Overview
	Technical Background
	The Threat
	Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials
	Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling
	Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
	Monitoring Stockpiles
	Ending Further Production
Reducing Stockpiles   HEU Purchase Agreement   U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition   Russian Plutonium Disposition   U.S. Plutonium Disposition

 

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Previous Publications
	Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends February2007 Readthe Full Report (1.5M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb 2006 The latest report in our series, from May 2006, finds that even though the gap between the threat of nuclear terrorism and the response has narrowed in recent years, there remains an unacceptable danger that terrorists might succeed in their quest to get and use a nuclear bomb, turning a modern city into a smoking ruin. Offering concrete steps to confront that danger, the report calls for world leaders to launch a fast-paced global coalition against nuclear terrorism focused on locking down all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide as rapidly as possible. Read the Executive Summary (379K PDF) or the Full Report (1.7M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives Our May 2005 report finds that while the United States and other countries laid important foundations for an accelerated effort to prevent nuclear terrorism in the last year, sustained presidential leadership will be needed to win the race to lock down the world’s nuclear stockpiles before terrorists and thieves can get to them. Read the Executive Summary (281 K) or the Full Report (1.9M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action Building on the previous years' reports, this 2004 NTI-commissioned report grades current efforts and recommends new actions to more effectively prevent nuclear terrorism. It finds that programs to reduce this danger are making progress, but there remains a potentially deadly gap between the urgency of the threat and the scope and pace of efforts to address it. Download the Full Report (1.2 M PDF) Выписки из доклада по-русски (423K PDF)
	Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan 2003 report published by Harvard and NTI measures the progress made in keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of terrorist hands, and outlines a comprehensive plan to reduce the danger. Download the Full Report (2.7M PDF)
	Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action 2002 report co-published by Harvard and NTI outlines seven urgent steps to reduce the threat of stolen nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile states. Read the Full Report (516K PDF)

Reducing Excess Stockpiles

Russian Plutonium Disposition

Status

Program mission and purpose.  The mission of this effort is to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Russia 's stockpiles of excess weapons plutonium, transforming them into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable in nuclear weapons (the "spent fuel standard").  As long as it remains in forms directly usable in nuclear weapons, Russia 's huge excess plutonium stockpile will pose a danger of nuclear theft, or of being returned to the weapons from which it came, should circumstances change.

Background and history.  The basic options available for disposition of excess Russian weapons plutonium — use as reactor fuel or immobilization with wastes — are the same as in the United States .  Like the United States , Russia does not have a large-scale facility for fabrication of plutonium fuel, or more than limited experience in the use of plutonium fuel in its reactors.  Unlike the United States , Russia lacks both the money to pay for the roughly $2 billion estimated cost of disposition of its excess plutonium, and the number of modern, safe reactors needed to burn the material rapidly as fuel.   Moreover, Russia refuses to consider the immobilization option, considering the plutonium as a valuable national asset produced with thousands of man-years of labor, not something to be thrown away as waste.[1]

Given this situation, the first priority is to store the material securely pending eventual disposition, and the Mayak fissile material storage facility, intended for that purpose, is now nearing completion.  The second priority is to place this material under bilateral or international monitoring to confirm that it will never again be used in nuclear weapons; this was the original purpose of the U.S.-Russia-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Trilateral Initiative, though that currently appears likely to end up focusing more on monitoring disposition of plutonium than on monitoring storage pending disposition; limited U.S.-Russian transparency for the Mayak storage facility may be the principal monitoring that takes place while the material is still in storage.

The next step, beyond secure and monitored storage, is actual disposition of this excess material — transforming it into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable in nuclear weapons.  Several nations are cooperating with Russia to study approaches to disposition of excess plutonium, but the U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area is the most extensive.  That cooperation was initiated by the January 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin summit, which established a joint plutonium disposition working group.[2]  In April 1996, the G8 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit called for timely action on plutonium disposition, endorsed the spent fuel standard and use as reactor fuel or immobilization as the main means of achieving that objective, and set in motion a process for international consideration of options and financial contributions — beginning with an experts' meeting in Paris in late 1996 — that continues to this day.[3]

By late 1996, the U.S.-Russian joint working group had produced a comprehensive study of the options for plutonium disposition,[4] and began to shift toward more in-depth research and development on specific options — work which expanded after the 1998 conclusion of a government-to-government agreement providing an umbrella under which it could proceed (including, for example, liability and intellectual property provisions).[5]  U.S.-Russian joint studies have included work on both converting the plutonium into uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for existing light-water reactors (LWRs), and immobilizing it with high-level wastes for disposal — as well as work on approaches to burning plutonium as fuel in existing and future fast-neutron reactors and development of advanced reactor types such as the Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR).

