

2. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

The Bush administration has proposed a budget of roughly \$1 billion for cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union in fiscal year (FY) 2003.¹ This represents a significant step forward when compared to the administration's attempt to cut these efforts the previous year. But the proposed spending is still not remotely commensurate with the threat that the Baker-Cutler panel described – even before September 11 – as “the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today.”² Total former Soviet Union cooperative threat reduction funding under the administration's proposal would be 26% more than what the administration proposed last year – but more than 5% less than what Congress appropriated for FY 2002. In effect, this is a “steady as you go” budget, slightly less than the Clinton administration proposed for FY 2001 – long before September 11 occurred.³ While the administration is working to accelerate some existing efforts, the budget proposal provides no funds for any new initiatives such as those recommended in this study.⁴ The

¹ While the problem of insecure nuclear weapons and materials is a global one, nearly all U.S. funding for programs to manage nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise beyond the United States' own borders has focused on the former Soviet Union. This budget analysis, therefore, focuses only on those programs focused in the former Soviet Union. Ultimately a broader analysis is needed that would include U.S. spending (both public and private) on securing and reducing its own nuclear stockpiles and facilities, as well as U.S. spending (and other countries' spending) on similar activities around the world – but some of this data would be much more difficult to gather. This analysis draws heavily on William Hoehn, “Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Requests for U.S.-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation Programs” (Washington, DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, May 2002, available as of May 13, 2002 at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/whatsnew/analysis_bush03_requests.html). The authors are grateful to William Hoehn for extensive discussions of issues relating to current and historical threat reduction budgets.

² Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, co-chairs, *A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2001, available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://www.hr.doe.gov/seab/rusrpt.pdf>). Specific funding figures are drawn from *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002, available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/budget.html>); U.S. Department of Energy, *FY 2003 Budget Request: Detailed Budget Justifications—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Washington, DC: DOE, February 2002, available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/03budget/content/defnn/nuclnonp.pdf>); U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Budget Materials, FY 2003 Budget, Operation and Maintenance Budget Justification, Volume I, Part 2, Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2002, available as of May 13, 2002 at http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2003budget/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/fy03_CTR.pdf); and U.S. Department of State, *FY 2003 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of State, April 15, 2002, available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2003/>). These were supplemented by interviews with executive branch officials.

³ The amount proposed by the Clinton Administration was approximately \$970 million for the same set of projects. See William Hoehn, “The Clinton Administration's Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Requests For Nuclear Security Cooperation with Russia” (Washington, DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, March 13, 2000, available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/related/congress/status/FY01-budget.html>).

⁴ The one exception is a new effort on helping states improve their border security, a \$40 million item in the Cooperative Threat Reduction request. This effort – whose specifics were still being fleshed out as this report went to press – would complement a broad range of other efforts already underway in this area, funded by the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy.

budget can be summed up in a simple phrase: “status quo plus.” In the aftermath of September 11, modest additions to the status quo are simply not good enough.

Although insecure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials around the world pose one of the greatest terrorist threats of truly mass destruction in the U.S. homeland, the \$1 billion allocated for threat reduction – about two-thirds of which is devoted to efforts relating to managing nuclear weapons, materials or expertise – is a tiny fraction of the \$38 billion allocated for homeland security. It represents only 3% of the \$33 billion increase in U.S. defense spending President Bush requested before September 11 occurred. By contrast, the Baker-Cutler panel outlined a much faster, more far-reaching approach to securing nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise that would cost \$3 billion every year – still less than 1% of U.S. annual defense spending.⁵

Funding for some key initiatives – such as securing nuclear material, securing nuclear warheads, and reducing the Russian nuclear weapons complex – is actually reduced in the administration’s proposed budget, compared to FY 2002. The Bush administration argues that given the large emergency appropriations provided in FY 2002, these programs could not effectively spend more than requested in FY 2003. As discussed below, this argument is probably correct in the near term (at least with respect to nuclear material and weapons security, though not with respect to downsizing the Russian weapons complex). But it is, in a sense, a self-fulfilling argument: because access problems and bureaucratic obstacles have been allowed to fester until large quantities of unspent funds built up, adding more money now will not suffice to accelerate these efforts. But if, as this report recommends, an accelerated partnership is put in place to secure all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and related materials as quickly as possible, a sustained application of resources will be needed to get the job done.

