To date (December 23) about 85% of the aircraft wreckage has been recovered, including about 60% of the forward fuselage. According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) there is still roughly 19,000 kilograms of wreckage that has yet to be recovered. The forward section of the aircraft, including the cockpit area, is being reconstructed with the aid of a metal scaffold that was built especially for this purpose. There is still no concrete evidence as to what may have caused the loss of the aircraft. Investigators believe that very high temperatures existed in the forward aircraft area and that various instruments ceased to function before impact. The TSB feels that it could be up to two years before the investigation publishes its report.

Part of the wiring for the inflight entertainment system - which has, incidentally, been certificated by the US Federal Aviation Administration - leads into the cockpit. Since the TSB investigations are focusing on the cockpit area, the decision was taken on October 29 to deactivate the inflight entertainment systems on all our fifteen MD-11s and three Boeing 747s as a precautionary measure, since this system is not essential to flight operations.

Members of the Care Team made contact again in mid-October with those relatives who wanted such contacts to continue. Some ten to fifteen persons are currently working in the Care Team, two or three of them in Halifax. The team is now being led by Jack Brändli.
In the days immediately following the loss of SR 111, the Care Team had over 100 members assisting the bereaved. Delta Air Lines was also closely involved, recruiting some 120 volunteers in the early hours after the accident for its own Family Assistance Team, which has been looking after the relatives of Delta's 53 passengers.

Next of kin were offered an upfront payment of USD 20 000 and travel expenses of USD 3000 immediately after the accident to meet their initial financial needs. So far (up to October 15), a total of CHF 4.68 million has been distributed to 156 families. Swissair contacted the next of kin again this week to offer them a further amount which will bringing total payments (i.e. including any immediate payments made) up to 100 000 Special Drawing Rights or around CHF 195 000. The final compensation paid to each family will be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances concerned.
Swissair has so far received three claims for compensation. Under the US legal system, the amounts claimed tend to be extremely high. If no out-of-court settlement can be reached, the final amounts will be determined by a judge.

The local fishermen have suffered loss of income as a result of the large exclusion zone imposed around the accident site by the investigating authorities. Swissair is aware of the fishermen's situation, and established a CAD 25 000 fund at the end of September to cover their immediate financial needs. The fund is being administered by the local fishermen's associations.

Yes. Although Swissair, like other major airlines, decided in November 1996 to voluntarily abolish the compensation ceilings imposed by the Warsaw Convention, and to determine all compensation for the next of kin of accident victims on a case-by-case basis, the company is still adequately insured. The claims are covered by an insurance pool to which Swissair belongs together with other airlines. Swissair has already received compensation for the loss of the aircraft itself.

The MD-11 has been in production since 1990. A total of 178 are currently in service, and the type has clocked up some 3.5 million flight hours.

Swissair was one of the first airlines to order the MD-11, and received its first aircraft of the type on March 4, 1991. The MD-11s superseded the company's DC-10s.

The aircraft lost off Halifax, HB-IWF, carried the manufacturer's serial number 465 (counting began with the MD-11's predecessor, the DC-10). Swissair took delivery of the aircraft on August 5, 1991. Up until its loss, the aircraft had accumulated 36 041 flight hours and flown 6560 takeoff-and-landing cycles. It had undergone its heavy maintenance check, performed every six years or 30 000 flight hours, between August 21 and September 10, 1997.

Swissair's MD-11s are powered by three Pratt & Whitney PW4462 powerplants.

Swissair was operating sixteen MD-11s at the time of the accident. The company's MD-11 fleet had accumulated a total of around 470 000 flight hours.

Both Swissair's operational standards and workflows and the technical maintenance that SR Technics provides for Swissair's aircraft are of the highest quality and have proved their worth and soundness over the years. Swissair cannot and will not make any basic changes to these tried and trusted procedures without concrete indications from the SR 111 accident inquiry. Similarly, no recommendations to make such changes have been received from either the manufacturers or the authorities. Needless to say, though, a tragedy of this kind tends to make everyone intensify their vigilance and care.

Swissair and its parent company SAirGroup are doing everything to support the investigating authorities in any way they can, to ensure that the cause of the accident is determined as quickly as possible. As soon as findings are available from the investigation that suggest possible improvements, we will act on these immediately, taking all the action required.

The 178 MD-11s in service around the world have a good safety record. Up until our own loss on September 3, there had only been two major incidents involving the type. One was the total loss of a Federal Express MD-11 freighter in a landing accident in Newark in 1997, whose cause was probably not related to the aircraft; the other was an incident with a China Eastern Airlines MD-11 in 1993, where the slats were inadvertently deployed during the flight, causing the aircraft to respond so violently that two passengers lost their lives. Modifications were subsequently made to the relevant lever on all MD-11s to prevent a recurrence of this error. China Eastern Airlines suffered a further MD-11 incident in Shanghai on September 9 of this year, when the nose landing gear collapsed due to a faulty locking mechanism. The aircraft landed on its main landing gear and the forward part of the fuselage. Some of the passengers aboard suffered slight injuries as they were leaving the aircraft via the emergency slides.

