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Overview
Legislative Summary: 2009 Update
Written by Andrew Newman and Matthew Bunn
August 2009
 Latest Legislative Developments |
| Options for Further Action |
| Congressional Action |
| Other Pending Legislation |
President Obama has committed his administration to seeking to ensure effective security for all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide within four years. Congress can play an important role in strengthening this effort and other programs to prevent nuclear terrorism. Here, we offer:
- A summary of the latest legislative developments relating to securing nuclear stockpiles;
- A menu of options for further action by the 111th Congress;
- A report on Congressional action on the fiscal year 2010 budget request as of mid-2009; and
- A brief summary of other pending legislation related to nuclear terrorism.
Latest Legislative Developments
- On 21 July 2009, Reps. Ed Markey (D-MA) and Fred Upton (R-MI) introduced the "American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2009," which would authorize $163 million over 5 years to establish robust production of medical isotopes within the United States without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Previously, the United States has relied on isotopes produced in a Canadian reactor that is five decades old and uses weapon-grade HEU targets for isotope production; that reactor is shut down and its future is in doubt, creating an isotope supply crisis. The bill is being considered by Markey's Energy and Environment subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee [1].
- The House version of the defense authorization bill included some $400 million in additional funds to help achieve President Obama's objective of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years. But the Senate version of the authorization bill, and both the House and Senate versions of the energy and water appropriations bills, did not include similar funds. The Senate completed action on the defense authorization bill on 23 July and the energy and water appropriations bill on 29 July; the House completed its defense authorization bill on 25 June and its energy and water appropriation bill on 17 July. The outcome of the House-Senate conferences on these bills will determine whether funds are appropriated to finance the accelerated effort needed to meet President Obama's objective. (See our analysis of the administration's FY 2010 budget request for programs to secure nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise.)
- The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Improvement Act of 2009 (S. 873) was introduced by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) on 23 April 2009 to promote the continued global expansion of bilateral and multilateral CTR activities, and to authorize the Secretary of Defense to accept monetary contributions from any person, foreign government or international organization for CTR programs. S. 873 language has been incorporated into the House and Senate defense authorization bills — see below.
- Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (H.R. 730) on 27 January 2009. Cosponsored by Reps. Yvette Clarke (D-NY), Steve Israel (D-NY), Ben Ray Lujan (D-NM), and Michael McCaul (R-TX), H.R. 730 would strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear material by: developing international data exchange and sensitive information dissemination protocols; giving the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (which is tasked with stewardship, centralized planning and integration of nuclear forensics activities) a permanent legislative mandate; and establishing a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program which would create undergraduate student scholarships and graduate student fellowships incorporating summer internships and post-doctoral work at national labs or federal agencies, as well as faculty awards to ensure sustained funding.
Options for the 111th Congress
Congress can play a major role in strengthening the effort to prevent nuclear terrorism, and in particular in helping to achieve the challenging objective of ensuring that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide have effective security in place within four years. Congress should work with the administration to (a) set clear objectives and targets; (b) provide the resources, authorities, and structures needed to meet those objectives; and (c) exert in-depth, informed oversight over these efforts. Congress may also choose to mandate particular new programs, where it sees key gaps.
Setting Objectives
Congress should take action to support a high-priority effort to prevent nuclear terrorism, calling for the development and implementation of a fast-paced comprehensive plan with measurable milestones of progress; calling on President Obama to put nuclear terrorism at the top of the national security agenda; calling for President Obama to seek effective global nuclear security standards; authorizing an expanded, accelerated approach to consolidating nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials to small numbers of secure sites around the world; and authorizing reformed efforts to interdict nuclear smuggling and control nuclear expertise.
Congress has already taken action in several cases to establish challenging objectives for threat reduction programs, and may choose to do so again in the future. Existing legislation, for example, requires the administration to work with Russia to achieve an effective nuclear security system in Russia supported entirely by Russia's own resources by the beginning of 2013. With the completion of the upgrades included in the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, [2] intensive work is underway to complete additional upgrades agreed after Bratislava and ensure that Russia has the capability and commitment to sustain effective nuclear security with its own resources. [3]
A bill President Obama co-sponsored with Senator Chuck Hagel when Obama was still in the Senate required the Bush administration to prepare a comprehensive plan to ensure that all nuclear weapons and all stocks of plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) worldwide were sustainably secured against demonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities by the end of 2012. The Obama administration will presumably be revising the plan the Bush administration prepared (which remains classified, but appears to have represented little more than stapling together the plans of existing programs, which, even in combination, are not comprehensive enough to achieve the stated objective). Congress may consider whether to transform this requirement for a report into a requirement to structure programs to achieve that objective, as it did with the similar target focused on Russia, or whether to offer additional authorities or directives to help achieve this objective.
