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Sri Lanka: After the War

Sri Lanka: After the War  

Picture: Soldiers stand guard near internally displaced Sri Lankan ethnic Tamils at a camp for the displaced in Vavuniya November 21, 2009. REUTERS

1. The Current Situation

2. What Should Be Done

3. Resources

Last updated 17 February 2010

1. The Current Situation

Nine months after the decisive military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), there has been little progress in reconstructing Sri Lanka’s battered democratic institutions or establishing conditions for a stable peace. On 26 January 2010, Mahinda Rajapaksa was re-elected president of Sri Lanka after a campaign marked by violence and conducted in an environment where the rule of law has largely collapsed. Rights groups and the Election Commissioner raised concerns about the widespread misuse of state resources by the Rajapaksa campaign, biased media coverage favouring the incumbent and physical intimidation of the opposition. The 8 February arrest of Rajapaksa’s main presidential challenger, the retired General Sarath Fonseka, has increased levels of political tension and provoked street protests and criticism from both the Buddhist and Christian clergy. Fonseka is due to be court martialed for having conspired against the government while still a member of the military. The government is also considering charging him in a civilian court with corruption and other crimes. During the campaign, Fonseka accused the Rajapaksa family of corruption and raised the issue of war crimes during the final months the war. On the day of his arrest, Fonseka announced he would be willing to provide evidence to a future international inquiry into war crimes charges against the state.

Rajapksa’s election victory seems unlikely to move Sri Lanka in the direction of a sustainable peace. Despite vague promises about the need for reconciliation, Rajapaksa’s post-war policies have deepened rather than resolved the grievances that generated and sustained LTTE militancy. While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control over Tamil political life are historic and welcome changes, the victory over Tamil militancy will remain fragile unless Sinhalese-dominated political parties make strong moves towards a more inclusive and democratic state.

The government’s internment of more than a quarter million Tamils displaced from the Northern Province – some for more than six months – was further humiliation for a population brutalised by months of ferocious fighting, during which thousands of civilians were killed by government shelling and LTTE firing. The return by the end of 2009 of most of the displaced to their home districts, and the increased freedom of movement for the nearly 100,000 still in military-run camps, were important steps forward. However, the resettlement process has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified returns.

The government’s approach to the development and reconstruction of the north and east is also contributing to minority fears and alienation. Government plans remain unclear, with local communities and political leaders not consulted and even donors not informed of overall reconstruction plans. Strong military influence over policies, tight military control over the population and restrictions on local and international NGOs increase the risk of land conflicts, with the strong possibility of demographic changes that would dilute the Tamil character of the north. No real space has been given to Tamil and Muslim political or community leaders in the north and very little in the east.

The Rajapaksa government has initiated no political reforms to address the concerns of Tamils and other minorities. The government-sponsored All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft constitutional reforms has stopped meeting with no sign of an alternative process. Tamil and Muslim parties remain weak and divided, although recent encouraging initiatives to develop a common platform and build trust among Tamil-speaking parties deserve support. Inside and outside Sri Lanka, many Tamils remain angry at the lack of accounting or justice for the thousands of civilians killed in the final months of the war. Most of the million-strong diaspora is still committed to a separate state and many would be willing to support renewed violence.

The brutal nature of the conflict, especially in its closing months, has undermined Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions and governance. All ethnic communities are suffering from the collapse of the rule of law. Disappearances and political killings associated with the government’s counter-insurgency campaign have dropped considerably since the end of the war. Impunity for abuses by state officials continues, however, and fear and self-censorship among civil society activists and political dissidents has grown stronger in the wake of the government’s post-election crackdown on its critics in the media and opposition party activists. The government continues to maintain and use the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Emergency Regulations to weaken its political opposition.

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2. What should be done

  • The Sri Lankan government should take meaningful steps to reestablish the rule of law for all Sri Lankans. Particular measures would include ending emergency rule and abolishing the Prevention of Terrorism Act, establishing the Constitutional Council and independent commissions (especially for police and human rights), depoliticising the judiciary, ending the routine practice of police torture and prosecuting members of the security forces and paramilitaries against whom there is credible evidence of human rights violations.
  • The Sri Lankan government should take steps to normalise life in war-affected areas and address the longstanding and legitimate grievances of Tamil-speaking minorities. This would include reestablishing the primacy of the civilian administration over the military in the north, reducing high security zones, establishing a meaningful process of consultation with Tamil and Muslim leaders on development plans for the north and east, enforcing the language equality provisions of the constitution and maximising the devolution of powers already granted to provincial councils under the thirteenth amendment.
  • The UN and donor governments should coordinate more closely to see that all resettlement from government camps is done according to established guiding principles, and insure a strong role for protection agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Donors should end assistance to any camps where full freedom of movement is not allowed and link additional aid to an effective monitoring role for UN agencies and NGO partners. The government should be encouraged to resettle the long-term displaced Muslim population while limiting the risk of land conflicts between Muslims and Tamils in the north. India, Japan, Western donors, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should work together to see that additional development assistance is tied to an inclusive and transparent planning process for the reconstruction of the north which gives Muslim and Tamil community leaders real decision-making power.
  • The UN and bi-lateral donors should insist on a clear plan for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the more than 11,000 detainees who surrendered from or are suspected of involvement with the LTTE. No work with suspected ex-combatants should be funded until the government has put in a place a proper legal framework that guarantees the rights of the detained and has allowed the ICRC to play its internationally recognised monitoring and protection role.
  • The international community should actively support the establishment of an independent international commission of inquiry into violations of humanitarian law by both sides during the war. Donors should link further development assistance to governance reforms designed to curb impunity and make government accountable to citizens of all communities.

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3 . Crisis Group resources

For Crisis Group resources on the civil war and its aftermath, see:

Select previous Crisis Group Sri Lanka reports:

For all Crisis Group Sri Lanka reports and commentary, click here.

For a month-by-month report on developments in Sri Lanka since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch Database.

For more background on the situation in the country, see our Sri Lanka conflict history.

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