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Introduction: Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials
Ensuring that every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of nuclear material worldwide is secure and accounted for is the most important step in preventing nuclear weapons terrorism, and a key element in the global struggle to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, are beyond the capabilities of terrorists (and many states) to produce — but with enough of these materials in hand, nearly any state, and some particularly well-organized terrorist groups, could have the potential to make at least a crude nuclear bomb. Keeping these weapons and materials from being stolen in the first place is the key to keeping these items out of the hands of terrorists and hostile states, as finding them or blocking them from being smuggled after they are stolen is an extraordinarily difficult task.
If all of the existing stockpiles can be reliably guarded, nuclear weapons terrorism can be prevented: no material, no bomb. Yet these dangerous nuclear stockpiles exist in hundreds of buildings in scores of countries around the world, with security ranging from excellent to appalling — and there are no binding global standards in place. Urgent steps are necessary to secure the most vulnerable facilities around the world, or move the materials there to secure sites.
Hundreds of millions of dollars a year are being spent to meet this objective, and substantial progress is being made — but much, much more remains to be done. For example, as of March 2003, only about 37% of the potential bomb material in the former Soviet Union had even "rapid upgrades" of its security — bricking over windows, piling blocks in front of doors, and the like — completed, and comprehensive security and accounting upgrades had been completed for only about half of that material.[1]
This section provides information on key international cooperative efforts to improve security and accounting for nuclear warheads and nuclear material around the world[2] — what is being done today, and what urgently remains to be done:
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Material Protection, Control,
and Accounting (MPC&A) Security for hundreds of tons of nuclear material has been successfully upgraded in this U.S.-Russian cooperative effort, making it a highly cost-effective investment in U.S. national security, but most of the work remains to be done. A substantial acceleration of the effort is needed, along with new steps to ensure that effective security is sustained for the long haul. The program has largely completed MPC&A upgrades in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union (though funding continues to sustain security). In the aftermath of September 11, the program is seeking to expand to secure nuclear material in other parts of the world, and to improve controls on the most dangerous radiological sources that might be used in "dirty bombs" as well. |
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Warhead Security The United States and Russia are also cooperating to upgrade security for nuclear warheads in Russia. Substantial strides have been made in improving security for warhead transport, and for storage of Russian naval warheads, but most upgrades for warhead storage have been stymied by disputes over access to these sensitive sites and other bureaucratic obstacles — though these may be about to be overcome. |
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Mayak Storage Facility This massive bunker, to be completed by the end of 2002, will provide secure storage for 25,000 containers of material from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. |
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Converting Research Reactors Over 140 research reactors around the world are still operating with weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU). International efforts are underway to convert these reactors to fuels that cannot be used in nuclear weapons, and return remaining HEU to the countries that provided it. These efforts need to be expanded and accelerated, to reduce the security threat posed by HEU at poorly guarded civilian research facilities. |
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Removing Material from
Vulnerable Sites A number of efforts focus on removing potential bomb material from vulnerable sites. Project Sapphire, for example, airlifted almost 600 kilograms of HEU from Kazakhstan to the United States in 1994, and in 2002 Project Vinca airlifted some 48 kilograms of HEU (enough for 2-3 nuclear bombs) to a secure facility in Russia. What is needed now is a focused, accelerated effort to remove the nuclear material from all of the world’s most vulnerable sites as rapidly as possible. |
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International Nuclear Security
Upgrades In addition to the MPC&A program, which has focused primarily on the former Soviet Union, the United States and other donor countries provide assistance in upgrading security and accounting for nuclear materials in countries around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has programs to coordinate assistance for security upgrades and for accounting upgrades — and in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the IAEA put together an Action Plan to prevent nuclear terrorism, which would increase the pace of these international efforts. For the states outside the former Soviet Union, however, all these international cooperative programs combined are only funded at a few million dollars a year: a substantial expansion would be needed to ensure that the nuclear material at the world’s most vulnerable facilities is removed or secured as rapidly as possible |
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Global Nuclear Security
Standards Negotiations are underway to amend the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to cover nuclear material used and stored within the countries that are party to the agreement, and not just material in international transport — and to strengthen the convention in other ways. There are also IAEA recommendations on security for nuclear materials, which were amended in 1999 and may be changed again. And the new G-8 "Global Partnership to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" has called for strong security for all nuclear material throughout the world. The leading nuclear states now need to join in committing to protect their own nuclear material to an agreed, stringent standard, encouraging other states to join in that commitment, and offering assistance to those willing but unable to afford to do so. |
Links
| Key Resources | |
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Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003). |
| This new report assesses the U.S. budgets for programs to secure nuclear weapons and material (Download 538K PDF), examines how much has been accomplished on that goal to date (Download 847K PDF), and makes recommendations for next steps (Download 500K PDF). | |
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Matthew
Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing
Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate
Action (Cambridge, MA: Managing the Atom Project,
Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, May
2002). Download 528K PDF |
| Provides an analysis of the global threat posed by insecure nuclear weapons and materials, and seven specific recommendations for U.S. government action to address the threat. | |
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Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material (Washington, D.C. and Cambridge, Mass.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, 2000). |
| Detailed report, with photographs, focusing specifically on the former Soviet Union, analyzing the security threats posed by inadequate management of warheads and materials; what was being done as of 2000 to address these threats; and what should be done about them. | |
| Agreements and Documents | |
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Executive Office of the
President, Plan for Securing Nuclear Weapons, Material,
and Expertise of the States of the Former Soviet Union,
March 2003. Download 578K PDF |
| Section 1205 of Public Law 107-107, the FY 2002 Defense Authorization Act, required the President, in consultation with all the relevant agencies, to submit to Congress the administration's plan for eliminating the threat of unsecured nuclear weapons, material and expertise. Included in the plan are descriptions of the several programs to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material (such as the MPC&A program and the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility) on pages 26-46, along with summaries of the programs' accomplishments and key milestones, analyses of the their future and exit strategies, and summaries of recent funding. | |
| FOOTNOTES | |
| [1] | See extensive discussion in the page on the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program. |
| [2] | Efforts that individual states are making to improve security and accounting for their own nuclear weapons and materials are generally closely guarded secrets, so this section does not attempt to provide comprehensive information on such national programs, as important as they are. |
Written by Matthew Bunn. Last updated by Anthony Wier on April 23, 2003.
The Securing the Bomb section of the NTI website is produced by the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) for NTI, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. MTA welcomes comments and suggestions at atom@harvard.edu. Copyright 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.