One area where Congress has established a definite target that should be reconsidered relates to scanning shipping containers. In 2007, Congress passed legislation requiring that, by 2012, 100 percent of the shipping containers entering the United States must go through a radiation scan before they arrive at the U.S. borders. Unfortunately, such requirements for 100 percent scanning, without standards for how effective such scanning should be or a systems approach to blocking other smuggling routes, may lead to hurried deployment of systems that do not provide risk reduction that justifies the costs and inconveniences they impose. Meeting this U.S.-imposed mandate would require countries all over the world to make major investments in installing and operating radiation scanning systems. The legislation includes an option to waive the requirement if several specified conditions apply, and it appears likely that while the United States will push to get as many containers scanned abroad as possible, the requirement will be repeatedly waived. Congress should develop an approach that offers a greater chance of stopping nuclear smugglers at lower cost than the current mandate for 100 percent scanning of all cargo containers, focusing on an integrated system that places as many barriers in the path of intelligent adversaries attempting to get nuclear material into the United States by any pathway as can be accomplished at reasonable cost. (In particular, it is important to understand that neither the detectors now being deployed nor the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals will have any substantial chance of detecting HEU metal with even modest shielding.)
Providing Resources, Authorities, and Structures to Meet the Objectives
Resources
Nuclear security is affordable: a level of security that could greatly reduce the risk of nuclear theft could be achieved for all nuclear stockpiles worldwide for roughly one percent of annual U.S. defense spending for a single year. [4] (Current funding for all programs to improve controls over nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise around the world – going far beyond just nuclear security upgrades – amount to less than one quarter of one percent of the U.S. defense budget.) Congress and the administration should act to ensure that no substantial effort to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism is slowed by lack of money. As described in our Funding Update, high-level leadership to overcome the obstacles to expanded international nuclear security cooperation and increased budgets will both be needed to have any chance of meeting President Obama's objective of securing all weapons-usable nuclear material stockpiles worldwide within four years.
Successes in overcoming obstacles to cooperation often cannot be predicted when budgets are being prepared – and the need for action to secure nuclear stockpiles is urgent. Hence, Congress should consider making an appropriation in the range of $500 million, to be available until expended, that can be spent flexibly on high-priority actions to reduce the risk of nuclear theft as they arise. Such a flexible pool of funds would give the administration the flexibility to expand and accelerate this effort.
In addition, as described in our Funding Update, Congress should consider targeted increases for key nuclear security programs whose work will have to expand and accelerate to meet the four-year nuclear security objective, including the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program (whose nuclear security effort is also known as the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, or MPC&A) and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC), in its version of the FY 2010 defense authorization bill, took a major step in the direction we recommend, though with a different approach, adding some $400 million for programs to improve nuclear security around the world, with an explicit statement that these funds were intended to provide the resources to meet the four-year objective. (See our more detailed discussion of the House bill below.) Unfortunately, the HASC action was not matched by their Senate counterparts, or by either the House or Senate appropriators. As these bills move through conference, Congress and the administration should work together to ensure that efforts to keep nuclear weapons and materials out of terrorist hands are not slowed by lack of money – which will inevitably require going beyond the funding levels the administration has requested so far. Over the longer term, the Obama administration and Congress should work together to lay out a comprehensive plan for meeting the goal of effective security for all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide, estimate the costs of implementing the plan, and ensure that those costs are fully funded.
Authorities
In recent years, Congress has taken action to remove cumbersome requirements that the executive branch certify that foreign countries were meeting a long list of criteria before threat reduction funds could be disbursed. These requirements often took up large chunks of the time of senior officials and repeatedly halted or threatened threat reduction programs while bringing comparatively little corresponding benefit. Congress has also authorized threat reduction efforts wherever they are needed, not just in the former Soviet Union. In 2008, Congress also modified U.S. law to make it possible to carry out expanded dismantlement and threat reduction work in North Korea, China, Pakistan and India.
