as newspapers.

There are currently three threads devoted to the lawsuit:

1
2
3

Despite the seriousness of the situation, I couldn't help but laugh at the comment posted by one user "We have this thing called deflamation"...

The story is already sitting at 633 diggs... and is on slashdot.

The statement of claim filed by 2Clix is unimpressive... lots of quoting of nasty things said by unhappy 2Clix users... looking at the comments in question, and without the benefit of backend data such as IP addresses (to rule out one vindictive troll posting under numerous names) it sure does look like 2Clix has a lot of unhappy customers.  2Clix claims to have suffered a substantial loss in clients and sales since January 2007, which they blame on the Whirlpool threads.. but y'know what?  2Clix needs to come to terms with the reality that if you piss off enough people word is going to get around,  And thanks to services such as Google negative press can have a pretty much permanent life.. .once the genie is out of the bottle there is no putting it back.

Traditionally we cannot be sued for *honest* opinion.  We can all think and say whatever we damn well please about any software company, good or bad, **as long as what we say is our honest, heartfelt opinion**.  Things can get muddy if a conversation gets too heated or vindictive, but in the end, you can't be sued for honest personal beliefs.  You can't be sued for telling the world that Software Company X screwed you over when that is what has happened, and companies generally can't use the courts to muzzle honest complainants.

Fingers crossed this particular suit will be thrown out sooner rather than later. 

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Microsoft Update goes a little haywire...

So, what do we do when Microsoft Update offers this....

But this is installed....

 

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September security bulletins

MS07-051: Vulnerability in Microsoft Agent Could Allow Remote Code
Execution (938827)
Severity: Critical
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-051.mspx

MS07-052: Vulnerability in Crystal Reports for Visual Studio Could Allow
Remote Code Execution (941522)
Severity: Important
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-052.mspx

MS07-053: Vulnerability in Windows Services for UNIX Could Allow
Elevation of Privilege (939778)
Severity: Important
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-053.mspx

MS07-054: Vulnerability in MSN Messenger and Windows Live Messenger
Could Allow Remote Code Execution (942099)
Severity: Important
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-054.mspx

Did Sandi spam news.admin.net-abuse.email?

In answer to the question posted by Paul Wright here:
http://msmvps.com/blogs/spywaresucks/archive/2007/09/10/1184164.aspx#1184814

"Are you the person spamming links to this all over news.admin.net-abuse.email, by the way? Hope not."

I did NOT spam my article about the e360 v Spamhaus decision at news.admin.net-abuse.email, or anywhere else for that matter.  Here are the headers of the post to that group that garned quite a few hits and comments on my blog:

http://groups.google.co.uk/group/news.admin.net-abuse.email/msg/ca489baf05f611fb?dmode=source&hl=en

1) I don't use Forte Agent
2) My IP address is not 74.194.136.242 - I'm not even in the same country
3) I don't use Cox even when I am in the USA.


Path: g2news2.google.com!news1.google.com!news.glorb.com!cycny01.gnilink.net!hwmnpeer01.lga!news.highwinds-media.com!hw-filter.lga!newsfe13.lga.POSTED!53ab2750!not-for-mail
From: did...@not.der
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Spamhaus Lost vs e360
Message-ID: <jv8be353gbg63it3m2ttj3ruhtjhhfa3ot@4ax.com>
X-Newsreader: Forte Agent 4.2/32.1117
X-No-Archive: yes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Lines: 1
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2007 15:07:50 -0500
NNTP-Posting-Host: 74.194.136.242
X-Complaints-To: admin@cox.net
X-Trace: newsfe13.lga 1189454883 74.194.136.242 (Mon, 10 Sep 2007 13:08:03 MST)
NNTP-Posting-Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2007 13:08:03 MST
Organization: Cox

http://msmvps.com/blogs/spywaresucks/archive/2007/09/10/1184164.aspx

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Spamhaus v e360: Spamhaus loses

I hate to say "I told you so", but I told you so.