Swissair maintains its MD-11 fleet to the highest technical standards. The aircraft constantly undergo improvements, too, based on the Service Bulletins received from the manufacturers. All Airworthiness Directives (mandatory instructions from the aviation authorities) are carefully implemented, and proof of completion of the work concerned is forwarded to the relevant authorities.

Swissair's MD-11s have a good reputation. The aircraft's Pratt & Whitney engines did suffer some temporary problems in 1993. But the MD-11's reliability today is well in line with the high levels recorded by Swissair's other aircraft types. Only two out of every hundred long-haul departures - by MD-11, Boeing 747 or Airbus A310 - suffer technical delays. This is a very good average, all the more so considering that these aircraft are used over 15 hours a day, a very high value for the air transport industry.

Maintenance intervals are generally based on actual flight hours. This ensures that even a more intensively-used aircraft will be properly maintained.

Thirteen Swissair MD-11s have Kapton wiring insulation aboard, including the aircraft which was lost. Three of the fleet have the newer Teflon-Kapton-Teflon insulation material. Up until 1995, almost all aircraft were equipped with Kapton wiring insulation. From then onwards, a switch was gradually made to the Teflon-Kapton-Teflon alternative, which is lighter and less expensive.

Kapton has been rigorously tested and its use approved by the aviation authorities. It has never given cause for concern. It has been replaced by other materials on military aircraft, but on these aircraft it is subjected to greater physical stress, owing to the aircraft's different operating conditions and methods of construction.

All Swissair's MD-11s were delivered from the manufacturers with insulation blankets covered by Mylar. These blankets are designed to provide thermal and sound insulation, and are fitted between the aircraft's outer skin and the cabin walls.

Swissair, like all MD-11 operators, received a Service Bulletin from the manufacturers in October 1997 advising it to replace its Mylar-clad insulation blankets with blankets covered in Tedlar. This, like all Service Bulletins received from the manufacturers, was carefully studied by SR Technics. Service Bulletins are not compulsory and have no deadline by when the work proposed must be completed. They are in no way comparable with an Airworthiness Directive, which is issued by the aviation authorities and must be complied with within a specified timeframe. Needless to say, Swissair follows all Airworthiness Directives to the letter, and also pays due and full regard to all Service Bulletins.

HB-IWF underwent its periodic heavy maintenance visit in August 1997, just before the Service Bulletin on insulation materials was received. It is during heavy maintenance visits that the provisions of Service Bulletins without completion deadlines are usually implemented. The next Swissair MD-11 heavy maintenance visits are scheduled for 1999. These visits will be used to replace the aircraft's Mylar-covered insulation with the Tedlar alternative - unless, of course, other Service Bulletins or Airwothiness Directives are received between now and then.

In view of the controversy surrounding the fire and heat-resistant credentials of insulation materials, the US Federal Aviation Administration has initiated a series of tests designed to identify new materials for such applications. The results of these tests should be known in about six months.

The procedure to follow if smoke is detected in the cockpit of an MD-11 is laid down by the manufacturer. The MD-11 has a Smog Electrical Airsystem Switch which the crew can use to localise the source of the smoke. The switch has three different settings, which each turn off a particular part of the aircraft's electrical and air-conditioning systems. Any changes in the amount of smoke being generated should then help localise the source. Procedures on earlier-generation aircraft sometimes included shutting down all the systems and operating on emergency power only. This procedure is no longer used on aircraft today.

It is not true, as some media have reported, that Federal Express and Delta Air Lines have changed their cockpit smoke checklists following the loss of SR 111.

Smoke detectors are fitted in the toilets and in the cargo hold. The cargo hold is equipped with heat detectors, too. Halon and/or powder fire extinguishers are located in the cockpit, the cabin and the cargo hold. There are further fire extinguishers in each of the three engines.

Flight DL 065 from Manchester to Atlanta did have to make an unscheduled intermediate landing in Shannon, Ireland on October 8. The passengers left the aircraft through the normal exits. The flight was diverted not because of smoke but because a strange smell was detected in the forward part of the cabin. An examination of the aircraft revealed a minor malfunction in the pump on one of the two potable water compressors. The problem was rectified on the spot.

An MD-11 can descend by a maximum of 4500 feet (1400 metres) a minute, though this performance is also dependent on weight and weather conditions. The maximum rate of descent is limited by the aircraft's maximum speed of Mach 0.87: if this speed is exceeded, the aircraft may begin to suffer structural damage.