Following up on these positive steps, there are several other areas Congress should consider. First, several programs have been constrained by sanctions against particular countries or institutions unrelated to threat-reduction goals, and would benefit substantially by authority to implement their efforts "notwithstanding any other provision of law" – authority that the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund at the Department of State already has. [5] It is encouraging that, as discussed below, the House and Senate have included nothwithstanding authority language in their versions of the defense authorization bill. Second, Congress might consider making it clear that the executive branch has the authority to put together packages of incentives – including incentives that may go well beyond the particular facility in question – to help build partnerships with countries and allow HEU or plutonium at their facilities to be shipped away (as the United States did in the case of Project Sapphire). [6]
Structures
A senior leader with a focused mission. Today, there are dozens of programs in several cabinet departments focused on different aspects of preventing nuclear terrorism. Responding to a 2007 Congressional mandate, President Obama appointed Gary Samore as the coordinator for nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation, arms control, and counterterrorism, to lead all of efforts in these areas. Within this very broad mandate, Laura Holgate has been appointed as the National Security Council Senior Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterterrorism and the Threat Reduction, focusing primarily on preventing nuclear and biological terrorism. Samore, Holgate, and those working with them will be responsible for conceiving, articulating, and coordinating a comprehensive, prioritized, government-wide strategy to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, linking that prioritized strategy to programs and resources, defining agency roles in executing or supporting that strategy, holding agencies accountable for delivering outcomes that achieve the strategy—and keeping this issue on the front burner at the White House every day. A key focus should be to find and fix internal and external obstacles to accelerated and expanded progress.
Congress and the administration should work to together to ensure that Samore and Holgate have all the authorities they need, are not distracted by other assignments, and in particular can work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to ensure that President Obama's priorities and strategy in this area are reflected in agencies' budgets. President Obama and the Congress should ensure that OMB prepares and submits to the Congress a crosscut of all budgets related to preventing nuclear terrorism, and puts those programs under a single budget examiner, to ease problems of coordination. [7]
Congress and the administration should work together to put in place a structure that will effectively focus sustained White House attention on seizing every opportunity for progress in keeping nuclear weapons and the materials and expertise to make them out of terrorist hands. [8] This includes ensuring that each of the key participating agencies has the organization and leadership needed to succeed. In particular, NNSA is implementing the most crucial efforts to secure nuclear materials around the world; if nuclear terrorism is indeed the most urgent threat to global security, NNSA must be seen as a central national security agency, at the same table with State and Defense. Once an effective structure has been put in place for U.S. efforts, Russia and other key countries should be convinced to do the same.
Rebuilding the State Department's nonproliferation capabilities. Unfortunately, many nonproliferation experts left the State Department during the Bush administration, seriously weakening the expertise and capabilities State can bring to bear in this critical area. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher have committed to rebuild State's nonproliferation expertise, but there is much left to be done: as of mid-2009, State did not yet even have an Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation in place. Congress should work with the administration to rebuild the State Department's nonproliferation capabilities, including by offering financial and career incentives that can attract nuclear experts who currently have attractive opportunities in the private sector.
Reforming nonproliferation capabilities at the Defense and Energy Departments. DOE's nonproliferation efforts expanded rather than shrinking during the Bush years, but there is more to be done to strengthen nonproliferation efforts there as well. As of mid-2009, no one had been nominated for the critical position overseeing all DOE's nonproliferation programs, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In addition, DOE needs to forge an appropriate partnership between its labs and headquarters, in which the strong laboratory technical expertise and personal contacts with counterparts in foreign countries can contribute substantially to effective policymaking. Similarly, the Defense Department's efforts in nonproliferation and defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons require substantial strengthening, as a report from a senior advisory panel toward the end of the Bush administration made clear. [9] Overall, cumbersome contracting procedures, difficulties between NNSA and DOD and their labs and contractors, and other issues continue to impede progress. Congress and the executive branch should work to remove or minimize these remaining impediments as quickly as possible.
Consolidating offices handling security for nuclear materials. President Obama should direct the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and Homeland Security each to put all their efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials around the world under a single official – or explain in detail why it is better to leave those efforts split. Today at DOE, for example, one office is charged with improving security for nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and India (though no cooperation with India is yet underway); another is charged with improving security at research reactors in developing and transition countries around the world (but not in developed countries); another is charged with making sure that recipients of U.S.-origin nuclear material follow at least minimal security measures; another is charged with collecting and analyzing detailed information on nuclear security worldwide; another is charged with working to strengthen IAEA recommendations on nuclear security; and so on. Much the same is true at the State Department. Pulling these efforts together would greatly ease the task of coordinating them.