Similarly, other countries have also pursued joint cooperation with Russia on options for plutonium disposition.  A trilateral French-German-Russian team developed a design for a pilot-scale MOX fabrication plant (based on the MOX technology already being used to fuel civilian reactors in France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe), along with detailed cost estimates (and a French-Russian team developed a complementary plan for a plant to convert plutonium weapon components to oxide to feed this proposed MOX plant). After a Socialist-Green coalition took power in Germany , however, Germany dropped out of this effort to support development of MOX in Russia .  Japan has pursued in-depth cooperation with Russia on fueling Russia's existing BN-600 sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor (the largest operating fast-neutron reactor in the world) with excess weapons plutonium, including studies of a "vibro-pack" approach to making the fuel which, it was hoped, would be cheaper than traditional fabrication of fuel pellets, and might be applicable in Japan’s own planned civilian plutonium fuel programs.  Canada has worked with Russia on joint studies of the feasibility and costs of using Russian excess weapons plutonium as fuel in Canada's CANDU reactors (which may be more economically attractive than other approaches to plutonium fuel use, because the use of MOX fuel could, in these reactors, resolve a safety issue that has led Canadian regulators to require that these reactors operate at reduced power — and hence the use of plutonium fuel could make it possible to generate more power from the same plants).  The GT-MHR development has had financial and technical participation from Russia , the United States , Japan , and France , among others. 

As technical work proceeded, political discussions of how to approach disposition of excess weapons plutonium proceeded in parallel.  At their September 1998 summit, President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued a statement agreeing in principle to carry out disposition 50 metric tons of plutonium on each side, and called for rapid negotiation of a more specific and binding government-to-government agreement laying out how this would be done.[6]  Negotiation of such an agreement was complicated by Russian negotiators' reluctance to agree to anything in the absence of clear commitments on how it would be paid for, and U.S. negotiators’ inability to make commitments of funds that had not yet been appropriated by Congress.  Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), who had been pushing for faster action on plutonium disposition for years, stepped in to this gap in 1999, pushing through an appropriation of $200 million to support Russian plutonium disposition — provisional on the conclusion of a U.S.-Russian agreement.  This led to a breakthrough in the talks, and after two years of intensive negotiations, the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) was signed in September 2000.[7]

The PMDA, in the end, covers only 34 tons of weapons plutonium on each side, not 50 — because only 34 tons of the 52.5 tons of U.S. excess material was weapon-grade material of a quality matching the plutonium Russia had declared excess (most of which was plutonium metal in the form of components from dismantled weapons).[8]  The PMDA calls for each side to take "all reasonable steps" to begin carrying out disposition of 2 tons of excess plutonium per year by the end of 2007, and to develop an "action plan" to at least double this rate "at the earliest practicable date."  The accord calls for the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on financing and management of the effort, and allows either side to back out of the disposition commitment if adequate financing does not become available.  The PMDA also includes provisions for bilateral monitoring throughout the disposition process to confirm that the agreement's terms are being met, and commits the sides to allow IAEA verification as soon as the excess plutonium has been placed in storage after processing to transform it into unclassified forms and mixtures, or arrives at a fuel fabrication facility.

In putting a commitment to specific amounts and timetables on paper — conditional on arranging adequate international financing — the PMDA represented a significant step forward. A number of troublesome issues were not addressed, however, as agreement could not be reached — notably liability provisions (which are now becoming the focus of negotiations both between the United States and Russia and in the multilateral talks over financing and managing plutonium disposition in Russia).  More broadly, it should be remembered that 34 tons represents roughly one-fifth of Russia 's total estimated stockpile of separated plutonium (both military and civilian) — so this initial agreement can only be considered a first step.  Indeed, the PMDA includes provisions pledging each side to include plutonium that may be declared excess in the future in the agreement or similar arrangements.