Yes, but it is extremely risky. And the shorter the runway, the greater this risk becomes. The risk will also increase if the runway surface is wet.

The MD-11 receives the electrical power it needs from three generators. Each generator is fed by one of the three engines. Each generator provides 115 volts of alternating current, along with 28 volts of direct current supplied via a transformer/rectifier. In an emergency, one single generator would still be able to provide all the power required. In the event of a total power failure, the on-board battery can be used to power the most essential instruments needed to land the aircraft safely. Alternatively, an emergency air-driven generator or ADG can be deployed beneath the aircraft's forward fuselage. The ADG provides additional power for landing the aircraft safely. The auxiliary power unit or APU, the small jet engine located in the tail, is only used to provide power while the aircraft is on the ground. It cannot be used in the event of a total power failure inflight, because it would require too much valuable battery power to start it up. Each engine has its own full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) facility. Each FADEC is powered by its own small generator, making it independent of the rest of the aircraft's electrical supply.

The FDR and the CVR are connected to one of the electrical circuits. Neither the FDR nor the CVR has its own emergency power supply in the event of a total power failure on board. There would be little point in providing this anyway, since, if all the electrical systems failed, the supply of data to the recorders would cease, too. The FDR does, however, incorporate a battery to power a transmitter that sends out a signal to help searchers locate it after an accident.

The flight data recorder (which is also known as the "black box") records a number of flight parameters: altitude, speed, attitude, engine performance, the settings of the control surfaces and more. By analysing this information, investigators can accurately reconstruct the flight. The FDR's prime function is to help identify the possible cause of an accident if it occurs.

The cockpit voice recorder records conversations and noises in the cockpit. The data are recorded onto a continuous 30-minute tape: after 30 minutes, the tape begins to record over the earliest parts, so the last 30 minutes are always available.

Swissair has a further recording device in its cockpits. This is the Aircraft Data Acquisition System or ADAS. The ADAS is not designed to be used in accident investigations, so it is not protected against damage like the FDR and CVR are, and it is not equipped with a signal transmission device. The ADAS records around 1500 flight parameters that may be of use for flight safety and aircraft maintenance purposes: if certain data readings exceed prescribed norms, these data can be used either to help identify a technical problem or to help a member of the flight safety team reconstruct a sequence of events together with the crew.

The hydraulic pressure needed to operate the control surfaces and other features of the aircraft is provided by two pumps located at each of the three engines. One of these pumps is the active one, the other is a standby. Even if two engines were to fail, the power from the remaining engine would be sufficient to provide the aircraft with hydraulic pressure.

The Swissair fleet is maintained to the highest possible standards. Cost economies in certain areas of SR Technics have had no impact on the training of its personnel or the quality of its maintenance work. If proof were needed of this, we need only look at the large number of major foreign airlines who entrust SR Technics with the maintenance of their aircraft fleets.

MD-11 maintenance is performed according to the following plan:

Pre-flight Check	after every landing
A-Check	every 700 flight hours
C-Check	every 6000 flight hours
Heavy Maintenance Visit	every 30’000 flight hours or 72 months

The cockpits of aircraft today are designed to be operated by a two-person crew: a third crew member wouldn't have anything to do. In emergency situations more than ever, collaboration between the crew members needs to be as smooth and clear as possible, with each crew member knowing exactly what they are supposed to do within their well-functioning team. The duties previously performed by the flight engineer are now divided upon between the two pilots, who have automatic system monitoring equipment and various other electronic worktools to help them in their tasks.

A group of specialists appointed by then-US President Ronald Reagan to look into the issue in the early 1980s came to the conclusion that a two-person cockpit was no less safe than a three-person one. Short-haul aircraft have been operating with a two-person cockpit for decades now. The two-person cockpit was extended to long-haul aircraft with the Airbus A310.

HB-IWF was carrying 14.5 tonnes of cargo. This consisted mainly of "general cargo", i.e. textiles and spare parts for cars, computers and other machines. Most of Swissair's MD-11s cross the North Atlantic with between 11 and 20 tonnes of airfreight aboard. The cargo on HB-IWF included 38 kilos of dry ice, which is used for keeping foodstuffs cool and is classified as "dangerous goods". The aircraft was also carrying a valuables container (a normal container with reinforced walls and a special lock with a metal seal) that contained normal mail along with 50 kilos of banknotes, one kilo of diamonds, two kilos of watches and 4.8 kilos of jewellery (all weights including packaging). The general cargo included a painting by Picasso which was valued in accompanying documentation at USD 1.5 million. All cargo consignments are automatically insured at USD 20 per kilo, though forwarders also conclude their own insurance policies for their customers.