Exert In-Depth, Informed Oversight
Congress must exert in-depth oversight over efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, emphasizing the urgency of the threat, holding the executive branch accountable for measurable progress in reducing it, and exploring new approaches. This should include in-depth hearings exploring each of the most critical programs to prevent nuclear terrorism, with independent witnesses and in-depth staff examinations. In the past, major decisions on nuclear security programs have too often gone unexamined and unremarked on Capitol Hill. Even with an administration that strongly supports these efforts, Congress must act to ensure that they are carried out effectively and efficiently, that they are not constrained by unnecessary financial, legal, or bureaucratic bottlenecks, and that all critical opportunities are seized.
There is broad support for most nuclear security programs in Congress. Virtually every year since 9/11, Congress has appropriated either 100 percent or more of the budget request for the most important nuclear security programs. But there are still very few members of Congress who get directly involved in these efforts, or propose new initiatives. Few lobbyists work on strengthening or accelerating these programs, as there are no large firms that get more than a few percent of their revenue from these efforts. More members of Congress should take an active interest nuclear security issues.
Mandating Particular Steps
In addition, where Congress sees continuing gaps, it should authorize or mandate the administration to take particular new steps to reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism. Starting with the original Nunn-Lugar legislation, there is a long record of Congress taking action to launch new initiatives to control these dangers.
Particular areas where Congress might consider action include:
- Global Proliferation Prevention Initiative. As Kenneth N. Luongo of the Partnership for Global Security has suggested, it may make sense to pull together the many disparate initiatives related to preventing nuclear terrorism and rebrand them as a single next-generation "Global Proliferation Prevention Initiative" or "Nuclear Security Initiative." Such an initiative would build on current structures but also include new policy ideas and tools, players and coalitions, and funding to reconceptualize the existing agenda as an integrated global proliferation prevention tool focused on security, removal, and elimination of WMD and targeting of the financing for illicit programs and activities. Congress could work with the administration to provide the political and financial capital that will be needed for such an effort. [10]
- Establishing new incentives for effective nuclear security. Every dollar a nuclear manager spends on security is a dollar not spent on accomplishing that facility's main mission, and every hour a nuclear worker spends complying with nuclear security rules is an hour not spent on activities that might be more likely to lead to a raise or a promotion. Given these clear incentives to cut corners on security, strong incentives pointing in the opposite direction need to be put in place – at the level of individual workers and teams, at the level of facilities, at the level of agencies or ministries, and even at the level of entire countries. Congress might consider, for example, whether current standards for the security required for nuclear material exported from the United States are sufficient to meet the requirement that such exports not be "inimical to the common defense and security." Facilities that had demonstrated superior security performance might be given preference in U.S. nuclear exports or in contracts from the U.S. government; U.S. nuclear security upgrade programs might work with other countries to establish awards programs for nuclear security performance and the like. [11]
- Tactical nuclear warheads. There is still much to be done to improve security for tactical nuclear weapons, reduce the number of these weapons and the number of locations where they are stored, and increase transparency in their management. One possibility would be a U.S.-Russian reciprocal initiative—modeled in part on the Bush-Gorbachev-Yeltsin initiatives of 1991-1992—to secure, monitor, and dismantle thousands of the most dangerous warheads (especially tactical weapons without modern electronic locks). [12]
- Limiting the use of HEU for medical isotopes. Technologies have been developed that make it possible to produce medical isotopes without HEU, but the four producers that produce 95% of the world's isotope supply all still use weapon-grade HEU targets. [13] With no production in the United States, Canada's new production reactors canceled, and Canada's existing reactor shut down, there is a crisis in supply of medical isotopes. [14] Congress should take action to ensure reliable supplies of medical isotopes produced without the use of HEU. As noted earlier, legislation introduced by Reps. Ed Markey (D-MA) and Fred Upton (R-MI) would authorize $163 million over five years for support for development of U.S. isotope production without HEU. The bill would also phase out U.S. exports of HEU for isotope production in other countries over 7-10 years, eliminating a major element of commerce in weapons-grade HEU. The House energy and water appropriations subcommittee provided $10 million to boost efforts to produce medical isotopes, and their Senate counterparts provided $20 million. Congress should take steps such as these – including providing not just authorization but appropriations – to ensure that sufficient funding is available to establish reliable non-HEU production of medical isotopes as rapidly as practicable. Congress should also consider imposing a roughly 30 percent user fee on all medical isotopes made with HEU, with the funds used to help producers provide reliable supplies made without HEU. This would give producers a strong financial incentive to convert, and since the isotopes are a tiny fraction of the costs of the medical procedures that use them, would not significantly affect the costs or availability of these life-saving procedures.