Ever since the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, there has been a continuing effort within the G-8 forum to agree on international approaches to financing the roughly $2 billion estimated cost of disposition of Russia's excess plutonium, and this effort continued with renewed intensity as the PMDA came to a conclusion. At the Okinawa G-8 summit in 2000, the assembled leaders announced that their "goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to co-ordinate this co-operation."[9]  Unfortunately, however, only modest progress was made in that direction, and what commitments other G-8 states had been willing to make were thrown into doubt when, after the Bush administration came to office in early 2001, plutonium disposition was publicly identified as among the programs that might be terminated.[10]  (It was in this same period that the German Socialist-Green coalition withdrew its support for the effort, so the G-8 was no longer unified behind it.)  So little progress had been made by the time of the 2001 Genoa G-8 summit that for the first time in years, plutonium disposition was not mentioned at all in the leaders' communiqué; the weak statement inviting countries that might wish to contribute to join in an international financing plan was relegated to the foreign ministers' statement.[11]  The prospects for pulling together the financing and moving forward with Russian plutonium disposition appeared grim.

By 2002, however, the situation began to turn around.  First, in January, 2002, the Bush administration endorsed moving forward with an all-MOX approach to disposition of U.S. excess weapons plutonium, in parallel with disposition of Russian excess weapons plutonium, removing the previous year's doubts about the U.S. commitment to the effort.  (See U.S. Plutonium Disposition.)  Second, in June, 2002, the G-8 leaders launched a "Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," under which they pledged $20 billion over 10 years to cooperative threat reduction projects — with plutonium disposition identified as one of a few "priority concerns."[12]  With that commitment, the prospects for reaching agreement on an international financing approach brightened considerably.  The $2 billion estimated cost of disposition in Russia includes roughly $1 billion in initial capital costs to build the needed facilities, and then $1 billion in operations costs — and by late 2003, total pledges for financing plutonium disposition in Russia came to some $800 million, nearly enough to build the needed facilities, with half of that coming from the United States.[13]  With Congress insisting that U.S. plutonium disposition go forward only in parallel with Russian plutonium disposition, improved prospects on the Russian end brightened prospects for the U.S. program as well.

Current plans.   As of late 2003, the planned approach was to burn Russia's excess weapons plutonium as MOX fuel in Russia's in Russia's VVER-1000 reactors — the most modern and safest reactors in operation in Russia — and possibly also in Russia's BN-600 fast-neutron reactor.  In addition, it remains possible that some of the MOX fuel fabricated from excess weapons plutonium in Russia would be exported to other countries.

The first step would be converting plutonium metal weapon components (known as "pits") to oxide in preparation for fuel fabrication, and blending this oxide with a limited amount of reactor-grade plutonium to obscure the specific mix of isotopes used in weapon plutonium (which is still secret in Russia).  Given the sensitivities surrounding this step, Russia has been reluctant to allow the kind of transparency the United States would require if it were contributing to the cost, so as of 2003, the idea was for Russia to carry this conversion out on its own, using the existing facilities that once fabricated new plutonium weapons components.[14]

The next step is to fabricate the resulting oxide into fuel, which will require construction of a new MOX fabrication plant.  In late 2002, Russian officials agreed in principle to a U.S. proposal for Russia to use a "Russianized" version of the U.S. MOX fabrication plant design, representing a substantial saving in time and cost compared to designing a different plant from scratch.[15]  Construction of the plant was intended to begin in 2004, and the PMDA calls for the plant to be producing fuel from 2 tons of plutonium a year by 2008, but given that funding and liability issues remain unresolved, and no multilateral agreement to support the activity has yet been reached, it is no longer plausible that this schedule can be met.

Russia currently has 8 operational VVER-1000 reactors.[16]  Using MOX fuel in only one-third of their reactor cores (the approach that has generally been taken with civilian MOX fuel in Europe to date), each of these reactors could consume approximately 270 kilograms of plutonium per year, for a total of just over 2 tons of plutonium per year if all eight were used.[17]  The most recent technical analyses, however, suggest that larger fractions of the core can safely use MOX fuel: with minimal modifications, and remaining within their existing safety margins, the VVER-1000s are believed to able to handle 430-450 kilograms of plutonium per year.[18]  Some of the VVER-1000s, however, are older plants with fewer safety features and less remaining lifetime before they will be shut down, which may not be converted to plutonium use. The five most modern plants would be able to consume over 2 tons of plutonium per year, meeting the requirement of the PDMA.  Russia has two other VVER-1000s that are expected to come on-line within the next few years, and a substantial number of others that it plans to build if sufficient funding becomes available; if these are in fact completed and become operational by the time plutonium disposition begins on a large scale, the available capacity to burn plutonium fuel would increase substantially.  The BN-600 with a partial core of plutonium fuel could consume 270 kilograms of plutonium per year (or more, if the fuel were irradiated for shorter periods); if converted to a full core of plutonium fuel (an option whose feasibility is still being examined), it might be able to consume 1.2 tons of plutonium per year.[19]

In short, with Russia 's existing reactors, it should be possible to meet the 2 ton-per-year initial rate specified by the PMDA, but getting to a doubled rate may be more challenging (see discussion below).