Today, it seems clear that other steps are more important than budget increases for FY2003 in accelerating efforts to secure nuclear material around the world, including focusing sustained, high-level leadership on this issue; building an accelerated partnership with Russia; and forging an effective global coalition to secure and account for nuclear weapons and materials and other WMD stockpiles worldwide. Nevertheless, funding remains a constraint to be considered: the proposed budget, for example, would not provide the funds needed to implement most of the specific recommendations made in this report. To succeed, U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction programs must be well managed, properly focused on addressing the most urgent threats, and built on genuine partnership – but they must also have the money they need.

The FY 2003 Threat Reduction Request

Overall, the Bush administration proposes to spend approximately \$957 million in FY 2003 on cooperative threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union.⁶ This funding is

⁵ Baker and Cutler, *A Report Card*, op. cit.

⁶ A fundamental issue in analyzing cooperative threat reduction budgets – which drives the differences in numbers from different sources – is that there is not universal agreement on “what’s in and what’s out.” In general, we include in our definition: (a) all the programs that were included in the executive branch analyses of

spread between the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy. This proposed funding level effectively puts the Bush administration in support of continuing threat reduction activities at more or less the scale at which they had been underway before – a substantial improvement compared to the large cuts the administration proposed in FY 2002, which were reversed by Congress. But the budget remains lower than what Congress actually appropriated after September 11, and proposes few new initiatives or changes in the shape and direction of the government’s efforts. The total budget request for cooperative threat reduction in the former Soviet Union is outlined in Table 1.

Table 1 - FY 2003 Budget Proposal for Cooperative Threat Reduction

(Dollars in Millions)

Program	FY 2001 Funding	FY 2002 Request	FY 2002 Appropriation	FY 2003 Budget	FY 2003 vs.	FY 2003
					FY 2002 Request (Percent)	vs. FY 2002 Approp. (Percent)
Department of Energy	313.2	229.3	417.6	419.7	83.1%	0.5%
Department of Defense	450.4	417.6	411.7	428.3	2.6%	4.0%
Department of State	112.5	112.7	184.9	108.9	-3.4%	-41.1%
Total, Cooperative Threat Reduction	876.1	759.6	1,014.3	956.9	26.0%	-5.7%

After September 11, Congress substantially boosted funding for programs focused on keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and defending against them on U.S. soil. The Department of Energy (DOE) received an extra \$120 million for its Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, above the \$171.9 million approved for the program in the FY 2002 Energy and Water Appropriations Act, a nearly 70 percent increase. Another \$15 million extra (above the regular appropriations of \$42 million) of the \$40 billion Emergency Response Fund (ERF) was directed toward DOE’s Russian Transition Initiatives, designed to shrink Russia’s nuclear complex and provide civilian jobs for excess weapons experts in the former Soviet Union. In addition, the President approved \$42 million in additional funding from the ERF for the State Department’s Export Control and Border Security programs in Central Asia (above the estimated \$40.7 million allocated to these programs through the regular process). In addition, a supplemental measure in the FY

the “Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative” in early 2000; (b) a small number of programs with clearly similar objectives that were left out of those analyses (such as U.S.-Russian warhead dismantlement transparency work funded by the Department of Energy); and (c) similar new initiatives that have begun since then (such as funding for take-back of vulnerable Soviet-supplied HEU to Russia). We do *not* include either the cost of parallel efforts that are taking place in the United States (such as the \$350 million proposed for disposition of U.S. excess weapons plutonium) or the cost of initiatives that relate exclusively to safety, not security (such as the nearly \$15 million DOE has proposed for the international nuclear reactor safety program), both of which are sometimes included in administration tallies of the proposed “cooperative threat reduction” budget. We have, however, included several Defense Department threat reduction programs that are more focused on conventional forces than on weapons of mass destruction, in order to conform to the common definition that includes the entire Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction account. Other threat reduction efforts that are not focused on the former Soviet Union (including a substantial fraction of the State Department’s Export Control and Border Security program, for example) are also not included.