- Accelerating Russian and U.S. HEU blend down. Congress should direct DOE to enter into discussions with Russia concerning a broad range of possible incentives the United States might be willing to provide to help convince Russia to blend down additional HEU—and should consider setting aside a conditional appropriation in the range of $200 million to finance such incentives if an agreement is reached that requires such funding. Similarly, the United States can and should expand and accelerate the blend-down of its own excess HEU, beyond the roughly three tons per year now planned. The administration request of $35 million for the disposition of U.S. HEU is $4 million less than the FY 2009 appropriation.[15] Congress should provide additional funding targeted to accelerating the effort to get the HEU out of warheads and their components and blended down to LEU as rapidly as practicable.
- Priority for intelligence support to reducing nuclear terrorism risks. The level of effort the intelligence community devotes to nuclear terrorism issues has increased dramatically since 9/11. The Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP) is helping to focus collection and analysis on nuclear materials and their security. But there is still more to do to focus collection and analysis on some of the critical issues that shape where the greatest risks and opportunities for action lie. Congress could consider legislation designed to increase the priority the intelligence community assigns to collecting information on security conditions, terrorist and criminal activity, staff pay, morale, corruption at sites with weapons-usable materials, addressing questions such as "How much do the people at this HEU-fueled research reactor get paid? Is there a lot of organized crime there? Who would have to decide for this reactor to convert to LEU or shut down, and what incentives might convince them?"
- Broader approaches to interdicting nuclear smuggling. Congress should consider whether enough is being done on steps to stop nuclear smuggling that go beyond radiation detectors. Congress could mandate additional focus on expanded international police and intelligence cooperation targeted against nuclear smuggling; more work with individual countries to ensure that they have laws on the books, and fully enforced, providing severe penalties for nuclear smuggling; new efforts to provide rewards and other incentives for providing information that helps stop nuclear smuggling conspiracies; additional "stings" and other operations to interfere with, and increase our understanding of, the nuclear black market; and more. (Some of these measures involve the intelligence agencies; others are within the scope of programs such as the State Department's Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative.)
- Increased efforts on nuclear forensics. Congress could consider additional action to improve U.S. and international abilities to analyze nuclear materials and "rule in" or "rule out" possible origins for them, including expanded R&D budgets, increased cooperation with other countries developing such approaches, and an expanded effort to build international data banks of information on, and samples of, nuclear materials. (As noted above, Rep. Adam Schiff has introduced legislation on this subject.)
- Strengthened steps to make nuclear conspiracies more difficult. A wide range of counter-terrorism initiatives and steps to win the struggle of ideas could make it more difficult for terrorists to recruit nuclear experts, raise the substantial funds needed for a nuclear plot, and take the other needed steps to turn stolen nuclear material into a bomb.
- Getting the United States' own house in order. It will be far more difficult to convince other countries to convert HEU-fueled research reactors to use low-enriched uranium, and to provide effective security for such facilities, if the United States does not do so itself. Congress should provide sufficient funding to DOE to finance the conversion of the remaining U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors as rapidly as practicable, and should also fully fund NNSA's program to work with U.S. reactor operators to carry out voluntary security upgrades. Beyond those initial voluntary steps, Congress should consider modifying the law to direct the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to phase out the exemption from most security rules for HEU that research reactors now enjoy, and provide funding for DOE to help these operators pay the costs of effective security. Congress should also insist that NRC revise its rule exempting HEU that is radioactive enough to cause doses of more than one Sievert per hour at one meter from almost all security requirements, as recent studies make clear that this level of radiation would pose little deterrent to theft by determined terrorists.
In short, Congress can play an important role, working with the Obama administration, in reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism. By setting challenging objectives; providing the resources, authorities, and structures necessary to meet them; exerting in-depth oversight over the progress of these efforts and course corrections that may be needed in them; and mandating new steps where necessary, Congress can be a major partner in strengthening the effort to ensure that terrorists never get a nuclear weapon or the nuclear materials needed to make one.