U.S.-Russian cooperation to move this program forward shifted into higher gear during 2002, as the project moved toward actual construction — but disagreements over the remaining obstacles sharpened as well.  Russia 's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has designated TVEL, its fuel-fabrication firm, as the lead institution for managing the project, and has designated some of their leading experts to take charge of its implementation.  Modifications to the U.S. MOX plant design are proceeding apace.  DOE is offering Russian experts training in project management to help run the project, and the project management software that is being used to keep track of the U.S. effort; MINATOM may hire a U.S. integrating contractor to oversee construction.[20]  The U.S. government is working closely with the Russian nuclear regulatory agency to help it prepare to regulate the safety and security of both the MOX fabrication plant and the use of MOX in Russian reactors — DOE hopes that 12 "high priority" regulations will be published in fiscal year (FY) 2004.[21]

At the same time, progress toward agreement on multilateral financing, as called for in the PMDA, remained painfully slow, and disagreements over liability in the event of an accident during the program’s implementation appeared increasingly difficult to bridge.  In the optimism of Kananaskis, when the Global Partnership was announced, the G-8 foreign ministers set a deadline of the end of 2003 for putting an effective financing and management plan in place for Russian plutonium disposition[22] -- but by the 2003 G-8 summit, any restatement of this deadline had been dropped, with the senior officials working on the Global Partnership noting only that "significant progress can be noted" in gaining increased pledges of financial support, and "substantial agreement on concepts" for how the program would be managed.[23]  In the Global Partnership Action Plan announced by the G-8 leaders themselves, plutonium disposition was not mentioned.  The talks over such a multilateral agreement are continuing, but whether the agreement can move forward if the available pledges are only enough to cover the initial capital cost — leaving the costs of operating the facilities once built to be addressed later — and the issue of liability remain important obstacles.[24]

Disagreements over liability came to a head in 2003, as the end of the 5-year term of the 1998 plutonium disposition technical agreement approached.  The 1998 agreement included liability provisions which DOE and its contractors had judged to be adequate for the modest scale joint research and development activities covered under the agreement.  But these provisions did not include language that would absolve the United States and its contractors of responsibility even if they cause an accident intentionally, which is included in the government-to-government "umbrella" agreement that governs all the projects in the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.  While Russia was happy to simply extend the 1998 agreement for another 5 years (and DOE officials would have preferred this outcome as well), the U.S. State Department insisted that the plutonium disposition technical agreement should not be extended unless Russia agreed to modify it to include CTR-type liability.  Russia was not willing to accept again the CTR-type provisions that it accepted many years ago (which have not been ratified by the Russian legislature, and which Russian officials argue are contrary to Russian law).  At the last minute, the U.S. side offered a 3-month extension of the agreement (with the idea that this might be enough time to resolve the liability dispute), but Russia evinced little interest in a 90-day agreement relating to long-term research and development.  As Bryan Wilkes, a spokesman for DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) put it to a reporter, "we just want to proceed with our programs, essentially, and we don’t want to get bogged down in these legal issues, but… the State Department is insisting on some legal changes on the liability issues."[25]  With neither side showing any flexibility, the agreement expired in July, 2003.[26]  Work under existing contracts signed while the agreement was in force can continue, however — and officials on both sides made sure that contracts were in place to cover the work that most immediately needed to be done before the agreement expired.[27]  (The same problem also led the 5-year agreement on the Nuclear Cities Initiative to expire in September, 2003.)

To actually build and operate major plutonium-handling facilities, and use plutonium fuel in reactors, would require a stronger agreement on liability than is included in the 1998 agreement, which focuses only on research and development.  But neither bilateral U.S.-Russian nor multilateral talks have made much headway in devising an approach to liability that is acceptable to the Russian government, the U.S. State Department, contractors that might participate in the project (many of whom want to be indemnified against any responsibility for damages by the U.S. government, regardless of what the agreement with Russia says), and other countries that may contribute.  It has become clear that Russia is absolutely unwilling to again agree to language that would leave the Russian government liable for intentional sabotage by U.S. contractors, while the U.S. is unwilling to accept liability language that left the determination of what was intentional sabotage solely up to Russian courts;[28] if there is to be any way out, it will likely have to involve some process that both sides can agree on relating to how to determine whether intentional sabotage was the cause of an accident, or some means to address liability in that case without either the Russian government nor the U.S. government picking up the entire tab.