2002 Defense Appropriations Act directed that \$30 million of unused FY 2000 balances be taken from the Department of Defense (DOD) and added into the new funding available to the State Department for its efforts to redirect the work of former Soviet biological weapons scientists.⁷

In sum, these increases tacked an extra \$207.2 million, or nearly 26 percent, on to the \$807.1 million appropriated for cooperative threat reduction through the regular appropriations process. Even in the initial appropriations process, Congress clearly rejected the funding levels proposed in the first Bush budget, and the administration acquiesced. But September 11 demanded a stark reevaluation of the threat posed by WMD materials and expertise in the states of the Former Soviet Union, and, as Table 1 shows, the Congress and the Bush administration responded by increasing the level of resources available to address that threat.

Roughly one month after the final FY 2002 appropriations bill became law, President Bush submitted to Congress his proposed budget for FY 2003.⁸ The budget sets the war on terrorism overseas and the defense of the homeland as the top priority for the nation, and the administration states that in so doing it is proposing \$38 billion for homeland security spending, an \$18 billion increase over FY 2002 (a “virtual doubling,” as the budget document itself proclaims).⁹ The dramatic increase in resources leaves no doubt that the administration has determined that the threat facing the nation is grave enough to warrant decisive and immediate shifts in priorities and policies.

The information on the FY 2003 budget in Table 1, then, might come as a surprise: few expenses are being spared in securing the homeland and combating overseas terrorism, but the total budgets proposed for cooperative threat reduction programs are lower than those appropriated in FY 2002.¹⁰ The contrast between the homeland security budget and the administration’s approach to addressing the threat at its source – by securing the weapons of mass destruction, materials, and expertise in the former Soviet Union and around the world – could hardly be more stark.

⁷ The FY 2002 appropriations also ordered the rescission of \$32 million from the Department of Defense FY 2000 funds for the plutonium reactor shutdown program. The negative amount, like the \$30 million described above, has been counted as part of the FY 2000 total funding level in this analysis. For specific bill language, see “Status of FY 2002 Appropriations Bills” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, updated on January 15, 2002, available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/appover.html>).

⁸ On March 21, 2002, the President also submitted to Congress a request for additional \$27.1 billion in supplemental FY 2002 funding. The Congress has not, as of early May 2002, acted upon the request, which included \$19.4 million to improve the Department of Energy’s emergency nuclear response capabilities.

⁹ *Budget of the United States Government*, p. 17.

¹⁰ The President’s budget states that it is proposing \$1.5 billion on cooperative threat reduction efforts, but this figure results from a broad definition of what should be included. In this definition, U.S. Plutonium Disposition is included, as is all DOE Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. See *Budget of the United States Government*, p. 26.