Congressional Action on the FY 2010 Budget Request
As described in our Funding Update, for FY 2010, the Obama administration made a "steady as you go" budget request for threat reduction programs that did not include the funding that would be needed to achieve President Obama's objective of securing all nuclear materials worldwide within four years. With this in mind, the House Armed Services Committee took action to increase threat reduction budgets by some $400 million, but the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House and Senate appropriators did not follow suit, instead largely rubber-stamping the administration's threat reduction budgets and thereby leaving insufficient funds to accelerate and broaden efforts to secure nuclear stockpiles worldwide. The House and Senate have each passed their respective energy and water appropriations bills, and their versions of the defense authorization bill, which include DOE's nonproliferation programs. The House has passed a defense appropriations bill (which includes funding for the Defense Department's Nunn-Lugar program), but the Senate has not. While staff are working to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions during the August recess, the final outcome will not be resolved until the Congress returns in the fall.
On 18 June, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) approved a defense authorization bill that recommended an additional $403 million beyond the request for programs focused on securing nuclear material. [16] Highlights include:
$577 million for GTRI, $224 million above the request, in order to accelerate specific efforts – the increase provides: $127 million to secure and remove vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear material from around the world by 2012 (that is, to achieve President Obama's four-year goal); $35 million to convert research reactors; $2 million to remove vulnerable radiological sources outside the United States and $5 million to remove excess radiological sources within the United States; $10 million to secure sites with vulnerable nuclear and radiological sources outside the United States; and $45 million to secure U.S. research/test reactors and sites with high-priority radiological sources.
$731 million for the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program, $179 million above the request. This includes $30 million to secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and material and $149 million to deploy radiation detection equipment at high-threat border crossings and ports.
HASC recommended a total of $434 million for Cooperative Threat Reduction, $30 million more than the request. [17] Of this increase, $29 million is for CTR initiatives beyond the former Soviet Union, a program that received no funding in the DOD request. HASC recommended that nothwithstanding authority be granted to not more than 10 percent of the CTR appropriation in order to fund certain urgent CTR activities. [18] The committee also recommended that the Secretary of Defense have the authority to enter into agreements with foreign governments or entities to enable them to contribute funds to CTR activities. [19]
On 26 June, by contrast, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) provided no funding beyond the request to implement President Obama's objective of securing all nuclear materials in four years. SASC did recommend an additional $20 million in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding. [20] Of this increase, $10 million is for new CTR initiatives for states outside of the former Soviet Union and $7 million for strategic offensive arms elimination. [21] The committee also recommended granting notwithstanding authority for 10 percent of the CTR appropriation to fund bilateral and multilateral activities.
On June 25, the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee recommended a budget of $592 million for the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation program, $40 million above the request. [22] (These funds were balanced by a reduction in funds for dismantlement activities in North Korea, which will not be needed if North Korea continues on its current confrontational course.) Within this program, the subcommittee recommended: $73.5 million for the protection of civilian nuclear sites ($30 million above the request) and directed the additional funds be used for high priority work outside the former Soviet Union; and $68.5 million for maintaining Russia and other partners' security upgrades, including work to strengthen security culture and increased cost-sharing at Russian nuclear sites. The subcommittee fully funded the $333.5 million GTRI request, including $71.5 million for converting HEU-fueled reactors. [23] The subcommittee supported the full $666 million request for the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and the Waste Solidification Building (WSB) for plutonium disposition and directed that these projects be shifted to the Other Defense Activities account, to ensure that funding for nonproliferation activities "is not eroded by cost-overruns that might occur in the domestic construction projects." Similarly, on 8 July, the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee approved the requested funding for most nonproliferation programs. The subcommittee recommended $187 million for Nonproliferation and International Security programs, a reduction of $20 million tied to the requested funding for North Korea. [25] In addition, the subcommittee noted that it wants to ensure that the U.S. investments in Russian materials control and security are maintained and expects the Russian Government to share in the operations and maintenance responsibilities. [26]
Other Pending Legislation Related to Nuclear Terrorism
Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced the Nuclear Trafficking Prevention Act (H.R. 3244) on 16 July 2009 to establish the transfer of any nuclear weapon, device, material, or technology to terrorists as a crime against humanity, with the goal of making it possible to prosecute perpetrators wherever they may be found. Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) introduced the same language (S. 1464) in the Senate on the same day. H.R. 730 passed the House on 24 March and has been referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. H.R. 3244 has been referred to the House Committees on the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs. S. 1464 has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Radiological Materials Security Act (H.R.2070), introduced by Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-NY) and 8 cosponsors on 23 April 2009, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a risk assessment regarding the theft or other procurement of radiological materials that could be used by a terrorist in a radiological dispersion device. It then directs the NRC to maintain and update nuclear materials events and tracking databases and to issue regulations requiring high-risk radiological material facility owners/operators to create and implement facility security plans to address vulnerabilities. H.R. 2070 has been referred to House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology.