In short, as of October, 2003, it seemed nearly certain that a multilateral agreement on financing and management of disposition in Russia would not be completed by the end of 2003, and that the previously planned 2004 start of construction of the needed facilities in Russia would not occur.  While technical progress continues to be made, getting the program back on track will require overcoming major political and legal hurdles.

Budget

See budget table

Through FY 2003, the U.S. government has appropriated $375 million to support disposition of Russian excess weapons plutonium, including the $200 million conditional appropriation provided in FY 1999.  The request for FY 2004 is $47.1 million.[29]  Other governments, particularly France, Germany , and Japan , have also appropriated tens of millions of dollars to support their plutonium disposition cooperation with Russia .

The total cost to complete the program remains somewhat uncertain.  The most recent official estimates are in the range of $2 billion for disposition of 34 tons of excess weapons plutonium (blended with roughly four additional tons of reactor-grade blendstock); subtracting the value of the fuel that would be produced reduces the net cost to $1.7-$1.8 billion.[30]  Analyses prepared independently by German, French, and Russian experts come to roughly similar conclusions.[31]  The reports outlining these estimates acknowledge, however, that a number of important factors – such as the costs of safeguards and security for the entire operation – are not yet known and have not been included in these estimates.  Moreover, the history is that cost estimates for the U.S. side of the program more than doubled from the early estimates to the current ones – and given the uncertainties in estimating future Russian inflation on wage rates and materials costs, the uncertainties may be even larger on the Russian side.  Thus, current estimates are quite uncertain – and in the author’s judgment the final costs are more likely to be higher than to be lower than currently estimated. 

Key Issues and Recommendations

Russian plutonium disposition faces serious challenges that must be overcome if the program is to be successful, as well as other key issues that should be addressed:

Solving the liability problem.  The Bush administration made a fundamental mistake in allowing the legal dispute over liability to bring the 1998 technical agreement crashing down.  It has been obvious for years that Russia was not again going to accept an agreement that would make it liable for intentional sabotage by U.S. personnel.  Moreover, the debate over this issue has missed a fundamental point – the mere fact that Russia requires billions of dollars in assistance for arms reduction and nonproliferation suggests that it would not have billions of dollars available to pay damages in the event of such an accident even if it had signed an agreement requiring it to do so.  More creative approaches – such as some type of jointly funded insurance – are likely to be a better way to solve the liability problem, and there are a range of past models available on which to draw.[32]

• Recommendation: The U.S. government should drop its insistence on Russia adopting the exact language of the CTR umbrella agreement, and explore more creative approaches to liability which would do more to ensure that in the event of a major accident the funds to cover the resulting claims would actually be available.

Finding the funds, and a reasonable management approach.  As of late 2003, the international commitments to financing of Russian plutonium disposition were not yet sufficient to fund the project.  By early 2003, the United States had committed $400 million to the effort, and the Department of Energy reports that the United Kingdom, France, and Japan "have collectively pledged approximately" $300 million;[33] by late 2003, this total from all sources appeared to have edged up by $100 million, to $800 million[34] – well below the estimated cost of disposition of 34 tons of Russian excess weapons plutonium.  Moreover, with several countries contributing, several countries will want a voice in the project's management, and discussions of how to establish a multilateral management mechanism that can get the job done quickly and cost-effectively have proved to be difficult.  With construction of plutonium fuel fabrication plants in both the United States and Russia originally slated to begin in 2004, but hinging on agreement on the funding and management arrangements, rapid agreement is crucial.  If, following the progress of 2002, the effort again fails to make substantial headway toward putting realistic financing arrangements in place and moving toward actual construction of facilities – after nearly a decade of attempts to move this effort forward – officials and legislators in Washington, Moscow, and other capitals are likely to begin to lose faith that this effort will ever move forward.  Whatever momentum now exists, if lost, would be very difficult to regain – with the result that enough excess weapons-grade plutonium for many thousands of nuclear weapons will simply remain in storage, in forms readily usable in new nuclear bombs.

• Recommendation: Working with other governments, the United States should press hard to reach agreements in the first half of 2004 on an effective financing and management arrangement, and a step-by-step work plan, for disposition of Russian excess weapons plutonium.  Such a plan should make maximum use of potential commercial contributions, but should clearly delineate the parts of the project that require on-budget government financing.

• Recommendation: The management arrangement agreed to should be designed to get the job done as quickly and cost-effectively as possible.  Some arrangement for a single decision-maker for management decisions should be put in place (as has been successfully done, for example, for the internationally funded International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor), rather than having every decision going through a multilateral committee.