Table 2 - FY 2003 Budget for Securing Nuclear Material and Expertise

(Dollars in Millions)						
Program	FY 2001 Funding	FY 2002 Request	FY 2002 Appropriation	FY 2003 Budget	FY 2003 vs. FY 2002 Request (Percent)	FY 2003 vs. FY 2002 Appropriation (Percent)
Securing Warheads and Materials	353.2	222.2	381.3	318.5	43.4%	-16.5%
DOE MPC&A ¹	170.5	138.8	291.9	233.1	67.9%	-20.2%
DOD Fissile Material Storage Facility-Russia	56.4	-	-	-	N/A	N/A
DOD Warhead Security-Russia	89.7	56.0	55.0	40.0	-28.6%	-27.3%
DOD Warhead Transport-Russia	14.0	9.5	9.5	19.7	107.4%	107.4%
DOE Kazakhstan BN-350 Reactor Project	15.9	8.9	15.9	8.1	-9.2%	-49.0%
DOE Russia/NIS Safeguards Sustainability	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.0%	2.0%
DOE Russian HEU Fuel Return	1.0	1.0	1.0	9.5	852.0%	852.0%
DOE RERTR Program	1.0	5.6	5.6	5.8	2.0%	2.0%
DOE Spent Fuel Storage & Repository	2.4	-	-	-	N/A	N/A
Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling	48.0	53.8	91.3	84.3	56.8%	-7.6%
DOE "Second Line of Defense" ²	1.9	4.0	[24.0]	[24.0]	[500.0%]	[0.0%]
State Dep't. Export Control and Border Security ³	44.0	40.7	82.9	35.4	-13.1%	-57.3%
DOD/FBI/USCS Counterproliferation	2.1	9.1	8.4	9.0	-1.3%	7.1%
DOD WMD Proliferation Prevention	-	-	-	40.0	N/A	N/A
Stabilizing Nuclear Custodians	99.8	79.8	108.0	105.3	32.1%	-2.5%
Russian Transition Initiatives ⁴	50.8	28.8	57.0	39.3	36.8%	-31.0%
International Science and Technology Centers ⁵	35.0	37.0	37.0	52.0	40.5%	40.5%
CRDF	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	0.0%	0.0%
Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions	26.1	23.0	23.0	34.9	52.0%	52.0%
DOE HEU Transparency Implementation	14.6	14.0	14.0	17.2	23.5%	23.5%
DOE Warhead Dismantlement Transparency	9.5	7.5	7.5	16.2	115.3%	115.3%
DOE Trilateral Initiative	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.0%	0.0%
DOE Pu Registry	0.5	-	-	-	N/A	N/A
Ending Further Production	32.1	41.7	41.7	49.3	18.3%	18.3%
DOD Pu Reactor Shutdown Program	32.1	41.7	41.7	-	-100.0%	-100.0%
DOE Pu Reactor Shutdown Proposal	-	-	-	49.3	N/A	N/A
Reducing Excess Stockpiles	39.5	15.0	19.0	34.0	126.7%	78.9%
DOE Russian Pu Disposition	39.5	15.0	19.0	34.0	126.7%	78.9%
Other Nuclear Cooperative Efforts	3.5	7.0	7.0	7.5	7.1%	7.1%
State Dep't Nonprolif. and Disarmament Fund ⁶	3.5	7.0	7.0	7.5	7.1%	7.1%
Total, Securing Nuclear Materials and Expertise	602.1	442.4	671.2	633.9	43.3%	-5.6%

¹ FY 2002 includes \$120 million in supplemental funding.
² Rolled into MPC&A beginning in FY 2002 Appropriation.
³ Limited to FSU states only. Includes \$42 million in FY 2002 supplemental funding, and \$18 million in FY 2003 in funding from the
⁴ Includes \$15 in FY 2002 supplemental funding.
⁵ Includes unallocated amount FY 2003 funding for State Dep't. Biological Weapons Redirect program.
⁶ Only funds specifically allocated to programs in the states of the Former Soviet Union, which typically constitute about half of NDF funding. Total of \$15 million is proposed for FY 2003.

Of the nearly \$1 billion requested for cooperative threat reduction activities in FY 2003, approximately two-thirds is focused on efforts related to securing, monitoring, or reducing nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise. These programs and their budgets are identified in Table 2. The pattern here is the same: the proposed FY 2003 budget reverses past Bush administration attempts to cut back these programs, but still represents a cut compared to what was appropriated in FY 2002.

The Budget by Department

Overall, proposed funding for DOE's former Soviet threat reduction activities is nearly identical to what it received last year for the same programs, while DOD's is moderately increased. (Actually, since \$49 million in funding for the Russian Plutonium Reactor Shutdown program is being moved from DOD to DOE, the remaining programmatic activity for DOE is lower than FY 2002, while for DOD, it is higher.) At the same time, the State Department's level of new funding is very similar to the regular level of appropriations for FY 2002 and FY 2001, and is much lower than the FY 2002 total, which was an abnormally high level owing to the \$72 million in the emergency supplemental for border security and BW redirection.