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
While not directly related to nuclear terrorism, nuclear cooperation agreements set the terms for U.S. participation in international nuclear commerce, which can have indirect effects on nuclear terrorism risks, and have provoked substantial debate in Congress over nuclear issues. Several issues related to such agreements are now before Congress or may soon be under consideration.
In 2008, Congress approved the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement. On Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's visit in July 2009, India finally announced that it was setting aside two sites for potential U.S.-design nuclear reactors (which it had already done for reactors from French and Russian companies), and the sides agreed to begin negotiating subsequent arrangements that would govern the terms for Indian reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuel.
A U.S. nuclear cooperation deal with Russia is also back in the news. The Bush administration had pulled that agreement from consideration in the face of mounting opposition after the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008. [27] In London on 1 April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev committed both sides to work to bring a 123 agreement into force; the two presidents reaffirmed this commitment during Obama's July 2009 visit to Moscow. [28]
On 15 January 2009 then-Secretary of State Rice and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, but the Obama administration renegotiated the terms to make the ban on enrichment and reprocessing in the UAE more explicit. On 8 April, the UAE signed the IAEA's Additional Protocol. On 21 May 2009 President Obama submitted the re-worded agreement to Congress, starting the clock on Congressional review. [29] After 90 days of continuous session (which will occur by late October), the agreement takes effect unless Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law. [30] By legally binding the UAE to not engage in enrichment or reprocessing, and to adopt a range of nonproliferation measures (including the Additional Protocol), both governments hope that the agreement will serve as a model for responsible nuclear energy development. As the UAE has no HEU or plutonium, and no plans to acquire any, the agreement should not increase the risk of nuclear theft. However, it is critical that robust infrastructure – focused on safety, security and safeguards – be established from the beginning to mitigate the risk of sabotage.
| FOOTNOTES | |
| [1] | The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee recommended $20 million to advance the creation of a domestic supply of molybdenum-99; the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee recommended $10 million for a similar effort. |
| [2] | In February 2005, Presidents Putin and Bush agreed to enhance nuclear security cooperation in five key areas: extending emergency response cooperation; sharing information on improving security at nuclear facilities; expanding nuclear security culture cooperation; continuing research reactor conversion; and accelerating security upgrades at Russian nuclear facilities. |
| [3] | While the focus on achieving nuclear security self-reliance in Russia is appropriate, when the time comes Congress should be willing to provide modest funding to continue cooperation with Russia, in order to continue exchanges of best practices and related partnership-based approaches that can serve the interests of nuclear security in both countries. |
| [4] | See discussion in Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008), pp. 179-180. |
| [5] | The National Academy of Sciences recommended providing the Defense Department with nothwithstanding authority for a maximum of 10 percent of the overall annual CTR appropriation – this language was included in the House and Senate versions of the defense authorization bill. See National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program/Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Policy and Global Affairs, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009), p.14; available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12583.html as of 6 August 2009. |
| [6] | See Philipp Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, September 2004). |
| [7] | For this and other useful suggestions for aligning strategy and resources in this area, see Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Security Studies Program, June 2008), pp. 45-56. |
| [8] | See Matthew Bunn and Andrew Newman, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: An Agenda for the Next President (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008). |
| [9] | See Ashton B. Carter and Robert G. Joseph, et al, Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 2008. |
| [10] | Kenneth N. Luongo, "Loose Nukes in New Neighborhoods: The Next Generation of Proliferation Prevention," Arms Control Today, May 2009; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Luongo as of 20 May 2009. |
| [11] | Matthew Bunn, "Incentives for Nuclear Security," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005). |
| [12] | For a more detailed discussion, see Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008), pp. 171-172. |
| [13] | In January 2009, the National Research Council of the National Academies released a congressionally-mandated report on the feasibility of conversion to LEU for production of medical isotopes. The report found that "LEU targets that could be used for large-scale production of Mo-99 have been developed and demonstrated … At the present time there are not sufficient quantities of medical isotopes available from LEU targets to meet U.S. domestic needs. However, the committee sees no technical reasons that adequate quantities cannot be produced from LEU targets in the future." Committee on Medical Isotope Production Without Highly Enriched Uranium, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division of Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies, Medical Isotope Production Without Highly Enriched Uranium (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009); available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12569 as of 13 July 2009. |
