Preventing Implosion in Sudan
1. The Current Situation
2. What Should Be Done
3. Crisis Group Resources
Photo: UNMIS troops from Zambia patrol the Abyei area in the wake of the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the borders of Abyei, 27 July 2009 (Reuters).
Updated January 2010
Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup. The main mechanisms to end conflicts between the central government and the peripheries – the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement – all suffer from lack of implementation, largely due to the intransigence of the National Congress Party (NCP). Less than thirteen months remain to ensure that national elections in 2010 and the South Sudan self-determination referendum in 2011 lead to democratic transformation and resolution of all the country’s conflicts. Unless the international community, notably the U.S., the UN, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the Horn of Africa Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), cooperate to support both CPA implementation and vital additional negotiations, return to North-South war and escalation of conflict in Darfur are likely.
Since 2005, such political goodwill as the NCP and the SPLM may have had to implement the CPA when they signed it on 9 January 2005 has dwindled, if not totally vanished. The NCP has not created an environment for peaceful democratic transformation throughout Sudan and has in effect done everything possible to discourage SPLM interest in what happens outside the South. As a result, the GNU is no longer a partnership. The SPLM has given up on reform of the center, and its leader Salva Kiir in October 2010 for the first time openly called for Southern secession. The little remaining collaboration is tactical, focused on those CPA elements that protect each party’s own interests.
Several key provisions of the CPA remain unimplemented as the NCP has continued to use its national assembly majority to obstruct both the South’s secession and meaningful political reforms in the North. Important provisions on power and wealth sharing, resolution of the conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, organisation of free and fair elections and security arrangements have not been implemented.
The 2010 national elections were meant to encourage political inclusion and make unity acceptable to the South, but now have little chance of achieving what they were originally set out to do. Originally scheduled for 2008, and no later than July 2009, they have been pushed back to April 2010. The elections are not only challenging logistically, but the precarious security situations in Darfur and parts of the South makes it difficult to hold a credible vote in these areas. Several other key issues remain unaddressed: the Government of South Sudan, Southern Kordofan and JEM have rejected the recent census, claiming it has been manipulated to over-represent NCP constituencies. Some two million Darfuri IDPs could be prevented from voting as they have doubts about registering to vote before being allowed to return to their home areas. The Carter Center has also noted several other irregularities in the registration process, mainly favouring the NCP. Flawed, illegitimate elections, which now seems likely, would only escalate conflict and violence, and the poll should be pushed back to November.
The Southern self-determination referendum is to be held no by 9 January 2011, with polls indicating that southerners will overwhelmingly vote for secession. The contentious issue of the demarcation of the 1956 North-South border first needs to be solved, however, and there are growing signs of internal tensions in the South over the form secession would take. If the referendum does not go ahead as scheduled the South will most likely declare unilateral secession, plunging Sudan into a new civil war. The South must, however, not rush to complete separation, if it wants to avoid becoming a failed state. A post-referendum transition period is needed so that pre-referendum agreements establishing the terms and modalities of peaceful secession can be properly implemented.
The security environment has seriously worsened, particularly in the South, where the UN reported in June 2009 that the death rate had exceeded that of Darfur in the early part of the year. In October, the UN reported serious deterioration in six of ten South Sudan states, and were forced to organise armed protection for its staff. Darfur remains unstable and unpredictable, despite more and strengthened units of the UN/AU mission UNAMID. Sporadic clashes between government forces and SLM, as well as intra-tribal violence, have continued, leaving dozens dead in late 2009.
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In its latest report, Sudan: Preventing Implosion (17 December 2009), Crisis Group made the following recommendations for 2010:
It is essential to move rapidly on a number of fronts, including to negotiate a Darfur peace agreement that allows all Darfuris to vote in national elections; to implement legal reforms necessary for a free and fair national election process; and to agree on the commissions for the South’s self-determination referendum and the Abyei referendum. Time is also required to negotiate a framework for the negotiations over how two highly interdependent states will relate to each other, were the South to decide in its referendum for independence, as appears quite certain. This should cover two periods: first, from the day after the referendum to July 2011, when the CPA’s interim period ends; and secondly, for a further several years – perhaps the four-year equivalent of a parliamentary term – to complete implementation of the peaceful transfer of sovereignty and decide numerous practical details. The NCP and SPLM should negotiate this framework as early as possible in 2010.
These processes require strong, united international facilitation, as well as support from other major political forces in Sudan. Cooperation can be promoted by providing significant economic and political incentives for the NCP, the SPLM and Darfuri rebel groups and by isolating and sanctioning recalcitrant parties. The current U.S. initiative goes part way toward what is needed but is not comprehensive enough. The U.S., China, other members of the UN Security Council, members of the AU Peace and Security Council and IGAD member states should cut through the welter of multiple facilitators by agreeing to support an individual of international stature to lead the several negotiations with a view to reconciling the paths of the Sudan peace process. The ideal sequence would be along the following lines:
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implementation early in 2010 of outstanding major pre-electoral CPA benchmarks: legal reforms guaranteeing basic freedoms of expression, association and movement; demarcation of the 1956 North-South border, including Abyei; and agreement on the commissions for the South’s self-determination referendum and the Abyei referendum;
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completion on the basis of the recommendations of the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) by April 2010 of a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive security arrangments, monitored by the international community;
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negotiation of a new CPA protocol by June 2010 to allow fair Darfuri participation in elections; establish post-election transitional arrangements to administer the South’s referendum and the new Darfur ceasefire and security arrangements; decide the process, if necessary, for transfer of sovereignty to an independent South; and create a strong international mechanism to monitor and support these terms and other CPA elements; and
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postponement of general elections to November 2010, along with adoption of a constitutional amendment by July 2010 to authorise extension of the term of the present GNU through those elections or, in the event that they are further postponed, to July 2011, and incorporate the terms of the post-referendum transition.
The lead mediator should mobilise support for the above by brokering an agreement between the U.S., China, the AU, European Union (EU), UN and the Arab League in particular on incentives (eg, financial aid, lifting of sanctions, deferment of ICC action) and disincentives (eg, further sanctions, increased isolation, national arms embargo) to be applied to the parties depending on their actions. International support for the elections and its results should be conditioned on the credibility of the process.
Progress should be monitored closely and a decision taken by July 2010 at the latest whether it has been sufficient to maintain the full agenda. If implementation again lags badly, it will be necessary to concentrate on achieving the minimum essential to prevent return to deadly chaos, namely ensuring that the South’s referendum is held on schedule, and a day-after arrangement is in place. Elections would consequently have to be postponed until such time after January 2011 as the Darfur peace process had advanced adequately; delay in other CPA benchmarks such as governance reforms might also have to be accepted reluctantly.
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3. Crisis Group Resources
Recent Crisis Group reports on Sudan
Click here to access all Crisis Group reports on Sudan.
Recent Crisis Group commentary on Sudan
Crisis Group multimedia
Podcast: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, 19 January 2010.
Multimedia Presentation: Preventing Implosion in Sudan. An interactive presentation on Sudan, including a video interview with Louise Arbour, interactive maps and timelines, and extensive background information to the conflict.
Other Crisis Group Resources
For extensive information and resources related to Darfur, visit our "Crisis in Darfur" advocacy page
For more information on the ICC and the indictment against President Omar al-Bashir, visit our Peace and Justice page.
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