• Recommendation: It may make sense to focus first on financing the initial capital cost of the needed facilities, estimated to be roughly $1 billion of the total program cost (within striking distance of the amount already pledged).  Once these facilities have been built, it is unlikely the international community would allow them to sit idle for the lack of approximately $40 million per year needed to run them.

• Recommendation: If it proves to be impossible to arrange sufficient multilateral financing to fund Russian plutonium disposition, or to agree on an effective multilateral management approach, the United States should consider financing Russian plutonium disposition itself, as part of its $10 billion planned contribution to the G-8 Global Partnership.  Making the project primarily bilateral rather than multilateral would simplify the management arrangements considerably.[35]  If Congressional backing for full U.S. financing cannot be secured, alternative financing arrangements – such as financing a portion of the project through additional HEU sales or through revenue from spent fuel storage in Russia – might also be considered.[36]

Finding sufficient reactors for a 4-ton-per-year or higher rate.  After "not enough liability protection" and "not enough money," the next major problem to be resolved is "not enough reactors."  As noted earlier, the VVER-1000s now operating or under construction in Russia might be able to handle 3 tons of plutonium per year, with modest modifications, but burning four tons per year or more might require some different approach.  Approaches being actively considered include: (a) exporting some of the MOX fuel to Europe or Canada; (b) modifying the VVER-1000s to handle still larger core fractions of MOX fuel (especially the reactors now being built, where modifications could be incorporated in the design at lower cost than changing existing plants); (c) modifying the BN-600 to accept a full core of MOX fuel; and (d) completing the BN-800, a large new fast-neutron reactor under construction, whose completion remains somewhat uncertain due to funding limitations, but which could burn large amounts of plutonium fuel.  (Under current plans, advanced systems such as the GT-MHR would not be used on the first 34 tons, but would be considered for whatever plutonium remained when they became available.[37])

At least for later stages of the program, if not for the initial stage, the options of exporting some MOX fuel for use in European reactors or for use in Canadian reactors appear particularly plausible.  The "Euro-burn" option is limited by the fact that European utilities already have more civilian, reactor-grade plutonium to burn as MOX than their reactors licensed to burn MOX can handle – but in a few special cases (enough to make a significant difference in the plutonium disposition rate), there may be utilities who would be interested in consuming some of the Russian MOX if the price was right.  (One approach being considered is a "leasing" arrangement in which Russia would take back the MOX spent fuel for storage and disposal in Russia, easing the utilities' spent fuel management headaches and increasing their incentive to be interested in such a deal.[38])  Canada's CANDU reactors do not currently burn MOX fuel, but might be able to do so cost-effectively; Canadian regulators have ordered these reactors to operate at power levels below their maximum capacity for safety reasons, and the use of MOX fuel could address that safety concern, allowing them to generate more electricity for sale.  There are also a substantial number of VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine , already supplied with fuel by Russia , and consideration could be given to burning some of the MOX in these reactors.

• Recommendation: The U.S. and Russian governments, working with other interested governments and firms, should continue to push to work out arrangements for exporting some of the MOX from a MOX plant in Russia to other countries, including through leasing arrangements.

Overcoming political, technical, and regulatory challenges.  Just as is the case with the U.S. plutonium disposition program, the Russian program faces intense opposition from environmentalist and anti-nuclear critics, who argue that using MOX fuel in Russian reactors will worsen safety risks[39] and create new security hazards from processing and transport of tens of tons of plutonium.  As in the case of the U.S. program, if there were a significant accident or theft incident in the plutonium disposition program itself – or in civilian plutonium recycling efforts elsewhere in the world – public concern would greatly increase, and there would be a real prospect of the program grinding to a halt.  This political opposition highlights real technical challenges in safely and securely fabricating and using MOX fuel in existing Russian nuclear reactors; both U.S. and Russian experts will have to work hard to ensure that the program is implemented in a way that fully addresses these concerns.  Regulatory hurdles could also still pose a risk of delay or derailment of the effort, particularly given the Russian nuclear regulatory agency's limited experience in regulating plutonium fuel operations.

• Recommendation: U.S. and Russian plutonium managers should focus intensely on ensuring that stringent standards of safety and security are met throughout the effort, that there are sufficient opportunities for critics to voice their concerns, and that public concerns are effectively addressed.