| [14] | See Ian MacLeod, "Canada's Isotope Shortage Elicits Worldwide Reaction," Canwest News Service, 15 June 2009 and Daniel Horner, "Panel: No Big Barriers to Making Isotopes From LEU," Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 26 January 2009. For earlier accounts of the issues, see Medical Isotope Production Without Highly Enriched Uranium and Cristina Hansell, "Nuclear Medicine’s Double Hazard," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, Issue 2, July 2008, pp. 185-208. |
| [15] | DOE, FY 2010 Congressional Budget Request, Vol. 2, p. 420; Communication with DOE official, 13 April 2009; U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2009 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration, vol.1, DOE/CF-024, 2008, p.517; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/09budget/Content/Volumes/Volume1a.pdf as of 9 June 2008. |
| [16] | House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Report 111-166 with additional and supplemental views, 18 June 2009, pp. 583-584; available at http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/111_hr2647_rpt.pdf as of 9 July 2009. |
| [17] | House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2647, Report No. 111–166, 18 June 2009, p.474; available at http://www.rules.house.gov/111/LegText/111_hr2647_armedsvc.pdf as of 8 July 2009. |
| [18] | Notwithstanding authority ("notwithstanding any other provision of law") makes it possible to move money rapidly to newly identified needs by bypassing time-consuming contracting requirements and procurement regulations and allows agencies to finance work in countries that the United States has sanctioned without receiving a waiver to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. |
| [19] | The HASC language mirrors a National Academies recommendation that Congress should provide comingling authority to all CTR implementing agencies as a way to encourage other partners to contribute funds to global security engagement efforts. National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction, p.13. |
| [20] | U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services press release, "Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010", 26 June 2009, p.4; available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/press/10mark.pdf as of 8 July 2009. |
| [21] | U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Report 111-35 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (S. 1390), 2 July 2009; available as of 13 July 2009. |
| [22] | Statement of Congressman Edward Pastor, Subcommittee Markup: Fiscal Year 2010 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, p.3. |
| [23] | In its report, the subcommittee explained that while it "recognizes that agreements have been reached that obligate GTRI to secure material in low-risk countries but all efforts should be made to address the most vulnerable material first." House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill 2010, Report 111-203, 13 July 2009; available as of 6 August 2009. |
| [24] | U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Statement of Congressman Edward Pastor, Subcommittee Markup: Fiscal Year 2010 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 25 June 2009, p.3; available here as of 8 July 2009. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 transferred the MOX program from NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account to DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, on the argument that it was now delinked from Russian plutonium disposition and hence no longer a nonproliferation effort. Funding for the WSB and PDCF was moved to NNSA's Weapons Activities account. The administration, arguing that removing the program from NNSA entirely was not consistent with the division between DOE and NNSA created in the legislation that established NNSA, asked for funding for this program for FY 2009 under the category "Other Defense Activities." Following guidance in the FY 2009 Defense Authorization Act, the FY 2010 request reverts to funding MOX (and WSB) out of NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account. DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, FY 2010 Congressional Budget Request, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Vol. 1, May 2009, p.9-10; available here as of 8 July 2009. |
| [25] | Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill 2010, Report 111-45, 9 July 2009 available as of 6 August 2009. |
| [26] | Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill 2010, Report 111-45, 9 July 2009 available as of 6 August 2009. |
| [27] | Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns recently remarked: "President Obama reaffirmed that constructive cooperation with Russia in 2009 should help to facilitate Congressional approval of the bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation — the "123" agreement, building on our Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, and commitment to support Russia's proposed international fuel center for countries that forego indigenous enrichment capabilities." William J. Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "Remarks at Russia World Forum", Washington, DC, 27 April 2009; available at http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2009a/122279.htm as of 6 May 2009. |
| [28] | The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America, London, 1 April 2009 available here as of 8 July 2009; and the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation, Moscow, 6 July 2009 available here as of 8 July 2009. |
| [29] | See Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Arab Emirates: Message from the President of the United States, House Document 111-43, 21 May 2009; available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/uae-nuclear.pdf as of 14 July 2009. According to a report in Arms Control Today, the new agreement moves the phrase, the UAE "shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engage in activities within its territory for, or relating to, the enrichment or reprocessing of material," from the preamble into the body of the agreement to assuage the concern that the pledge might not be legally binding. Daniel Horner, "U.S., UAE Sign New Nuclear Cooperation Pact", Arms Control Today, June 2009; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/UAE as of 8 June 2009. |
| [30] | See Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, R40344, 1 April 2009; available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122293.pdf as of 8 June 2009. |
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