Department of Energy

DOE receives a very small increase over the final FY 2002 appropriated level in the administration's budget for FY 2003 for the Department of Energy's nuclear threat reduction programs in the Former Soviet Union. At first glance, the requested level appears to maintain the heightened level of new funding provided by the \$135 million in supplemental funding provided as part of the Emergency Response Fund. However, as noted above, \$49 million has been added to DOE's budget for it to run the Russian Plutonium Reactor Shutdown program. When that is factored in for an apples-to-apples comparison, overall funding proposed for FY 2003 is significantly lower than what Congress approved for FY 2002.

The President's budget proposes \$233.1 million in new funding for DOE's flagship MPC&A program. This represents a \$58.8 million cut below the total provided last year. This is justified on the grounds that the large FY 2002 appropriation will cover a range of activities that will continue into FY 2003, so that less new funding is required.¹¹ As noted earlier, for the near term this is probably correct, as the MPC&A program has substantial unspent balances resulting from difficulties with access to Russian facilities – now at least partly overcome, as described in Chapter 5 – and other bureaucratic obstacles that have been allowed to slow progress. But if an intensive effort to build an accelerated partnership with Russia actually occurs, as proposed in this report, additional resources are likely to be required. In comparing the MPC&A budget to those of previous years, it must be remembered that both the Second Line of Defense program (slated for \$24 million in FY 2003) and a new initiative to control radiological sources that could be used in “dirty bombs” are now included in the MPC&A budget, along with its traditional focus on securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials – and both could consume enormous resources in FY 2003.

¹¹ Department of Energy, *Detailed Budget Justifications—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation*, pp. 115, 117, 119, 125. Several separate programs, including Material Conversion and Consolidation and Naval Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites, explain in the section titled “Detailed Program Justification” that the FY 2003 “Decrease [is] due to the ability to place several large comprehensive upgrade contracts during FY 2002 (from funds provided in the FY 2002 supplemental appropriation). . . .”

The President's budget proposes \$39.3 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives account, which includes funding for both the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative. This is a \$17.7 million cut – nearly one-third – from the FY 2002 appropriation, \$2.7 million less even than was appropriated before the emergency supplemental. In this case, it is very difficult to make a tenable argument that existing balances mean that more is not needed. Congress should consider returning this account to its FY 2002 appropriated level of \$57 million.

The largest contribution to the apparent increase in DOE's nuclear threat reduction level over last year actually represents only a slight increase in programmatic activity. Following the December 2001 conclusions of the administration's review of nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia, the administration is transferring from the Defense Department to DOE the management and funding for a program aimed ending new Russian plutonium production.¹² This shows up as increase of \$49.3 million in new funding being proposed for DOE. Last year the Defense Department received \$41.7 million in new funding for this program.

Other notable moves in the programs aimed at preventing theft and smuggling of nuclear material include a significant increase in the new funding proposed for the Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Fuel Return program, from approximately \$1 million in FY 2002 funding to \$9.5 million proposed for FY 2003, and a decline in the new amount of funding proposed for securing plutonium at Kazakhstan's BN-350 breeder reactor, from \$15.9 million in FY 2002 to \$8.1 million proposed for FY 2003.

The Bush administration is also proposing to increase the level of new funding being provided for monitoring stockpiles and reductions. The budget proposes increases the amount of new funding by \$3.2 million, or nearly 24 percent over the FY 2002 level of funding, for carrying out transparency measures in the implementation of the HEU deal between Russia and the United States. In addition, the budget more than doubles the new amount of funding proposed for DOE's efforts to develop measures for warhead dismantlement transparency, going from \$7.5 million in FY 2002 to approximately \$16.2 million of new funding proposed for FY 2003.

Following the administration's separate review, DOE's Russian Plutonium Disposition program is scheduled to receive \$34 million in new funding, a \$15 million increase over the level provided in FY 2002. Though not included in this analysis of the overall cooperative nuclear threat reduction budget, the President's budget also proposes increasing the pace of funding provided to DOE's efforts to dispose of the United States' own excess plutonium stockpiles.

