 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling
WMD Proliferation Prevention Program
Status
For fiscal year (FY) 2003, the President submitted to the Congress a request for $40 million to begin a new WMD Proliferation Prevention program. When the proposal was announced in spring 2002, few people outside the government knew what the program was intended to accomplish. Only later did it become clear that this program was intended to improve the capabilities of Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union other than Russia to "prevent, deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials, and to respond effectively to trafficking incidents at the border."[1] Still, as late as July 2002, after the House and the Senate had initially approved the funding levels for the program and only a few months before the beginning of FY 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) official responsible for the program reported to a Senate subcommittee that the exact plan for the program had yet to be developed.[2]
Defense Department officials believe that U.S. assistance efforts focused on interdicting WMD smuggling, including the new WMD Proliferation Prevention program, should focus on developing indigenous, sustainable capabilities among the target countries in areas such as
- Capacity to secure not just discrete ports of entry,
but the long stretches of land, sea, and air borders in
between ("green," "dark blue," and "light blue" borders,
in DOD parlance);
- Internal security from illicit WMD trafficking;
- Robust legal and regulatory systems;
- Adequate investigations and prosecutions;
- Interagency and international communication and coordination;
and,
- Infrastructure to train personnel once assistance is
reduced.[3]
DOD officials cite two important reasons why their agency should continue to be part of the U.S. approach. First, in the recipient countries, the agencies responsible for border security are military or paramilitary organizations. They are organized along military lines, and uniformed and outfitted in at least a paramilitary fashion, making the U.S. Department of Defense their obvious counterpart.[4] Second, the Defense Department as an agency brings with it unparalleled expertise in securing open borders, through the use of "field reconnaissance, C3I [command, control, communications, and intelligence], placement and use of ground sensors, NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] defense, and small unit tactics."[5]
Program officials envision starting out with several prototype projects in FY 2003. As of July 2002, they are giving close consideration to projects in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. The project in Kazakhstan will focus on the deployment of ground-based sensors along the wilderness border with Turkmenistan. Mobile response teams could be outfitted in the Ukraine. A proposed project in Azerbaijan would create a maritime surveillance radar system to detect and interdict smugglers on the Caspian Sea. Representatives from Uzbekistan have requested assistance in adding extra portal monitors at key border crossings in that country.[6]
Budget
See
budget table
No money has yet been devoted to this program. As of August 2002, the House of Representatives and the Senate have both voiced initial approval to the President's proposed budget of $40 million for the WMD Proliferation Prevention program
Key Issues and Recommendations
Integrating with the International Counterproliferation program. As discussed in the page on the International Counterproliferation program, DOD officials have been working for over five years with the FBI and the U.S. Customs Service to train customs and law enforcement officials in the NIS and elsewhere. While the WMD Proliferation Prevention program represents an important contribution of additional financial resources and solutions for the vast areas between border checkpoints, the addition of the new program in a different office and with a separate funding line than the International Counterproliferation program presents challenges.
- Recommendation: The Department of Defense should consolidate these two programs. The experience and the relationships developed by the officials who manage the International Counterproliferation program will be critical to successfully accomplishing the goals described above.
Coordinating with other security assistance efforts. Efforts under NATO's Partnership for Peace program and the FREEDOM Support Act program of assistance to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union are working to assist military and border security forces in the NIS, the same target countries of the WMD Proliferation Prevention program. While these programs do not have a nuclear, or even a WMD, focus, they are working to improve the operational capabilities of military and paramilitary forces focused on securing their borders from inappropriate flows of people and goods of any kind.
- Recommendation: Program officials responsible for the WMD Proliferation Prevention program should coordinate their efforts, such as the training of border security personnel and the provision of equipment, not only with other nuclear smuggling interdiction programs, but with the other security assistance offices in the Departments of Defense and State, such as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the State Department's Bureaus of Political-Military Affairs and of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. This new program potentially can provide an important bridge between those programs trying to help countries stop nuclear materials from illicitly crossing and those programs trying to help countries stop other illicit transport across borders, such as terrorists, guns, and narcotics.
Links
| Key Resources | |
 |
Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy
and Counterproliferation, "Combating WMD Smuggling,"
Testimony before U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee's
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, July 30, 2002. Download 50kb RTF |
| Testimony by the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense responsible for the WMD Proliferation
Prevention program (but not the International Counterproliferation
program) at the Senate hearing prompted by the release
of the May 2002 report. She was the lone DOD representative
at the panel, even though she is not responsible for
the International Counterproliferation program. |
|
| FOOTNOTES | |
| [1] | Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, "Combating WMD Smuggling," Testimony before U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, July 30, 2002. |
| [2] | Lisa Bronson, "Combating WMD Smuggling," op. cit. |
| [3] | Lisa Bronson, "Combating WMD Smuggling," op. cit. |
| [4] | Interview by author with DOD officials, July 2002. |
| [5] | Lisa Bronson, "Combating WMD Smuggling," op. cit. |
| [6] | Lisa Bronson, "Combating WMD Smuggling," op. cit. |
Written by Matthew Bunn.
Last updated by Anthony Wier on August 27, 2002.
The Securing the Bomb section of the NTI website is produced by the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) for NTI, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. MTA welcomes comments and suggestions at atom@harvard.edu. Copyright 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.