Back in October 2006 I said:

"What I want to know is, where the heck were Spamhaus's legal counsel when Spamhaus made the very silly decision to simply ignore the US lawsuit because they're in the UK and they felt somehow "safe"?  Did Spamhaus receive bad advice, or did they ignore good advice? Only Spamhaus knows."

Followed by:

"They should have fought this issue.  Whoever it was that told Spamhaus that they were "safe" in the UK or did not discourage the misapprehension that USA laws couldn't touch Spamhaus, have a lot of explaining to do."

The decision released on 30 August addressed Spamhaus's appeal against the validity of the default judgment against them, whether or not the default judgment was properly served at all, the size of the damages award and the injunctive relief.  Except for some technicalities, Spamhaus have pretty much lost on all fronts.

Now, virtually every article by-line I have seen so far focuses on the fact that the $11+ million award against Spamhaus has been vacated, putting a nice spin on the story with by-lines like "Appeals Court Tosses $11M Spamhaus Judgement, "Court junks $11m judgment against Spamhaus", "US court grants Spamhaus reprieve", "Appeals Court Vacates $11M Judgment Against Spamhaus", "Spam Blacklists Still In Tunnel, But Is That Light Up Ahead?", "$11 Million Spamhaus Penalty Tossed" and, the best of the lot, "Spamhaus Appeal: They Win on Substance".

You know what? I think it's time to shine the light of reality on this sorry story.  The only thing that could be classed as being close to a true 'win' of any real substance is the decision about the injunctive relief originally granted to e360.  Everything else is a loss for Spamhaus, or a decision to reassess, but not reverse, a decision.  Let's have a look at what was actually decided, shall we?

At the time of publication, Spamhaus themselves are strangely silent on their 'win' with the news latest entry being 21 June 2007.

The default judgment

This loss for Spamhaus boils down to one thing- a really stupid move on Spamhaus's part.  Spamhaus answered the original e360 complaint, denied many allegations and asserted 14 affirmative defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process.  Their Counsel at the time was not too happy about his client's instructions, but he didn't have much of a choice.  Snippets of the transcript from the hearing in question are, to say the least, enlightening.  Counsel says:

"I am not authorized to do anything more today than to ask this Court that the answer be withdrawn; and, then, once we hear from this Court on that, to get a ruling on our motion to withdraw as counsel."

Then, in what proved to be a killing blow to Spamhaus's later attempts to rescue their situation, their ex-Counsel said:

"[Spamhaus] have been fully informed of the fact that the default judgment is a real possibility.  And they are aware of that, and are prepared to take that risk." 

Remember that statement, gentle reader, it is pivotal.

In short, Spamhaus responded to the suit, and then abandoned their defense.  The Judge made his feelings very clear when he said:

"Here is what we are going to do.  I am going to give you leave to withdraw the answer; I am going to give you leave to withdraw; and, in light of the fact that your client is aware of that - and apparently, has sent no one here to disagree with the request to withdraw; and I assume you told them it was a dead-bang certainty that default is going to be entered without any resistance to the lawsuit - I am going to enter a default order today.  And I will ask you, as your, if not your final act, at least approaching finality, to let you[r] client know what happened this morning.  And tell them it is not just a risk that they will lose the case, but it is a dead-bang certainty.  And the first step has been undertaken with the entry of a default."

Default judgment was eventually entered against Spamhaus for $11,715,000.00 plus $1,917.50 in costs.  Attorney fees and punitive damages were denied, and a permanent injunction was granted.  All of a sudden this became far more than a UK company thumbing its nose at the US legal system, whilst blowing raspberries in e360 and the USA Court system's general direction.

Spamhaus lodged a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the default and the default judgment making various assertions, including that they had received conflicting legal advice, and that its instruction that prior counsel withdraw was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law.  A lot of protection that they claimed depended on some very important features - whether or not the defendant in question had **appeared in the case** and whether the defendant had **actively abandoned their defense***.  And therein lies a big problem.  Putting aside the comments made by their original Counsel that made it very clear that Spamhaus had been warned what would happened if they went down the path they chose, the District Court said:

"I do not think there was anything unknowing or unintentional about the decision made not to defend this case once it got over here at some point."

