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Updated May 2010
Introduction
South Africa's nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs were products of the threat perceptions of pro-apartheid government and the country's advanced state of technical development. Pretoria developed nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles but relinquished these armaments in the early 1990s. While the proliferation legacies of South Africa's nuclear and missile programs were effectively resolved through verified disarmament measures that won international acclaim, a stigma hangs over South Africa's former chemical and bioweapons activities because: 1) agents from the program were reportedly against opponents of the apartheid-era government; 2) the program's dismantlement was not independently verified; and, 3) personnel from the program may have abetted proliferation. The post-apartheid government of South Africa implemented its nonproliferation and disarmament policy through the 1993 Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act to control the transfer of sensitive items and technologies.
In the 1960s South Africa began to explore the technical utility of peaceful nuclear explosions for mining and engineering purposes. In the early 1970s Pretoria approved a program to develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability. Ultimately, South Africa manufactured six air-deliverable nuclear weapons of the "gun-type" design. In parallel with decisions to end apartheid, the government halted the bomb program in 1989 and dismantled existing weapons and associated production equipment. South Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors subsequently verified the completeness of its nuclear dismantlement. South Africa joined the Zangger Committee in 1994 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1995. South Africa was instrumental in winning indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and played a leading role in successful conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. South Africa has emerged as a champion of both global nuclear nonproliferation and equal access to peaceful nuclear energy. In 2004, South Africa worked closely with the IAEA to monitor international smuggling of nuclear weapons materials after investigations of a South African businessman exposed connections to the A.Q. Khan network.
See South Africa Nuclear Profile
Personnel from Project Coast have characterized this chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program as the most sophisticated program of its type outside of the former Soviet Union, but international CBW experts generally consider Project Coast to have been considerably less scientifically advanced than the Soviet CBW programs. The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a total onslaught by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing red-black danger it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. The South African government therefore secretly initiated Project Coast in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces. Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes, from the outset the program also had offensive features and capabilities. The military front company Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, located north of Pretoria, was the centerpiece of the biological warfare (BW) component of Project Coast, although other facilities were set up to develop protective clothing and manufacture exotic assassination devices. Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also established an elaborate network of procurement and financial front companies overseas to abet Project Coast. The scientists in this program tested and developed a wide range of harmful BW agents, including Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, Clostridium perfringens, plague bacteria, and salmonella bacteria. Some of these pathogens, particularly anthrax and cholera, became tools in the apartheid government's assassination program. The South African government officially dismantled the CBW program in 1993, in the midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. Project Coast personnel, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge, equipment, or materials to rogue regimes, to foreign intelligence personnel, to traffickers of dangerous weapons, and to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing extremists. Like the proliferation that may have resulted from Project Coast, the extent to which various foreign governments covertly assisted South Africa's CBW program remains an open question. A member of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention since its 1975 activation, in 2007 South Africa reiterated the importance of strengthening the bioweapons nonproliferation regime.
See South Africa Biological Profile
The military front company Delta G Scientific, located between Johannesburg and Pretoria, was the centerpiece of the chemical warfare (CW) component of Project Coast, although several other facilities were set up to develop protective clothing, manufacture exotic assassination devices, and weaponize irritants and incapacitants. Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also established an elaborate network of procurement and financial front companies overseas to abet Project Coast. The scientists in this program developed, tested, synthesized small-scale quantities of well-known CW agents (e.g., mustard agent, sarin, tabun, BZ, and perhaps VX) and a host of lethal, hard-to-trace toxic chemicals. Project Coast scientists researched the suitability of using illegal drugs such as incapacitating calmatives. Several of chemical compounds, above all the toxic organophosphates, became tools in the apartheid government's assassination program. The South African government officially dismantled the CBW program in 1993, in the midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. Project Coast personnel, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge, equipment, or materials to rogue regimes, to foreign intelligence personnel, to traffickers of dangerous weapons, and to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing extremists. Like the proliferation that may have resulted from Project Coast, the extent to which various foreign governments covertly assisted South Africa's CBW program remains an open question. A member of the Chemical Weapons Convention since its 1975 activation, South Africa has undertaken a variety of activities to support the full implementation of the treaty.
See South Africa Chemical Profile
A certain amount of South Africa's short-lived ballistic missile program remains an enigma. Although South Africa had developed short-range tactical missiles and rockets since the 1960s, a July 1989 test launch of what South Africa called a "booster rocket" confirmed Pretoria also had a missile program. U.S. intelligence sources noted similarities between the South African and Israeli missile programs, prompting speculation of a back-scratching arrangement between the two countries. Whether South Africa fully integrated its ballistic missile and secret nuclear weapons programs remains unclear. Facing U.S. opposition to missile proliferation and the end of the apartheid government, South Africa abandoned its missile and space launch programs in 1991 and dismantled associated facilities under international observation. South Africa became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995.
See South Africa Missile Profile
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