Lack of a backup to the current all-MOX approach.  As just discussed, there remain significant program risks in the current all-MOX approach.  Currently there are no major alternatives being pursued should the all-MOX approach fail.  A number of alternative or complementary approaches should be considered.  Considerable care should be used, however, to explore these concepts without undermining the main thrust of the plutonium disposition program.  Additional concepts that should be examined include:

• A "plutonium swap" approach, using existing plutonium fuel fabrication facilities and reactors already burning plutonium fuel.  Today, some 10 tons of reactor-grade civilian plutonium is already being burned as fuel for civilian power reactors each year.  By far the fastest and cheapest approach to reducing stockpiles of excess weapons plutonium, if agreement could be reached on it, would be to substitute excess weapons plutonium for this civilian plutonium, thereby burning some 10 tons a year of excess weapons plutonium while using existing fuel fabrication facilities and contract arrangements.[40]  The excess weapons plutonium would be converted to oxides suitable for fuel fabrication in Russia and the United States , and shipped to existing European fuel fabrication facilities under heavy guard.  Modest license modifications for those facilities and for the reactors that use fuel from them would likely be needed in order for them to use weapon-grade rather than reactor-grade plutonium.  The civilian plutonium that would have been burned at a rate of 10 tons per year would be displaced and would build up in storage, adding to the large quantities of civilian separated plutonium that are already in storage.  In effect, this would transform a problem of excess weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and the United States, under no international safeguards, to a problem of excess reactor-grade plutonium stored in secure facilities in Europe under international safeguards – a significant improvement, though not a complete solution to the problem by any means.

These stockpiles of displaced civilian plutonium could be "swapped" for the excess weapons plutonium, so that the United States and Russia would retain title to the same amount of fissile plutonium they each sent to Europe (potentially important for Russia, which focuses more on the potential future value of plutonium than on its present liabilities).  Indeed, given the costs and difficulties for utilities in managing plutonium, the European and Japanese utilities that own the huge stocks of separated civilian plutonium now in storage would likely be happy to have Russia take title to two tons of civilian plutonium for every one ton of weapons plutonium sent to Europe. 

• Until further development was canceled, technology for immobilizing plutonium with high-level wastes – creating massive, intensely radioactive objects quite similar in their proliferation characteristics to spent fuel from nuclear power plants – provided a possible backup to MOX.  Indeed, to avoid putting all the plutonium disposition eggs in one basket, a panel of the National Academy of Sciences recommended that the U.S. and Russian programs pursue both technologies at the same time, as did a group of senior U.S. and Russian experts asked to advise their two Presidents on plutonium disposition in the late 1990s.  While the Russian government has traditionally opposed plutonium immobilization on the grounds that it would throw away a material that cost an enormous amount to produce and may be valuable in future, carrying out joint research and development on immobilization approaches could help build up the cadre of experts in Russia who understand immobilization and its potential value – a value which may become more apparent to Russian officials if the costs and difficulties of the plutonium fuel approach continue to escalate in the future.  Moreover, if cost estimates for the plutonium fuel option continue to rise, it is conceivable that the option of buying Russia ’s excess plutonium and then paying to have it immobilized will ultimately prove to be competitive.[41]

• Since existing reactors and demonstrated fuel approaches are available, disposition of excess weapons plutonium should not wait for (or pay much of the costs of) the development, licensing, and construction of new types of reactors (such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors or new liquid-metal cooled reactors) or the development, licensing, and implementation of new fuel types (such as proposed thorium-plutonium-uranium fuels).  But such new reactors and fuel types may well be promising subjects of research and development for the future of nuclear energy.  A modest joint U.S.-Russian cooperative program to develop such advanced concepts – including, as much as possible, the participation of former nuclear weapons experts who are no longer needed for weapons purposes – would make sense, as an item to be funded separately from disposition of excess weapons plutonium.  Should such new reactors or fuels be developed and become available while there is still excess plutonium that needs to be eliminated, their use for disposition of that plutonium should certainly be considered.

• There are a variety of possible approaches worth considering for simply purchasing Russia ’s excess weapons plutonium – as the United States is now purchasing HEU from dismantled Russian weapons.  If Russia were willing to sell (senior Russian officials have said different things on this point at different times) the cost would likely not be astronomical.  If the buyer – the United States or other countries participating in the G-8 Global Partnership – were willing to pay the same amount per ton as the United States is now paying for HEU, then 50 tons plutonium (enough for over 10,000 nuclear weapons) would cost just over $1 billion.[42]  This would be a generous offer, since in the current market the plutonium’s actual commercial value is negative (the costs of securing it and making fuel from it are much higher than the value of the fuel).  The buyer, however, would presumably then have the right to remove the material from Russia for immobilization or use as fuel elsewhere, or to pay for it to be immobilized or used as fuel within Russia.  In the case of a U.S. purchase, for example, it might be possible to build only one plutonium fuel fabrication plant, rather than one in the United States and one in Russia .  A wide range of difficult political and legal questions would have to be addressed – along with some technical and economic questions – before such a purchase could become a reality, but it remains something that should be considered. 