¹² "Fact Sheet: Administration Review of Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to the Russian Federation," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, December 27, 2001 (available as of May 13, 2002 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011227.html>).

Department of Defense

Overall, the President's budget proposes a slight increase in the total funding for DOD's cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union, as Table 1 shows. However, as discussed above, the Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown program has been transferred to the Energy Department, so the funding level represents a larger programmatic increase over that funded in FY 2002.

The administration is proposing, however, to decrease the level of new DOD funding for securing nuclear warheads in Russia. The budget seeks to reduce the amount of new funding being provided to the Russian Warhead Security program, down to \$40 million from \$56 million in FY 2002, a decrease of over 28 percent. This decrease is partially offset by an increase of \$10.2 million, to \$19.7 million, for the Russian Warhead Transportation program, which helps the Russian Ministry of Defense transport warheads from operational sites to secure storage facilities. The administration argues, probably correctly, that the decrease in warhead security funding will not substantially slow efforts in FY 2003, because of the substantial unspent balances already available to this program – resulting from having allowed past access obstacles to stymie most efforts to upgrade security at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites for some years.

In addition to slightly increasing the amount of new funding for DOD's collaborative effort with the US Customs Service and the FBI to interdict nuclear smuggling, the President's FY 2003 budget also seeks \$40 million for the first year of a new initiative, called WMD Proliferation Prevention. It is believed that this program will be aimed at improving customs and border controls in the states of the Former Soviet Union, in tandem with Energy's Second Line of Defense program and the State Department's Export Control and Border Security program – but DOD officials report that details are still being fleshed out.¹³

Department of State

The President's FY 2003 budget request for the State Department mostly follows the overall funding pattern set by the regular FY 2002 appropriations level, minus the additional \$72 million added in supplemental legislation.¹⁴

The budget proposes an estimated combined total of \$35.4 million in new funding for export control and border security assistance for the states of the former Soviet Union.¹⁵ The

¹³ William Hoehn, "Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Requests," op. cit., and interviews with DOD officials, April 2002.

¹⁴ One significant change proposed is the movement of funding of most of the State Department's threat reduction programs out of the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) account and into the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account. This will make it substantially easier to track the State Department's threat reduction budgets, because decisions on how FSA funds will be spent are often not made until well into the fiscal year, and are often not made public even then, whereas the handling of the NADR account is much more transparent (as are the budget justifications for this account).

¹⁵ Most of this new funding is being requested in the NADR account, except for an estimated \$18 million in the FREEDOM Support Act.

request treats the \$42 million in Emergency Response Funds as a one-time event, not requiring replenished funding at the same level.

Another significant shift proposes merging the funding for the State Department Biological Weapons Redirection program with the International Science and Technology Centers funding. Though the BW Redirection program is only tangentially related to controlling Russia's nuclear expertise, it is included in this analysis in the Stabilizing Nuclear Custodians because the President's FY 2003 budget leaves it unclear how much will be allocated to each program.

Finally, the estimated funding level in the FY 2003 budget for the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) is the same as FY 2002. In addition, as the note in the chart describes, the total funding for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) is proposed to be \$15 million, up from \$14 million in FY 2002. The level of support the NDF will dedicate in FY 2002 and FY 2003 to reduction of the threat posed by nuclear material and expertise in the states of the Former Soviet Union is as yet unknown. Typically, funds specifically allocated to programs in the states of the Former Soviet Union constitute about half of NDF funding, so a nominal figure of \$7.5 million is counted here, up from \$7 million in FY 2002.

Conclusion

Funding levels should be considered in terms of what those resources are intended to accomplish. If what will be accomplished with those budgets is not adequate for the task at hand, given all other constraints, then one should not view that budget favorably. As long as the former Soviet Union's nuclear material is not adequately secured, and as long as its expertise is not appropriately utilized, the United States faces a chillingly serious threat. Therefore, the measure of success in this effort is not dollars budgeted in a given year as compared to last year, or even dollars spent. Success comes only as that threat is reduced. By that measure, the President's FY 2003 budget still leaves far, far too much left undone.