A-12 Avenger II - The Flying Dorito

The Demise of the A-12 Avenger

The Navy's A-12 Avenger Advanced Technology Aircraft (ATA) was slated to replace current A-6s on aircraft carriers in the mid-1990's. Plans for the Navy's A-12 combat aircraft called for incorporating more advanced stealthy characteristics than were used in the F-117A, as well as significantly greater payload capabilities. But on 7 January 1991, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney canceled the program, in the largest contract termination in DoD history. By one estimate the A-12 had become so expensive that it would have consumed up to 70 percent of the Navy's aircraft budget within three years. The Navy originally planned to buy 620 of the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics aircraft, with the Marine Corps purchasing an additional 238 planes. And the Air Force at one point considered buying 400, at an average cost that was estimated at close to $100 million each. The A-12 was designed to fly faster and further than the A-6E, and carry a large bomb-load in internal bomb-bays to reduce drag and maintain a low radar cross-section. As with the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), the A-12 was expected to have greater reliability than current aircraft (double that of the A-6E), and require half the maintenance manhours. The A-12 proved to be the most troubled of the new American stealth aircraft in large part because of problems found in the extensive use of composites in its structure. These composites did not result in anticipated weight savings, and some structural elements had to be replaced with heavier metal components. The weight of each aircraft exceeded 30 tons, 30% over design specification, and close to the limits that could be accommodated on aircraft carriers. The program also experienced problems with its complex Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar system, as well as delays in its advanced avionics components. The full scope of these problems were not appreciated at the time of Defense Secretary Cheney's Major Aircraft Review, which slowed the production rate and dropped 238 Marine Corps aircraft, leaving the original total Navy buy of 620 aircraft. Cheney also decided to delay for over 5 years the Air Force buy (from 1992 to 1998), which was decoupled from the Navy project. Subsequently, the A-12 contractors revealed that the project faced serious engineering problems and a $2 billion cost overrun, which would delay the first flight by over a year, to the fall of 1991, and raised the unit cost substantially. At first blush, the A-12's performance capabilities would have been in roughly the same class as existing aircraft. The key improvement over existing aircraft, not inherently obvious when comparing specifications, was stealth. While today's radar can detect existing naval aircraft at a range of 50 miles, the A-12 was designed to remain undetected until approximately 10 miles away. This would result in significant operational and survival benefits for the A-12 since defenders would have little opportunity to engage the aircraft once detected so close to the target. The A-12's reduced radar cross section would have been derived, in part, from carrying its ordnance internally. While the top speed of the more visible F/A-18 and A-6 would be significantly reduced by the drag induced by external weapons carriage, the internal weapons bay on the A-12 would provide no impediment to speed. Because it is doubtful that upgraded existing aircraft will be able to fulfill all of the A-12s requirements, Navy officials decided to get fresh bids for a new A-12, dubbed the AX. The Navy estimates the AX to cost $150 million per unit as opposed to the A-12's $165 million price tag. In FY 1992, the AX program will receive over $100 million. To facilitate this program's implementation, the Navy reportedly quizzed the Air Force on how it resurrected the B-1 after President Carter's cancellation. The AX's capabilities were scaled back from those of the A-12. The AX could be termed "A-12 lite" as its range, payload, and particularly its stealth requirements will all be more modest than those of the A-12. The Navy has emphasized the strike role at the expense of the air-to-air mission in the new program, rather than trying to "cover all the bases" and produce an aircraft that could perform numerous roles -- the ambition that proved to be the A-12's undoing.