  A somewhat similar proposal is to offer a substantial financial incentive, perhaps $10,000 per kilogram ($500 million for 50 tons) for Russia to deposit its plutonium in a facility in Russia with international (rather than purely national) guards and monitors, and, for reciprocity, have the United States deposit its excess plutonium in a facility in the United States under similar arrangements.[43]  A more radical idea is to set up a single facility in some third country, where all the U.S. and Russian excess material – and perhaps excess warheads as well – would be stored.[44] Obvious obstacles to that concept include obtaining the agreement of Russia , the United States , and the third country.

• Recommendation: Move ahead with the currently planned approaches to disposition of excess weapons plutonium, while exploring complements or alternatives to the current approaches, including:

  a. Initiate discussions of a "plutonium swap" approach, using existing plutonium fuel fabrication facilities and reactors already burning civilian plutonium fuel, which could burn weapons plutonium fuel instead.

  b. Pursue options for burning part of Russia ’s excess plutonium in reactors outside of Russia , including through leasing arrangements.

  c. Restart development of plutonium immobilization technologies.

  d. If advanced reactors and fuel cycles are developed and built for other purposes, consider their use for disposition of whatever excess plutonium remains at that time.

  e. Consider options for purchasing Russian excess plutonium stockpiles.

Maintaining stringent security throughout the process.  Nuclear material is more difficult to secure and account for when it is being transported and processed in bulk than when it is being stored at a secure storage facility.  Hence, to ensure that disposition of excess plutonium in fact reduces nuclear theft threats over the long term rather than increasing them, it will be essential to ensure that very high levels of security and accounting are maintained throughout the process.  The theft of nuclear material from a process that was only taking place because of U.S. and international support provided to promote arms reduction and nonproliferation – causing, rather than preventing proliferation – would not only be a security disaster, but also a political catastrophe for the entire threat reduction effort.  Achieving the needed levels of security and accounting for nuclear material will be more difficult and more costly if such issues are dealt with as an add-on after the entire approach has been designed.  It would be much better to design them in from the outset, and the United States should initiate discussions with Russia and its other international partners to do so.

• Recommendation:Begin now to plan in detail for maintaining very high levels of security and accounting throughout the disposition process.

Large remaining military plutonium stockpiles.  The 34 tons of Russian weapons plutonium covered by the PMDA, even with up to four tons of reactor-grade plutonium blendstock added, represents less than a quarter of Russia's total stockpile of separated plutonium (military and civilian).  The stockpile of plutonium Russia has still reserved for weapons use is enough to support a Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile.  Disposition of excess Russian plutonium will only make a major contribution to its main purposes – making nuclear arms reductions more difficult to reverse, and reducing the risk of theft – if a much larger fraction of Russia's plutonium eventually goes through similar processes.  This is an issue the Bush administration has been working to address.  At their May 2002 summit, President Bush and President Putin agreed to establish a joint working group on expanded disposition of weapons plutonium and weapons uranium.  That group's initial report called for continued exploration of concepts for burning MOX from additional plutonium in Russian reactors, and possible export of MOX from additional plutonium – but given the difficulties of making arrangements for the first 34 tons, there has been little Russian enthusiasm for serious discussions of what would be done with still larger quantities of plutonium.

• Recommendation: The United States and Russia should work toward putting in place agreements to reduce their total stockpiles of nuclear warheads – not just those deployed on active strategic systems – to low levels, and to reduce their fissile material stockpiles to the levels necessary to support the agreed remaining number of warheads.

• Recommendation: Arrangements for disposition of the 34 tons of plutonium covered under the PMDA should be designed to be scaleable, so that they can handle substantially larger amounts of plutonium in the future, if necessary.  For example, consideration should be given to designing the proposed MOX plant with enough extra space to allow an additional MOX line to be added in the future, if needed.

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Written by Matthew Bunn. Last updated by Matthew Bunn on October 3, 2003.

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The Securing the Bomb section of the NTI website is produced by the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) for NTI, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. MTA welcomes comments and suggestions at atom@harvard.edu. Copyright 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

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