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Security in Afghanistan

Security in Afghanistan

1. Current situation

2. What should be done

3. Background to the conflict

4. Crisis Group analysis

5. News and other reporting

6. Important documents

Photo: Afghan police stand in a line during a joint patrol with U.S. and Canadian troops in the town of Howz-E-Madad, 10 October 2007. Goran Tomasevic/REUTERS

updated 9 December 2009

1. Current situation

President Hamid Karzai’s re-election on 2 November 2009, following widespread fraud in the 20 August presidential and provincial polls, has delivered a critical blow to his government’s legitimacy. The deeply flawed polls have eroded public confidence in the electoral process and in the international community’s commitment to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Concentration of power in the executive to the exclusion of the legislature and judiciary has also resulted in a fundamental breakdown in governance while strengthening the hand of the insurgency. To restore stability, vigorous constitutional reform under the aegis of a loya jirga must be undertaken; an impartial commission of inquiry into the flawed elections should be formed; the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) should be restructured to restore credibility; and prompt steps must be taken to strengthen institutions.

The 20 August presidential and provincial elections were declared “successful” by both the Afghan government and the U.S., despite the significant Taliban violence that preceded the poll date. At least 30 people were killed on election day alone, and several provincial candidates and campaign workers were killed leading up to the elections, while intimidation resulted in several female candidates withdrawing from the contest. Allegations of systemic fraud emerged even before Karzai and his chief challenger, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, each declared victory within 24 hours of the polls’ closure. Reports of intimidation, ballot stuffing, ghost polling stations and interference by staff of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and candidate agents surfaced countrywide, but especially where insecurity led to an absence of female electoral staff, candidate agents and election observers. Turnout was far below the eight million in the 2004 presidential elections.

Preliminary results released on 16 September 2009 indicated Karzai as the winner with 54.6 percent of the vote to 27.7 percent for Adbullah. But a protracted investigation by the independent Electoral Complaints Commission into hundreds of reports of fraud disqualified almost a quarter of the vote and pushed Karzai’s toll below 50 percent. Following intense pressure from mainly the U.S., Karzai agreed to a run-off vote against Abdullah, only for Abdullah to on 1 Nov announce that he would not stand again. Abdullah claimed a fair vote was impossible after Karzai had refused to sack the “biased” head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The IEC declared Karzai the winner by default on 2 Nov, while Abdullah almost immediately announced he would refuse to join the new administration, and the chances for a negotiated power-sharing government are slim.                                    

With the elections having raised serious doubts about the leigitmacy of his presidency, Karzai now faces a critical test of his willingness to end corruption and cronyism. There is little evidence he will pass this test, as it will be very difficult for Karzai to accommodate the demands of his allies, an amalgam of religious conservatives, tribal strongmen, factional leaders, regional power-brokers, powerful businessmen and local chieftains. The international community must press harder for anti-corruption measures. Intense pressure on Karzai caused the President to promise a focus on curbing corruption in his inauguration speech on 19 November, while the government days earlier had announced the creation of a new high-level anti-graft body. The international community are, however, also perceived by Afghans as an active participant in the flawed electoral process. Although the elections were ostensibly under sole Afghan stewardship, UNAMA was heavily involved in planning, preparations and logistics.

It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of deteriorating security on the polls. Violence has steadily risen in Afghanistan during 2009, and the weeks before and after the poll date saw the worst levels of violence since the invasion in 2001. At least four candidates for the provincial elections were killed, and many more attempts were made. The Taliban announced towards the end of July that they would attempt to “disrupt the elections”, and subsequently launched a wave of attacks across the country, but particularly in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Security incidents have continued at a high level after the polling date. July saw at least 71 ISAF troops killed, the highest monthly toll since 2001, and UN figures show that 1,013 civilians were killed between January and June 2009, up from 818 in the same period in 2008. While Taliban influence has grown significantly within the last two years, much of the insecurity stemmed from Kabul’s failure to deploy sufficient numbers of competent police and soldiers. The elections were preceded by a large increase in foreign troops, with the U.S. committing 21,000 extra military personell before the elections, and NATO contributing a further 5,000, all mostly deployed in the south and east. On 1 December, U.S. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, which included the deployment of a further 30,000 U.S. troops and a tentative exit plan for July 2011.

The electoral fraud was a direct consequence of failure to build the capacity of governmental institutions. After the successful 2004 elections, the international community (UNAMA in aprticular) and the Afghan government failed to build up the Independent Electoral Commission, strengthen the legal framework (including replacing the inappropriate Single Non-Transferable Vote System), and produce a sustainable voter registry. Failure in wider institutional strengthening, such as disarmament programs and judicial and police reforms, has also increased popular disillusionment. The lessons learned must be used to ensure a much strengthened process for the planned 2010 National Assembly and district elections.