Enough said about that, methinks.

Fast forward to the Supreme Court appeal.  The Court makes its feelings plain....

"Based on its conduct before the court, we have no doubt that Spamhaus understood the defenses available to it, consistently asserted those defenses in the early stages of those proceedings and then affirmatively elected to abandon those defenses before the District Court.  We see no reason to allow Spamhaus to escape the consequences of that decision in the later stages of this proceeding."

In short, Spamhaus backed the wrong horse.  My personal opinion is that Spamhaus's actions had nothing to do with conflicting or bad legal advice, or a misunderstanding of the law, or a lack of understanding of the implications of what they were doing - in my personal opinion Spamhaus knew exactly what they were doing when they made the decision to say to the Courts and e360 "nyah nyah, we're in the UK, you're in the USA, go take a long walk off a short pier, you can't touch us".

The actual award

It could be said that Spamhaus have a win here - but as far as I'm concerned it's more a stay of execution.  To cut a long story short, the Court originally decided that because Spamhaus walked away thereby opening the door to the default judgment, that the damages claimed by e360 could be automatically granted in full.  But that's not quite true.  So, yes, the $11 million plus awarded has been set aside, **but** the Court is simply going to ask for more evidence of loss, and reassess how much will be awarded.  Considering the fact that Spamhaus still lists e360 is a spammer today, years later, this could get real nasty for Spamhaus.

How much will e360 eventually get? Well, let's wait and see.  The problem is *documentation*, not the total itself.  In short, the Judge said:

"Mr Linhardt's affidavit is a conclusory statement of the lost value of his business, based largely on his calculations of lost future profits.  It provides a list of businesses involved in "actual and pending contracts" and a total calculation of his calculation of loss, but says nothing about the status of his relationship with those businesses before e360 was listed on the ROKSO.  That is, the affidavit claimed future loss in absolute numbers, but provides no information whatsoever to support a finding that such future profits were certain prior to Spamhaus' act."

and

"this affidavit alone cannot provide the requisite "reasonable certainty" for a damages award without the necessity of a hearing".

Note the decision says that what is required is "reasonable certainty", not definitive proof.  All that has happened is the Courts have ordered a more extensive inquiry.  The Court has *not* said that e360 is not entitled to the original amount awarded - the Court may decide that the original total is proven to be realistic.  Hell, add to the damages the fact that Spamhaus continues to block e360 and the final award could be even higher!

Injunctive relief

This is a better win for Spamhaus.  Basically the Court decided that the injunction granted was too all encompassing, and inappropriate in any event.  To win an injunction the injured party must:

  1. have suffered an irreparable injury;
  2. the remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, must be inadequate to compensate for said injury;
  3. considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
  4. the public interest would not be disserviced by a permanent injunction.

That being said, there is nothing to stop the injunction being re-designed, becoming a statement instead of an injunction so that it addresses the Court's concerns about overstating when e360 spammed, and the Court's concerns about giving e360 a Get-Out-Of-Jail-Free card.  Reword the notice on Spamhaus's site to say that "e360 spammed from X date to X date and we have the proof, but we blocked them in a way that punished them for more than that", and a ruling that a statement be made on the Spamhaus site, and that Spamhaus be restricted from taking action against e360 except for under specific circumstances, could be reinstated.  You see, it's not the *fact* of the injunction that was rejected, it was its effect and whether it was indicative of the real situation, for Spamhaus or e360.

 

So what happens now?

We wait once more to find out what the final award judgment will be, and then we wait to see how it is enforced.  But I say this... Spamhaus **cannot** assume that the UK courts will any more tolerant of Spamhaus's shenanigans than the USA was.  There is no reason to believe that the UK Courts will allow Spamhaus to escape the effect of knowingly walking away from the lawsuit in the USA, any more than the USA courts allowed them to do so.   UK Judges are just as intolerant of defendant's saying "screw you - I ain't listening" as their USA counterparts.   Spamhaus choose their path, they backed their preferred horse, and now they face the music.

[Edited to fix some typos and grammatical errors]

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