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A Way Forward for Zimbabwe

A Way forward for Zimbabwe

1. The Current Situation

2. What Should Be Done

3. History of the Crisis

4. Crisis Group Analysis

5. News and Other Reporting

6. Important Documents and Websites

Picture: President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai make a rare show of unity at a press conference, Harare, 23 December 2009. REUTERS


updated March 2010

1. The Current Situation

Overview

A year after Zimbabwe’s unity government was formed reasonable progress has, against the odds, been made on restoring some social and political stability, but significant threats remain that could still derail the reform process. Especially still powerful hard-line security officials – President Robert Mugabe’s last reliable supporters – continue to resist and veto the democratic transition. South Africa, backed by the international community, must press all involved parties to see the transition through to a successful conclusion. Donors should back their efforts.

The unity government was formed in February 2009, ten months after the violent and disputed 29 March 2008 elections. Morgan Tsvangirai’s wing of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) announced it would enter the government alongside Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and the splinter MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M) faction. This followed an extraordinary summit of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on 26 January 2009, whose final communiqué called for Tsvangirai to be sworn in as the prime minister by 11 February and the remainder of the government two days later.

The inclusive government was born under a cloud of scepticism, with most observers predicting that Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule and destroy” strategy. They believed the agreement to be essentially unworkable since it created two centres of power within a single government, but left most real political and military authority with Mugabe, and accused the African Union (AU) and the SADC of being too accommodating of Mugabe during negotiations.

But, one year later, it is clear that the unity government is making discernible, if slow and painful, progress in a number of areas. Schools and hospitals have reopened; civil servants are being paid; goods have returned to store shelves; and the cholera epidemic has been controlled. Human rights activists have also reported a significant drop in abuses, as arbitrary and political detentions have declined, though not disappeared completely. The ravaged economy has also improved, with Zimbabwe noting a 4.7 per cent GDP growth in 2009, the first positive totals in a decade. Since the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended and the U.S. dollar and South African rand adopted as legal tender, inflation has fallen from a staggering 231 million per cent in July 2008 to a 6 per cent average in 2009.

The economy cannot, however, be restored to health through technical measures alone, but the political reforms envisaged in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) are needed. There has been gradual progress on the GPA’s implementation, helped by the regional engagement of the SADC after the MDC in October 2009 suspended participation in the unity government to protest ZANU-PF’s intransigence. Independent commissions have been formed to address media, human rights and election issues, and a land audit may soon begin to address the sensitive area of land reform. But a number of GPA issues remain outstanding, and the challenges of crafting a new constitution and moving towards elections could yet cause the inclusive government to collapse.

There are other serious threats to the transition. Security sector reform, firmly rejected by Mugabe, has emerged as a key challenge. Failure to initiate this process could unravel the inclusive government, prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so senior military and intelligence figures (the “securocrats”) are still believed to hold de facto veto power over any real transition, and opposes Tsvangirai leading the country, even if he wins an election. The broader challenge of developing a political system where ZANU-PF and MDC-T balance political competitiveness with cooperation in governance must also be met. This will be particularly difficult as long as the divisive Mugabe remains at the helm.

South African President Jacob Zuma and the SADC need to press the parties, and especially Mugabe, to see the transition to a successful conclusion. Zuma’s recent actions are welcome indications that he will be tougher vis-à-vis Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for the rule of law. The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., EU and China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts through careful calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition; and lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. Western donors should back their efforts, including by expanding assistance, keeping targeted sanctions on spoilers but also by ending sanctions on firms important for economic growth.

Concise monthly summaries of the situation in Zimbabwe are available in Crisis Group's monthly bulletin, CrisisWatch.

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2. What should be done?

In its briefing, Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government (20 April 2009), Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

  • Donors should pursue a “humanitarian plus” assistance strategy that covers the priority areas in the government’s Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), including revival of the education, health and water sanitation sectors, as well as a functioning civil service, and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. Zimbabwe should be treated as a post-conflict society in need of some front-loaded aid. Donors might also create a contact group, both to support the political process and to coordinate aid flows.
  • SADC countries, most significantly South Africa, should also provide more direct assistance but require strict compliance with the GPA and avoid in particular direct support to the Reserve Bank, which remains in the control of Mugabe loyalist, Gideon Gono, and could be expected to divert it to ZANU-PF patronage networks.
  • Support is also needed for programs to reform politicised legal institutions, including the judiciary, and strengthen civil society that has been deeply fractured in recent years, including religious, press, labour, academic, women’s and youth groups. SADC and the Commonwealth secretariat might work together to build parliament’s legislative and oversight capacities.
  • To counter the greatest and very real stability risk – an attack against Prime Minister Tsvangirai or a military coup – a strategy is needed to retire virtually all members of the security sector senior leadership. Persuading them to go peacefully will not be easy: the generals fear the post-Mugabe era. The government could create leverage with a law that offers immunity to senior generals from domestic prosecution for past political crimes (excluding crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide) in return for retirement. At the same time, it should create a panel tasked to recommend the modalities for setting up transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth commission and vetting processes as part of security sector and other administrative reforms.
  • The U.S., EU and others could, in accordance with their laws, sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who accept and comply. The new South African president, working with the SADC mediation team, should negotiate with the generals, making clear that those who do not step aside risk prosecution for their crimes domestically or internationally.