The political system itself is also in need of serious reform. It is now highly centralised and largely based on patronage, bringing personalities rather than policies to the fore. President Karzai wields enormous powers as head of state and has encouraged an ever-growing culture of impunity. The role of political parties has become increasingly marginalised. There now needs to be a focus on how the political system can be made more functional and representative. Broad agreement is needed on a balance of power among the branches of the state, among which the relationship is now very poor, as well as on identifying which body is the ultimate constitutional arbiter, and on ensuring a more appropriate role for political parties.

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2. What should be done

In the 25 November 2009 briefing Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance, Crisis Group made the following recommendations for measures to urgently be put in place:

  • restrictions on the size of the cabinet, and thorough vetting of cabinet and provincial governor appointees, barring nominees with demonstrated links to armed groups or criminal activities from joining the government;
  • the formation of an impartial commission of inquiry composed of respected Afghan and international experts to conduct a thorough public review of the 20 August 2009 elections; the National Assembly’s use of its full sanctioning powers against those suspected of abusing their offices to influence the polls; and vigorous criminal prosecution by the attorney general and courts of those involved in flagrant violations of the law, whether candidates, IEC staff or government officials;
  • consultations among relevant Afghan and international actors to achieve consensus on immediate steps to strengthen the machinery for the 2010 elections, including the timely delineation of district boundaries for district council elections; enhanced penalties for misuse of state resources during the campaign; clarification of the shape and scope of the IEC and ECC to build sustainable mechanisms to enforce electoral standards and arbitrate disputes; and reconstitution of the IEC Secretariat and IEC Board with the involvement of parliament and other stakeholders in the appointment process;
  • convocation of a loya jirga with the express purpose of undertaking constitutional reform, including consultations on the role of the Supreme Court; separation of powers by enhancing the independence of the judiciary and legislature; and the strengthening of provincial and district level governance through a meaningful devolution of authority and resources; and
  • resignation of UNAMA chief and SRSG Eide, since he has lost the confidence of many on his staff and the necessary trust of many parts of the Afghan polity, accompanied by a thorough re-evaluation of UN ELECT’s advisory role with the view to ensuring more robust support for Afghanistan’s electoral institutions and processes.

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3. Background to the conflict

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda was the latest manifestation of a conflict that had been running for nearly three decades. Afghanistan was first invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979, which withdrew in 1989 after a decade of fighting with anti-communist mujahidin. With continuing factionalism among the mujahidin, the Taliban eventually seized power, controlling about 90 per cent of Afghanistan's territory and permitting al-Qaeda to operate freely from there, until U.S. and allied military action following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

In December 2001, leaders from the Afghan opposition and diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, and drew up plans for a political transition starting with a provisional government structure, which led to the naming of Hamid Karzai as chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) on 22 December 2001. The AIA held a nationwide Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in June 2002, and Karzai was elected president of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan (see Crisis Group’s May 2002 report, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward?). In December 2003, the Transitional Authority held a second nationwide Loya Jirga in Kabul to debate a draft Constitution, which was ultimately adopted in January 2004 (see Crisis Group’s December 2003 report, Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga). After threats of boycott, violence and claims of fraud the first ever direct presidential election on 9 October was largely succesful (see Crisis Group's November 2004 report, Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections). Parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005; exclusion of political parties from electoral process may compromise the strength of the legislature (see Crisis Group's May 2006 report, Afghanistan's New Legislature: Making Democracy Work).

Militant violence has risen steadily over the past years to reach the worst levels since the 2001 invasion. The Taliban have strengthened their hold of the south and east of the country (see Crisis Group's June 2008 report, Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?). The fraudulent August 209 presidential elections dealt a serious blow to the creidbility of the Karzai government, and the political system is in need of significant reform (see Crisis Group's November 2009 report, Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance).

For more background on the conflict, see Crisis Group's conflict history for Afghanistan.

For a month by month report on the conflict in Afghanistan since September 2003, check Crisis Group's CrisisWatch Database.

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4. Crisis Group analysis

Crisis Group's reports

Crisis Group's previous reports on Afghanistan can be found here.

Commentary and other Crisis Group resources

Crisis Group Podcast: "Afghanistan's Post-election Challenges" (25 November 2009)

Crisis Group multimedia presentation: Afghanistan's Elections (18 August 2009)

For a month by month report on the conflict in Afghanistan since September 2003, check Crisis Group's CrisisWatch Database.

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5. News and other reporting

News sources with regular coverage of events in Afghanistan

Useful websites

Useful websites related to the 2009 elections

Recent reports by other organisations on Afghanistan

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6. Important documents

UN documents

i) UN Security Council resolutions

ii) Reports of the UN Secretary-General

iii) UN Office on Drugs and Crime Opium Surveys

iv) Reports of Security Council Committee on Resolution 1267

Constitutional documents

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