For the policy briefing in full, please click here.

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3. History of the crisis

Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections are the latest episode in the country's deepening political and economic crisis. The policies, corruption and repressive governance of President Robert Mugabe – in power for 28 years – and his ZANU-PF party bear primary responsibility for the severe economic slide, growing public discontent and Zimbabwe's international isolation.

Mugabe, with his ZANU party, came to power in 1980 as Africa’s most feted leader, after a UK-brokered agreement ended a protracted guerrilla war against the white minority government of Ian Smith. The early 1980s were marked by a five-year brutal repression in Matabeleland and Midlands against the minority Ndebele population that supported rival ZAPU. ZAPU was later forced into a merger, leaving Mugabe head of a de facto one party state, under ZANU-PF, by 1987.

State violence escalated since early 2000, when Mugabe lost a constitutional referendum on presidential powers and controversial land reforms, as the people voted in clear protest. The forcible acquisition of mostly white-owned farms by ZANU war veterans – beginning in the 1990s – also spiked after that electoral defeat, Mugabe’s only, crippling the economy and leading to chronic shortages of basic commodities. In the context of spiraling inflation and 80 per cent unemployment, the government launched “Operation Murambatsvina” in 2005 to forcibly clear urban slums, depriving over 18 per cent of the population of their homes or livelihoods.

The opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) entered the political scene in 2000, but failed to break Mugabe’s majority in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Elections in 2002 and 2005 were marked by gross manipulation and suppression of dissent. The MDC split in November 2005 over whether to boycott elections for the newly formed senate.

After a brutal government crackdown on the opposition in March 2007, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mandated South African President Mbeki to mediate between the government and the MDC – aiming to secure a new constitution and free and fair conditions for elections. Talks stalled in January 2008, when Mugabe called snap polls for March despite the MDC's call for postponement until new constitution adopted.
 
On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe held combined presidential and parliamentary elections marred by extensive pre-poll manipulation. Only "friendly" countries and institutions were invited to observe the polls and most Western media were barred. Despite the skewed playing field, Zimbabwe's people clearly signaled their rejection of the status quo: for the first time, ZANU-PF lost control of parliament to the MDC, which made unprecedented gains in rural areas.  

Yet rather than let democracy run its course, Mugabe and his hardline supporters moved to force victory, withholding the results of the presidential election and launching a countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation. Tsvangirai withdrew from a second round presidential run-off set for 27 June over election violence, leaving Mugabe open to claim his sixth term in office on 29 June. Amid rising international condemnation, talks between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions began on 24 July under the mediation of South African President Mbeki. After stop-start negotiations, a power-sharing deal between Mugabe and Tsvangirai was eventually signed on 11 September. Yet implementation has quickly stalled and as the humanitarian situation for the majority of Zimbabweans continues to worsen, a new political approach urgently required. For more detail on recent developments, see The Current Situation above.

Zimbabweans continue to face economic turmoil and corruption, severe food shortages and the collapse of vital services. HIV/AIDS among adults stands at over 20 per cent, while a mounting cholera epidemic has left over 1,500 dead. By January 2009 the annual inflation rate stood at over 200 million per cent – the world's highest by far – making day-to-day life for Zimbabweans increasingly difficult.  The government’s sticking plaster approach – including removing ten zeros from the Zimbabwean dollar in August 2008 – has done little to stem the economic crisis. Up to a third of the population is thought to have fled over recent years, and remittances from the growing diaspora have become a lifeline for many remaining.

For more information, see our Zimbabwe conflict history

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4. Crisis Group analysis

Crisis Group's publications on Zimbabwe

For a month by month report on developments in Zimbabwe since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch Database.

Other Crisis Group resources

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5. News and other reporting

News sources with regular coverage of events in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe news sources

Reports & articles by other organisations

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6. Important documents and websites

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) launched an initiative in March 2007 to facilitate a negotiated political solution.

  • Communique, 2008 Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Sandton, South Africa, 9 November, 2008
  • Communique, 2008 Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Lusaka, 13 April 2008
  • Communique, 2007 Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Lusaka, 16-17 August 2007
  • Communique, 2007 Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Dar es Salaam, 28-29 March 2007

The U.S., the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland have placed targeted sanctions on Mugabe’s regime.

In 2005, Mugabe’s government launched Operation Murambatsvina, which purported to eradicate "illegal dwellings" and "illicit activities". The UN report below documents the impact of the destruction that followed.

  • Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 25 July 2005. 

Zimbabwe Legal Documents

Websites

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Podcast

Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition

21 April 2010: Donald Steinberg, Crisis Group's Deputy President for Policy, talks about the transition in Zimbabwe, the challenges the country faces and how the international community can support the democratic process. Listen